DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 283 890 UD 025 164

AUTHOR	Bryce-Laporte, Roy S., Ed.; Mortimer, Delores M., Ed.
TITLE	Caribbean Immigration to the United States. RIIES Occasional Papers No. 1. Second Printing.
INSTITUTION	Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC. Research Inst. on Immigration and Ethnic Studies.
PUB DATE	83
NOTE	222p.; For a related document, see ED 278 721.
AVAILABLE FROM	Public Information Office, Department of Anthropology, NHB 363, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560 (free, limit of one copy).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - General (020) -- Books (010) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Acculturation; Blacks; Economic Factors; *Economic Opportunities; Ethnic Groups; Foreign Countries; Haitians; *Immigrants; *Migration; Migration Patterns; Minority Groups; Puerto Ricans; Quality of Life; *Socioeconomic Status
IDENTIFIERS	*Caribbean Islanders; *West Indians

ABSTRACT

Twelve research papers on Caribbean immigrants to the United States are collected in this volume. Their titles (and authors) are the following: (1) "The United States' Role in Caribbean Migration: Background to the Problem" (Roy S. Bryce-Laporte); (2) "International Migration and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Aspects of the Commonwealth Caribbean Situation" (Hilbourne A. Watson); (3) "Migration from the Caribbean to the States: The Economic Status of the Immigrants" (Ransford W. Palmer); (4) "Black Immigrants and the American Ethos: Theories and Observations" (Dennis Forsythe); (5) "Puerto Ricans in the U.S.: Growth and Differentiation of a Community" (Centro de Estudios Puertorriquenos, City University of New York); (6) "Haitian Immigrants in Boston: A Commentary" (Pierre-Michel Fontaine); (7) "West Indians in Los Angeles: Community and Identity" (Joyce Bennett Justus); (8) "The Caribbean Expatriate: Barriers to Returning--Perspectives of the Natural Scientist" (Theodore A. Bremner); (9) "Perspectives on the Total Utilization of Manpower and the Caribbean Expatriate: Barriers to Returning" (Edwin H. Daniel); (10) "Professional Migration: The Brain Drain from the West Indies and Africa--Abbreviated Remarks" (Rawle Farley); (11) "Caribbeans in America: Some Further Perspectives on Their Lives" (Delores M. Mortimer); and (12) "Caribbean Migration to the United States: Some Tentative Conclusions" (Roy S. Bryce-Laporte). Also included are a preface, introduction, notes on contributors, and publications list of the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies (RIIES). (KH)

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Caribbean Immigration to the United States

RIIES Occasional Papers No. 1
Second Printing

Edited by

ROY S. BRYCE-LAPORTE
and
DELORES M. MORTIMER

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Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies
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The Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, founded in 1973, is organized under the Smithsonian's Division of Science. The Research Institute focuses on immigration flows which have been affected by legislation since 1965. It also explicitly includes American extraterritorial jurisdictions among its scholarly concerns.

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Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies

Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., 1983

Caribbean Immigration to the United States

RIIES Occasional Papers No. 1

Edited by
Roy S. Bryce Laporte
and
Delores M. Mortimer

Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 1983 Second Printing

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Smithsonian Institution 1976
Second Printing 1983
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 76-46748

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Preface to the Second Printing, 1983

Soon it will be ten years since the 1973 official founding of the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies. In keeping with its original objectives, the Institute established three series of publications -- bibliographic studies, research notes and occasional papers -- for distribution free of charge to institutions, libraries and individual professionals interested in academic thoughts and research findings on contemporary (post-1965) immigration into the United States and its overseas territories. Since then, it has published, in addition to the series, at least one special monograph, and produced two commercially published works. It has also collaborated in production of other forms of disseminating information on new immigrants, including media, exhibits, conferences, festivals and outreach programs.

The occasional papers, in particular, tend to be thematic, substantive, and specialized toward Caribbean immigration. At this point in time RIIES has published three collections focusing on the Caribbean and has two more forthcoming. (See publications list on page 207.) These occasional volumes are geared to inform on recent and ongoing research or thoughts on specified aspects of Caribbean immigration not hitherto represented in the literature, as well as to indicate some of the scholars involved in their pursuit.

Like most of the other RIIES publications, its occasional papers are frequently sought and cited by researchers, academicians, journalists, students, public administrators, advocates and immigrants themselves. Its earlier volumes have been almost all out of print. In response to continued requests for this

particular volume by a growing readership, in observance of its coming tenth anniversary, and in keeping with its future intentions to narrow its scope and sharpen its focus on the experiences, cultures and contributions of Caribbean immigrants, the Research Institute issues this second but limited printing of its first set of occasional papers *Caribbean Immigration to the United States*.

It is to be noted that this is a second printing, not a second edition; meaning that there are minimal changes beyond correcting typographical and editorial errors detected in the first issue. Serious editorial work has been advanced toward a second edition and separate updated bibliographic effort, but their final disposition will be determined as part of our general considerations about the future of the entire set of Institute publications, especially those with Caribbean foci. This printing, then, is not a perfect or complete facsimile of its prototype. In addition to corrections mentioned, the binding, cover, table of contents, and lists of contributors and publications will show changes or adjustments. The bibliography on Caribbean immigration and the research notes on the U.S. Virgin Islands have been dropped since more updated or advanced works in these areas are now available, but the contents and integrity of all other chapters have been preserved, even when some could benefit from updating of events or data and modification in viewpoints or analyses. The decision to preserve them as they basically are was made in the interest of consistency, historicity and authenticity.

Clearly, important changes have taken place since 1976 when this volume was originally published and distributed as part of the well-known conference on *New Immigration: Implications for the United States and the International Community*, which RIIES held as part of the Smithsonian Institution's Bicentennial celebration of the American Revolution. Among these changes are: the

increase in number of the immigrants and nonimmigrants from nontraditional sources; evidence of international immigration within the socialist bloc and special considerations on the part of China to engage in labor emigration; the heightened and broadened debate on new immigration, especially refugees and illegals; the entry of Grenada into the socialist bloc, the return of the Canal Zone to Panama and other political shifts in the region; the meetings and recommendations of various select committees and U.S. governments; the sponsorship of research and conferences by government and private foundations; the unexpected entry, saga, and disposition of the latest waves of Cuban and Haitian refugees; the general economic malaise in the United States and the rest of the world; high court decisions and recent Congressional actions on refugees and legal and illegal immigration; and, efforts by the Reagan administration to execute a Caribbean Basin initiative and the discomfiture caused by its Falklands decision. Were many of these occurrences to be reconsidered, some of the articles here included would have had to undergo serious changes or additions, an opportunity, no doubt, that these authors will have elsewhere in time. The preservation of these statements as they are, however, to a readership already cognizant of the new situation, allows for a greater appreciation of both the situation and state of scholarship of ten years ago, thus assuring the kind of accumulation of knowledge and perspective of change which is so important to history and the social sciences. After all, U.S. immigration, whether as politics, process, or experience, is an ongoing dynamic activity and so too the scholarship which attends to or emerges from it.

More so than in the earlier publication, all of the authors are of Caribbean origin. As such they provide a unique presentation of insiders' views, and yet a variety of positions notwithstanding. Since then, a number of new scholars, many of similar origin, have been emerging or redirecting their attention

to this body of preoccupations. Quite a few have collaborated and will have published with RIIES by the time that its projected list of publications has been realized.

We at RIIES feel confident that the reprinting of this tenth anniversary issue of *Caribbean Immigration to the United States, RIIES Occasional Papers No. 1* will have proven to merit the effort. We hope it meets the number of requests and satisfies the interests of those who will have read it. For those who may have preferred a full and exact reproduction of the first printing, we regret their disappointment and hasten to note that older copies of that printing are available in many of the major or specialized libraries in the country and other selected places in the world.

Before ending, the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies wishes to express its sincerest appreciation to Stephen Couch, Betty Dyson, Lorraine Krusa, Joan Mentzer, Joyce Mortimer, Katherine Williams and Constance Trombley for their professional advice and technical assistance in the reprinting of the volume.

Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

The Smithsonian Institution was created by an Act of Congress in 1848 to carry out the terms of the will of James Smithson of England, who had bequeathed his entire estate to the United States to "found at Washington ... an establishment for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men."

Today, the Smithsonian Institution is known throughout the world as a special kind of museum which excels as a center of scientific, historical and anthropological research. As a center of higher studies, it has a growing interest in contemporary phenomena. In 1973 the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies (RIIES) was founded within the Division of Science. The Institute's mission was to include consultative services as well as to stimulate, facilitate, disseminate and carry out research on contemporary immigration to the United States. The scope of this work, while focused on movement of major immigrant groups into the continental United States since passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, also included explicit concern with the extra-territorial jurisdictions of the United States as both recipients and donors of contemporary migrants.

As part of its stimulating and disseminating efforts, RIIES has sponsored or participated in various public presentations and professional seminars on the subject of the new immigration to the United States. In addition, it seeks to communicate studied statements of academic scholars and provide direction in the study of those issues and areas concerning contemporary immigration which should be brought to the attention of public officials, private institutions, professional groups, and other members of the general public having special interest in or responsibility for immigration policy or service delivery to immigrant groups.

In the view of the Research Institute, the new immigration represents the newest extension of the continued historical

process of the peopling of the United States. However, this particular movement represents a qualitative change in characteristics and patterns, relative to its pre-1965 predecessors. In general their countries of origin are emergent, developing and either dependent or subordinate in their relations with the United States. Traditional Western and Northern European countries, and even Canada, have been replaced by Mediterranean, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries as the major sources of U.S. immigration. The new immigrants are phenotypically, culturally, and linguistically very visible compared to either the main stock of native-born Americans or the traditional immigrant population. Therefore, they face and pose challenges quite distinct from those of their most recent predecessors. This is so perhaps because of their high visibility and cultural variance. Certainly worries about unemployment and limited economic opportunities, in addition to a growing expression of resistance toward further population growth, also contribute to the distinctiveness of their experiences.

The United States finds itself confronted by the dilemma of an open-door policy tradition toward immigration on the one hand, and on the other hand a growing "politics of resistance" and alarm toward the continuation of such a policy. Unfortunately, the controversy proceeds without reasoned debate or scholarly depth. None of the various sides of the arguments or issues has been fully identified or pursued. Most of the policy research and ensuing recommendations proceed without benefit of a broader examination of the problem. Instead, what is done is to proceed with a limited view of what immigration and its policies mean to the various levels of American society (in short- and long-run terms), or what it means to immigrants themselves, their countries/regions of origin, the larger international economic and diplomatic role of the United States relative to such countries/regions, and the reverberation of all these factors on American society, culture, economy and image. Though undoubtedly significant and complex, such reverberations need not be totally negative or undesirable.

This volume on recent Caribbean migration to the United

States is the first of a series of occasional papers intended to highlight particular angles, areas or aspects of the new immigration within the comprehensive framework through which the new immigration is viewed by the Institute. The Caribbean is not a new source of U.S. immigrants. But, several of the nations now involved figure heavily among the sources of recent immigrants -- legal and illegal. This new migration from this particular area is neither isolated, discrete nor mechanistic. It is not simplistic nor one-sided in causes or consequences, patterns or problems. Perhaps more than any other source area of the new immigration (save perhaps Mexico) the movement of peoples of Caribbean origin to the United States is intrinsically and specifically related to a history of North American policies and attitudes toward that region -- its land, labor force, economy and politics.

Immigrants from the Caribbean or West Indies have made several contributions to the history and development of the United States, in numerous spheres of activity. Individuals from the islands have participated in the early settling of the frontier, the battle for independence, industrial and technological inventions, athletic, artistic and scholarly endeavors, local and ethnic politics, and even diplomacy. Caribbean immigrants and their offspring are believed to hold a disproportionate share of successful and leadership positions among the non-white minorities in this country. And, precisely because they have operated within defined structures of society and have sought to resolve their problems and achieve their ambitions within the context of such superimposed larger ethnic or economic status categories as black, poor, urban, Spanish-speaking, non-white, etc., they are seldom viewed as immigrants or sub-ethnics by the larger society.

It can be said that as a group the people of the Caribbean suffer multiple levels of ethnic invisibility. They suffer much disregard and discrimination, together with native-born blacks and other non-whites. And, even when they may be treated as part of the larger group with certain favors and redresses, their particular needs, concerns and desires as sub-ethnics or as

a composite immigrant group are less known than the successes they achieve and the services they render as *individuals*. At other times the problems they present as a *group* are exaggerated over the contributions and potential they represent. Hence, it is not often considered that a sizeable proportion of the early slave population in the United States was brought from or secured in the West Indies before coming to perform forced labor in the U.S.; that the bulk of the labor force which built and manned American enterprises in Central and South America were from the West Indies; that a sizeable contingent of West Indians entered the U.S. labor market as temporary migrants and permanent residents to provide labor for firms, farms and factories at a time when the local labor supply had been diverted by war needs or saturated by industrial booms. Then, there are many Caribbean peoples who come as U.S. nationals from extra-territorial holdings (such as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands), native-born North and Latin Americans of West Indian ancestry, Cuban and Haitian refugees, and Dominican immigrants (including illegals and part-time students), who continue to contribute to the working and professional forces in this country.

Today there is a general increase in visibility, marked by a heightened awareness of consciousness and identity, among most immigrant and ethnic groups in the United States, perhaps throughout the world. Caribbean peoples are no exception. The latter's increased visibility, however, is compounded by recent circumstances and characteristics which are particular to them; that is, the assertion of Civil Rights and affirmative action demands by non-white minorities in the U.S.; the aggressive pursuit of independence and self-determination by emergent nations in Africa and the Caribbean; the sharp and sudden increase in the number of Caribbean immigrants to the United States; and, the accompanying alarmist outcries from certain elements in this society to such an increase, which is often assumed to be largely illegal and competitive.

In the majority, the papers in this volume were prepared by scholars of Caribbean ancestry or who are indeed immigrants themselves. As a sub-group, they have suffered special forms of

invisibility in the past -- apart from that which they have suffered along with the larger group of which they are a part. Of course, their works tend to be treated with the same general disregard that the policy-making sector directs to the academic community. However, within that latter community itself, they suffer the special denial of outlet, opportunity, legitimacy, and weight reserved for most scholars from so-called minority groups. This, then, further reduces their potential for appealing to important elements of the policy- and decision-making sectors in this country and even in their countries of origin. Yet, immigration is a phenomenon with which Caribbean-originated scholars are intimately acquainted; it is an issue and subject which many have approached with deep professional and political concern even prior to its recent resurgence in prominence among academicians.

Through this collection of papers RIIES wishes to provide the readership with a glimpse of the range of thought and profundity of concern held by many Caribbean immigrant scholars. They neither complete the spectrum of positions nor represent the full breadth of thinking on any given position. The first section is comprised of four papers prepared by members of the Institute staff or participants in its seminars; the second contains solicited papers and commentaries by some of the Caribbean-originated scholars now involved in on-going research about West Indian immigrants or related subjects; and, the third section is a selective bibliography of recent works in the field. Hopefully, both the subject matter herein discussed and the individuals whose ideas are expounded will be seriously considered in the deliberations now taking place on the proper role of the United States in the face of continued migration of Caribbean peoples to its cities and countryside.

RIIES feels deep indebtedness to many persons who contributed to the completion of this manuscript. It here expresses sincere gratitude to Mrs. Constance M. Trombley for her constant commitment to maintaining the highest degree of excellence and professionalism. Appreciation is also extended to Mrs. Bernice Abram and Mr. Joseph Freeman, respectively, of the

Smithsonian Personnel Division and Duplicating Division, and, to Ms. Joyce Mortimer of the Overseas Liaison Committee of the American Council on Education for consultative services as we endeavored to complete this manuscript.

Neither the above nor any of the statements which follow represent official policy or opinion of the Smithsonian Institution. The editors and their fellow contributors hold sole responsibility for their collective and individual works.

Roy S. Bryce-Laporte
Delores M. Mortimer

The United States Role In Caribbean Migration: Background To the Problem[1]

Roy S. Bryce-Laporte

The most comprehensive definition of the Caribbean region is a geographical delineation which includes all the islands located in the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic littoral of mainland countries whose shores are touched by its waters. Technically, this area is referred to as the circum-Caribbean and may sometimes be extended as far west as the Mexican rim of the Gulf, south to the eastern shorelines of Brazil and northwest to embrace Bermuda and parallel rimlands and islands on the North American coastline. The general characteristics of the nations and territories of the area include small, powerless yet developing countries with a background of colonial plantation slave systems. Further, the economies are still dominated by single cash-crops or raw products of basic commodities, service establishments, and foreign investments. Also, for the most part, there is a preponderance of people with noticeable African and/or European ancestors superimposed over an almost extinct Amerindian rural type intermingled with Asians, Jews, Arabs, and other Old World ethnic groupings, thus representing various combinations of racial mixtures.

The area's friendly, cosmopolitan, but generally poor people reflect plural cultures, creolized languages, and are involved in the deepest throes and ferment for economic and political self-determination.

The inter-relationship between the Caribbean territories, especially the islands, and the United States pre-dates the revolution of 1776. From colonial times through the Civil War the islands constituted an important vertex of the triangular Atlantic trade between England, its North American colonies, and its Caribbean holdings. West Indian plantations produced sugar, molasses, spices and rum; gold and jewelry were amassed by raiding English buccaneers who plundered the Spanish Main; and slaves were seasoned for use on the plantations of English colonial North America. The islands also played an important role as a reference point in the anxieties and deliberations which North Americans experienced as they debated the ethics, efficacy, and the economics of slavery, and later, of emancipation.

The shocking success of the Haitian slave revolution, which resulted in the second independent state in the Americas; the calculated emancipation of slaves in the British Caribbean following a four-year period of apprenticeship; the contemplations of Lincoln as well as Delaney and other influential Americans who saw parts of the Central American coastline and the Caribbean islands as targets for black colonization schemes; and actual settlement by small groups of black freedmen in the area represent early forms of special meaningfulness that the Caribbean area has had for the United States.

Perhaps the first official declaration by the United States of special interest in the area took the form of the Monroe Doctrine, which purported to prevent further colonization of the continent by European powers. However, later treaties, policies, and attitudes emerged which not only stabilized the colonial relationship of given areas to given metropolitan states, but elevated the United States to the level of a colonial power as it acquired territories,

proclaimed protectorates, exercised rights of intervention and negotiated rights of transit in the area.

The advances made under a conviction of Manifest Destiny, victories in the Spanish-American War, and the practices of "Big Stick" policy had very clear and telling impacts in the shaping of the history and development of the Caribbean area. With United States acquisition of the Panama Canal and the establishment of banana and other plantation or business systems by American overseas companies in various parts of the region, the islands acquired a new importance within the United States imperialist system. They became a protective flank for its southern underbelly and its Central American interests. Since then, the area has gained an incomparable reputation as the target of a wide assortment of American interventions and, by the Second World War, it was to be the host of a multitude of bases and the United States military might.

In fact, the wider Caribbean region still comprises the only overseas area in the hemisphere with large *de jure* American dependencies, operating civilian American settlement colonies or military enclaves which are subordinated to American Federal regulations and distorted versions of American culture and institutional systems. In most cases, native peoples and alien immigrants are utilized largely as work force, deprived of full American citizenship rights, and suffer discrimination and stigmatization which effect their status with their regional peers. American and alien populations housed or employed in such jurisdictions receive the wrath, envy, distrust, and disdain of their native cohorts. Yet they are treasured as consumers by merchants, sources of revenue by government, and added financial support by relatives and friends.

This situation is further complicated because

for some time in their early development such American enclaves and jurisdictions represented significant centers of employment, facilities, services, and standards not duplicable by the local national governments. Hence, there has developed a similar ambivalent response by the host nations to the settlements and enterprises. In that sense, problems the U.S. had encountered in the use of the Puerto Rican islands of Vieques and Culebra as bombing targets represent similar extremes of the problems posed by Chaguaramas, Guantanamo, the Canal Zone, and Puerto Rico.

Thus, there already exists a special historical United States attitude toward and impact on the Caribbean, which at least implicitly represents a policy, hopefully, of the past. A glance backward suggests that not all but certainly many of the policies and attitudes of the United States toward the Caribbean were based largely on the simple, clear objective of protecting and advancing U.S. interests. Whatever benefits or improvements accrued to the Caribbean states (in return for the special services or resources they were conceived to offer to the United States) were largely incidental or compensatory in nature. However, the one-sided nature of this situation had as much to do with the stagnated colonial status in which most of the islands were found until recently, and a history of both a limited notion of development and a myopic view of governmental commitment or public accountability in the so-called independent states of the region.

The Caribbean region of today increasingly is becoming one of emergent nations, developing economies, and politicized populations. It seems fair to anticipate that the relations between the United States and these countries will not decline but will be intensified and become more delicate. The saliency of America's potential proximity and, in some cases, its presence has heightened and spread among all sectors and corners of the region. Whatever the reactions to this saliency, they do not involve disregard. The United States can expect greater

demands and more intricate designs to be made upon it as Caribbean peoples become more assertive in attempting to define the North American rôle within their programs for self and national interests.

Any effort to formulate or execute a regional policy by the United States in the Caribbean must take into account not only this historical perspective, but contemporary complexities which underlie the region. Despite its many commonalities, the Caribbean must also be seen as a region comprised of states with different levels of political development stemming from varying historical colonial ties. In recent years, some new structures of government and new directions have emerged in their economies, political ideologies, and diplomatic postures. Such complexities minimize the utility of a definition based simply on geographical delineations.

A more appropriate breakdown would have to include (1) the independent island states of the Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, Grenada as well as Guyana and Surinam which are located on the South American mainland; (2) the various island dependencies, including Belice and French Guiana, which operate as non-sovereign states or subdivisions of larger metropolitan systems located outside the Caribbean area, i.e., the United States, Great Britain, France and Holland; and (3) on occasion, those independent mainland states whose offshore islands and Atlantic littoral are closely related to states in the first two categories because of overlapping populations, culture, trade, communication, ethnic identity and growing consciousness of mutual economic and political interests, vis-à-vis the United States.

Finally, a special case must be made for Cuba which, in addition to being an independent island state, represents a socialist revolutionary government with unique ties with the Soviet Union rather than the traditional

capitalist metropoles of the West. Cuba does not merely provide inspirational and subtle support for leftist regimes and revolutionary forces in the region; it also explicitly competes with the United States as a model and center of political influence in the Caribbean -- as each has tried to isolate the other as undesirous and unnecessary to any larger inter-American community of nations. These complexities will have consequences for any attempt by the United States to engage in negotiations, treaties, policy implementations, and monitoring of international agreements in the region.

A specific issue of common concern to the Caribbean is population growth and its associated economic and political problems. Whereas these are still viewable as projected challenges for the future in the United States and some of the mainland states of the Caribbean region, they are perceived as a dilemma facing most of the islands at the present time. Among various approaches tried by Caribbean peoples and their governments in response to the economic imbalance are (1) family planning and birth control programs, (2) economic development, (3) tourism, and (4) voluntary migration.

Since the beginning of the last decade (actually just following the Cuban revolution) the Caribbean area has been contributing an increasing number of "immigrants" (very broadly defined) to the American territories -- the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Some of these people are of legal status, others are not; some locate permanently in the latter areas, but many utilize these islands as stopovers to settle finally in the continental United States. And, the two islands themselves provide a substantial number of immigrants (sociologically defined) to the mainland.

In fact, voluntary migration has been a traditional characteristic of Caribbean people since the middle of the last century. It has been directed toward areas of

employment in times of economic difficulty and to places with political flexibility during times of governmental crisis. It may well be that a migration-mobility syndrome has been absorbed into the ethos of the Caribbean people and is an inadvertent policy of their governments. Both the movement and its syndrome are selective, however. Whether inter- or intraregional, they generally entailed as ultimate targets the traditional capitalist metropolitan states of Europe and North America. Sometimes, the intermediate targets were islands or mainland countries of relatively higher development or standards of living in the region, which are themselves satellites of the very same metropoles. Seen from this perspective Caribbean people are pulled and displaced by conditions, forces and activities emanating from the target societies. Also being suggested is a coexistence of a counterpart to the syndrome and at least in ambivalence in policy of the metropolitan target societies to movement of peoples from the Caribbean. Such complexity and dynamics of these perceptions across boundaries, the manner in which they impinge upon international relations, the exchange of resources (human and otherwise) between the Caribbean and the United States, and the policy implications of all this are the subjects which demand thorough understanding.

Early migration of Jamaicans to the hemispheric mainland under American auspices began with construction of the Panama Railroad in the 1840's. George Roberts, the West Indian demographer, indicates that 146,000 Jamaicans alone left the islands for other parts of the continent at the turn of the century, 46,000 going to the United States and the remainder to Panama, Cuba, and Central America to provide labor for American-owned enterprises. Between 1820 and 1970, about one million (2 percent) of the legal immigrants into the U.S. were from the non-Latin West Indies.[2] R.B. Davidson indicates that 82,084 British West Indians left the islands for the United Kingdom between 1950 and 1960.[3] George Beckford estimates 280,000 persons to have

emigrated from the English Caribbean between 1960-1970.[4]

In 1960, there were 265,398 immigrants in this country, 14,047 (5 percent) from the Caribbean islands, including Cuba and the Dominican Republic, but not Puerto Rico or the American Virgin Islands.[5] By 1965 the United States Congress had passed its most recent comprehensive immigration law by which the single-nation quota system was replaced by hemispheric ceilings. For the first time independent countries of the Western Hemisphere would undergo a general limitation on the movement of their populations into the United States. At the same time, however, some of the Caribbean countries which had experienced a regional limitation of 800 per year due to the McCarran Act were to be relieved as they became independent. Thus, the new American law, the emergence of new nations in the Caribbean and, of course, the reclassification of large numbers of Cuban refugees as residents resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of Caribbean immigrants in the U.S.[6]

In 1970, of 373,326 immigrants to this country, 65,521 (18 percent) were from the same set of islands. The number of legal immigrants from the area had more than quadrupled itself and its proportion had tripled with Cuba, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic each sending more than 10,000 legal immigrants to the United States' shores.

By 1973, there were 64,765 (16 percent) immigrants from the Caribbean. And, in 1974, there were 394,861 immigrants of whom 61,284 (16 percent) were West Indians. Even if this may be indicative of a leveling off of Caribbean immigrants to the United States, it represents an astounding number or proportion to the total group of immigrants entering the country legally with permanent resident status. State Department information suggests that the interests of Caribbean peoples to enter and the probability of their entry into the United States continue

to run high. The data show that 43,572 immigrant and 90,457 non-immigrant visas were issued to applicants from the independent states of the Caribbean in 1972, as respectively compared to 40,009 immigrant and 137,747 non-immigrant in 1974.[7]

Political crises in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic have contributed to major waves of refugees, and some have since become legal residents and even citizens of the United States. Puerto Ricans and Virgin Islanders, both Caribbean people but United States citizens as well, came in the thousands each year as migrants and settlers to the mainland. And, from Mexico, Central America, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela came others, thousands of whom one cannot verify as being from the Caribbean littoral or of Caribbean ancestry.

In addition to those Caribbean immigrants who entered the country legally as resident aliens, or have since then obtained such status, there are many others residing here as legal non-immigrants, 403,299 of whom were from the Caribbean islands. The 1972 statistics show a total of 5,171,460 non-immigrants legally in the country, 484,340 of whom were from the Caribbean islands. The 1974 figures on illegal immigrants are less reliable. Reports estimate two to eight million illegal immigrants, mostly of Latin extraction, with the circum-Caribbean being a major contributor.

A total of 311 persons from the independent states of the Caribbean were deported, and 4,943 more of them were forced to depart in 1974. Perhaps hidden in these figures are persons who viewed themselves as temporary or circulatory immigrants anyway. (Between 1965 and 1974, a total of 6,285 West Indians including those from Belice and Guyana were deported from the United States, constituting about 6 percent of the total deported population. The order of top three sources and overwhelming reasons for deportation of these people remained constant. In descending order the leading sources were Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Trinidad-Tobago and Belice. It is significant

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that the overwhelming number of cases involving Caribbean people were categorized by immigration officials as those who "failed to maintain or comply with conditions of non-immigrant status," those who entered without inspection or by false statements, and those who entered without proper documents. This usually means that they were found working without permission or that when caught they were discovered to have entered the country illegally in order to obtain gainful employment. To this end, it was instructive that most of the Caribbean migrants were not expelled as security risks, vagrants, wards of the state, insane, incapacitated, addicts or criminals.

At present, Cubans constitute a very small number of illegal immigrants or deportees, which may be largely due to their special refugee status. However, with the recent cessation of the airlift program and despite the anti-hijacking agreements, it will be interesting to see if a noticeable increase in illegal immigration and deportation will occur among them. Also, it should be interesting to see whether large-scale Cuban immigration to the Soviet Union or other industrialized socialist countries will take place in the near future. As for the present, with the exception of Yugoslavia and Poland, there seems to be no comparable massive movement of immigrants among the socialist countries. The heavy movement of refugees from East Germany and Hungary and streams of Jews from the Soviet Union to Austria and Israel are similarly more politically than economically motivated and compare with the exodus of Cubans in the earlier period of the Castro government. Whether the absence of voluntary movement from Cuba is a result of government restriction, economic satisfaction, political accomodation, or lack of personal resources is not presently known and constitutes an important item for research.

The experience with illegal Latin American immigrants and political refugees shows that unilateral action is not sufficient to prevent the onrush. If political or economic reasons should prompt the United States (or Canada) to close its ports and borders to such immigrants, other political or economic reasons

will obligate local governments not to discourage the exodus. Without the movement there could be violent explosions throughout the Caribbean archipelago in a few decades. And, the United States (and Canada) would have to be prepared to confront the kinds of difficulties presented by massive streams of refugees, rather than mere waves of immigrants, from its southern neighbors. In addition, such explosive situations could have the potential of re-entangling the United States and other Eastern and Western metropolitan states in the politics of blatant intervention and causing regression in the present development of and aspirations for independence in the Caribbean.

At present, emigration is viewed ambivalently as both problem and solution from the Caribbean perspective. So far no clear conclusions have been arrived at as to whether it constitutes a safety valve or brain drain, a desired investment or necessary loss, potential legacy or perpetual linkages. In each case, perhaps, it represents both. Even if one but not the other, it demands carefully thought out policies and the preparedness to meet with their respective results.

For the United States this new immigration also poses serious dilemmas, particularly that movement from the Caribbean with its very special history and potential for future complications. It has brought to the forefront, once more, the historical strain which exists between the myths of egalitarianism and open door reception toward foreigners and the fluctuating tides of racist and exclusionary sentiments which have characterized immigration laws and politics of this country from its formative periods. It challenges the accuracy of claims regarding the saturation state of the job market, and the prudence of policies of limited employment and zero population growth. It questions the sagacity of cutting off at this time what has been a traditional source of new talent, new ties, new cultural enrichment, and new citizens in an ever-cosmopolitanizing society.

Also, the new immigration complicates the task of responding to the political demands of national minorities and poor sub-populations for more effective service and rapid, equal and meaningful participation in the economic and political mainstream. Yet, based upon sensitivities derived from unfair and discriminatory practices in their own ethnic experiences in the U.S., many of these minorities cannot but feel victimized if restrictive measures, continued exploitation or special penalties are directed at potential emigres -- even when presented as a way to protect opportunities for said minorities. Moreover, despite the felt and confirmed challenge that the increasing presence of new aliens may represent and the alarming outcry against it from certain quarters, it is quite obvious that beyond the commonly accepted motives and misconceptions which may have brought them here, there are (1) objective aspects of the American economy which are also responsible for their presence; and (2) sectors of that economy which rely and capitalize on the immigrants' presence.

Finally, some governments and parties in the source countries rely upon the departure of these immigrants and on the relief or returns which may follow. Further, the current movement of peoples from the Caribbean to the United States is not simply a matter of the "pull" of curiosity, ambition, sentimental ties, or the search for opportunity, safety and better living conditions. The movement also reflects the "push" of structual economic and political limitations within the source countries and various combinations or levels of "push" and "pull" resulting from the many systemic inequalities between such countries and the United States. These various levels of subjective and objective determinants are not always recognized or expressed by immigrants, admitted by representatives of governments, or consciously inter-related by scholars. There is also reason to believe that there is greater compatibility between perceptions and the contextual

realities of migrant experiences than might be indicated in some of the following papers. This, too, is a matter for further objective analysis within a broad interpretive framework.

Thus, American efforts to deal intelligently with the new immigration from the Caribbean requires a fuller understanding of the larger role of the United States in the economic development and international relations of the region. Moreover, it requires a commitment to re-evaluate that role candidly and drastically change it if that is deemed necessary. In doing so it will be desirable to hold an exhaustive hearing of learned and public opinions and carry out a comprehensive examination of the important implications of various levels of policy decision and public action-- international, national and local -- which relate to the new immigration and its meaning for the future of this society, the participant peoples and nations, and the future relations among them all.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This is an excerpt from a larger article entitled, "Redefining the Role of the United States in Caribbean Migration and Development," in Basil A. Ince, ed., *Contemporary International Relations in the Caribbean*, Kingston, University of the West Indies, Institute of International Relations, 1975. For related works by the author, see *United States-Caribbean Policy, Part I, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, September 19 and 21, 1973. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1974. Reprinted in *Continuities*, New York: C.U.N.Y., Black Studies Department, Spring, 1975.

[2]George Roberts, *The Population of Jamica*. Cambridge University Press, 1957. See also Hubert J. Charles, "Patterns of West Indian Emigration, 1880-1970," mimeographed paper presented at the Atlantic History and Culture Seminar, Johns Hopkins University, 1976.

[3]R. B. Davidson, *West Indian Migrants*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

[4]George Beckford, "Socio-Economic Change and Political Continuity in the English Caribbean," (unpublished); Hilbourne Watson, "Migration and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Notes on the Commonwealth Caribbean Situation," (unpublished).

[5]All statistics on Caribbean immigration, deportation and naturalization obtained from the U.S. Department of Justice, *Annual Reports on Immigration and Naturalization Service*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974.

[6]R. S. Bryce-Laporte, "The New Immigrants: Their Origins, Visibility and Challenges to the American Public: Impact of the Immigration Act of 1962" (unpublished). See also Forsythe article in this volume.

[7]Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, United States Department of State, *Report of the Visa Office*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1973.

International Migration and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Aspects of the Commonwealth Caribbean Situation*

Hilbourne A. Watson

Introduction

This study primarily deals with emigration from the English-speaking Caribbean to the United States. As used herein the concept of migration of labor (export of labor) does not necessarily include students and dependents, although it is our view that the reasons why individuals from these two categories also emigrate are bound up with the general problem of underdevelopment. The concepts of migration of labor and export of labor will be used interchangeably, although the latter has a more forceful and direct application. *Export of labor* as a term connotes a consciously rational policy designed and executed at the governmental level. Further, it may also be viewed as a policy which, even if engineered by private interests, obtains the support (direct or indirect) of the governments of the labor exporting underdeveloped countries and the labor importing developed countries.

It must be pointed out that we are not

*Revised version of paper prepared for the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies of the Smithsonian Institution for presentation to the panel on "International Migration as a Policy Issue: The Western Hemisphere," XVII Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 25-28 February 1976, chaired by Dr. Roy Bryce-Laporte.

attempting to state that migration as a process involves the one-way movement of people from *underdeveloped* to *developed* countries. Historical evidence confirms that many skilled persons have emigrated from developed countries to the underdeveloped areas so as to found colonies and establish and operate mines, plantations, manufacturing industries, banks, hotels and other concerns belonging to multinational (monopoly) enterprises based in the former countries. Our concern is particularly with the context in which migration takes place from underdeveloped capitalist countries of the so-called periphery to the developed capitalist countries of the center. The migrants' conceptions and interpretations of why they emigrate are in and of themselves important topics of research. However, the nature of this particular study limits us, at this stage, to helping to generate ideas that can be applied to the development of a general set of theories relating to examination of Commonwealth Caribbean political economy.

Before proceeding it is necessary to discuss briefly some of the concepts which are central to the line of thought developed in this study.

Governmental support for export of labor is based on social, political, economic and monetary considerations. Unemployment is at one and the same time a social and an economic problem. Failure to solve this dilemma can lead to serious political difficulties including unrest that might create problems for the political order. This is not to say that the political dimensions of the problem begin to emerge only when the political order is being directly challenged. The point is that the unemployment dilemma is rooted in basic political decisions that are made in order to pursue a given economic policy on industrialization, for example. If the economy must divert scarce resources to maintain the unemployed, the

social costs become more apparent since these costs carry fundamental implications for economic planning in underdeveloped capitalist societies. While the export of labor helps to regularize the problem, it does not solve it. It is probably the remittances that are received by dependents that have the most positive monetary impact. These remittances tend to help the government in the form of additional foreign exchange.

West Indian governments pursue population and employment policies that include conscious and rationalized efforts to export a portion of their population including working people and dependents. Our main argument is that this export of labor and the policy that informs it are part of that phenomenon we call underdevelopment. Even if it is taken for granted that working people (and we use this term to include all people who must sell their labor power in order to survive) emigrate from underdeveloped countries in search of better employment and training opportunities, it is still necessary to identify the contextual basis of this emigration. Such an attempt at identification cannot be undertaken in isolation from the developed capitalist countries with which the underdeveloped countries are linked to form the world capitalist system. Hence, underdevelopment and development within international capitalism are two sides of the same coin. Concretely, therefore, emigration from underdeveloped countries to developed countries is a reflection of the nature and direction of the process of accumulation on a world scale.

In qualitative terms, to appreciate the nature and direction of world capitalist accumulation we must first come to grips with the problem of the international division of labor. An appreciation of this phenomenon is indispensable for an understanding of the problem under consideration. The present epoch

of capitalist imperialism has seen production structures from imperialist countries exporting technology to underdeveloped countries. This occurence, however, should not be allowed to result in a fixation upon form thereby causing a failure to understand the content hidden behind the form. In other words, one must be mindful of the qualitative and quantitative relationships that exist between interconnected phenomena. More specifically, the export of production structures to underdeveloped countries by monopoly capital should be seen in terms of the competition between capitalists and imperialists to gain further control of markets, resources and profits in the host countries. Therefore, despite the apparent redirection of the process of accumulation toward the underdeveloped countries, the fact remains that such a phenomenon does not expose the essence -- that technology, capital, and know-how bear monopoly capitalist patents and are sources that augment exploitation of labor for profits. In most of these instances the host countries, rather than being importers of foreign capital, generate profits within their borders on indigenous capital to further accelerate the process of accumulation on a world scale, a process in which the qualitative advantage works in favor of the capitalist class in the economies of the center.

From World War I to the end of World War II large numbers of West Indians migrated to the United States. In general this kind of immigration helped to alleviate the labor shortages that existed in the U. S. economy. Many of these West Indian immigrants, along with Afro-Americans from the southern United States' "Black Belt" and European laborers, worked in northern factories and contributed to the war effort. During World War II alone about 100,000 British West Indians were recruited and sent to the U. S. to work as factory and farm laborers.[1] Since that period

several emigration schemes were developed with the cooperation of West Indian and metropolitan governments (U. S., Britain and Canada). Through these labor export schemes West Indian governments have provided labor for factories, plantations, transportation, and household requirements (domestics).

Within the last fifteen years the categories of laborers that emigrate from the Caribbean have been expanded to include large numbers of professional, technical and other skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers (doctors, nurses, engineers, technicians, cabinet makers, carpenters, masons, and gardeners for example). The fact that Commonwealth Caribbean countries have been referred to as "labor exporting economies" speaks to the emigration of a sizeable portion of the active labor force of these economies. Emigration schemes and other forms of active support for emigration have become essential features of what passes for population/employment policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

The Contextual Situation

The point of departure for a concrete analysis of the problem of migration must reflect an understanding of the international division of labor between the two basic components of the world capitalist system. The dynamic of this world capitalist system that is -- made up of exploited underdeveloped countries, the more or less developed capitalist countries, peripheral formation and formations of the center -- is the process referred to as "accumulation on a world scale." The nature of this international division of labor between these two basic components can be seen from the distribution of economic roles and functions: primary production in the "periphery" under foreign domination with the external market

dominating the economic process, and the production of producer goods, manufactures, technology and related services in the economies of the center with the dominance of the internal market as the dynamic feature.

West Indian countries belong among these so-called "peripheral capitalist formations" and have exported labor under conditions of chronic structural unemployment. The governments of these countries are fundamentally of the neo-colonial type. In capitalist economies -- underdeveloped as well as developed -- the laws of commodity production predominate and, in this respect, the main difference between center and periphery lies in how these laws operate based upon differences in the level of development of the productive forces, the nature of ownership of the means of production and the general nature of the operational relations between these two components of the world system.[2]

Reference to the two components of the world capitalist system -- center and periphery -- does not restrict or eliminate the phenomenon of the class struggle. Division into center and periphery helps to dramatize the workings of imperialism specifically with respect to the international division of labor and accumulation on a world scale. Samir Amin provides a very useful characterization and analysis of the two components of the capitalist world system. He argues that what is distinctive about the monopoly capitalist socioeconomic formations is not merely the dominance of the capitalist mode of production but the dynamic of the internal market and the tendency for the capitalist mode of production to become exclusive. In these socioeconomic formations we, therefore, tend to find one mode of production -- capitalism -- which then becomes one with the existing socioeconomic formation itself. On the other hand, Amin argues that

the dominance of capitalism in the periphery does not lead to its exclusiveness, since it is the external market which provides the dynamics for whatever growth takes place. It is this dependence on the external market for economic growth and the absence of an exclusive capitalist mode of production in socioeconomic formations of the periphery that permits pre-capitalist modes of production to co-exist with capitalism in a more or less deformed and distorted condition.[3] Thus, within the capitalist world system, capitalism predominates. But, by means of the imperialist nexus, capitalism appears in developed forms as well as underdeveloped forms.[4]

This situation leads Amin to speak of socio-economic formations of the periphery as formations which continue to experience a blockage in the process of transition. This outlook breaks very sharply with the conventional wisdom as reflected in that body of literature known as the bourgeois sociology of development. This ahistorical sociology of development views underdevelopment as a passing stage in the historical evolution of the countries of the periphery; a stage already passed through by the technologically advanced nations. The outlook with which Amin is associated views underdevelopment as a phenomenon that is produced and reproduced and one which belongs within the dialectical process of world capitalism.

As far as the literature on Caribbean economy is concerned, W. Arthur Lewis[5] is clearly identified with the ahistorical conventional view while others including Lloyd Best and George Beckford have provided useful insights in their work on "plantation economy" -- insights which suggest that underdevelopment is also a dynamic process. This can be gleaned from their notions of "metropole and hinterland" and "continuity in change" in the plantation framework.[6] Their contribution, when given the necessary dialectical

reformulation, is helpful to an understanding of the relationship between the problem of underdevelopment and international migration.

Incomplete Perspectives on the Problem

A number of perspectives on the problem of international migration from the "periphery" to the "center" have been developed by various scholars. Among these perspectives is Hla Myint's "less alarmist view." Though Myint is concerned with the so-called "brain drain" (export of skilled and professional workers from the periphery to the center) his treatment of the problem can be extended to cover other categories of workers. In this context Myint seems preoccupied with the market mechanism as the regulator and allocator of resources including labor (labor resources tend to gravitate toward places where employment is available). Clearly the market mechanism cannot really tell us why workers emigrate in the first place because the causal factors for this situation are internal to the underdeveloped economies while the conditioning factors are both internal and external. More than that, it does not address the problem of the causes of underdevelopment with which this kind of international migration is associated. This problem as well as the answer to it can be grasped only when we proceed from a clear understanding of the nature of the international division of labor. However Myint, for conceptual and ideological reasons, is unable to come to grips with the dialectics of the process of world capitalism with its structural inequalities in international production, exchange and distribution. In this specific context it also reflects his failure to come to terms with the dialectics of underdevelopment and real conditions in the periphery.

However, it is interesting that analysis of the problem of migration from periphery to center has been associated with more general studies dealing with the relationship between

population policy and economic development: population pressure/capital accumulation/investment/economic growth.[7] The general concerns of population policy and economic development studies as these relate to migration originate from the common epistemological foundation and the accompanying false consciousness that is so dominant in bourgeois social science, in this case "economistic science" (economics). It reflects the relationship between neo-classical synthesis and conventional underdevelopment theory. That is why underdevelopment is misunderstood and misstudied and that is also why appearances always seem to dominate essence with form prevailing over content.

In our view migration from the periphery is related to internal unemployment which must be explained in terms of how capitalism functions in those countries. Factors such as the nature of ownership of essential means of production, the level of development of productive forces, how surplus is used and where it accumulates, the major beneficiaries of capital accumulation and investment and the nature of the state, must all be taken into account.

The way in which the market mechanism works in these economies cannot really be explained separately from problems associated with underdevelopment, dependence and economic openness of these economies; in a word, it is linked to the role and function of these economies in the international capitalist division of labor and production. In effect, the fact that these economies depend for such dynamism as they have experienced upon externally oriented growth strategies also suggests their secondary position in the process of "accumulation on a world scale."

The Commonwealth Caribbean Situation

The economies of the Commonwealth Caribbean are underdeveloped capitalist economies -- peripheral formations -- which may also be classified as mixed export economies: mineral, plantation, tourist and peasant characteristics predominate according to country or groups of countries. For the most part, foreign domination and ownership of the essential means of production has been a fact of life and it has been dominance of the "overseas sector" (foreign capitalist sector) over the so-called "residentiary sector" that has accounted for the weakness and parasitism of the latter. The low level of transactions and the marginal quality of those transactions between the two sectors is a feature of underdeveloped economies where growth is based on the external market. It is not surprising that the major contribution of the overseas sector to internal economic activity has come in the form of payment to government of taxes and royalties and payment of wages and salaries to workers.[8]

The problems of unemployment, underemployment and the generally low level of the development of the productive forces in these economies, are all related to the nature of the existing socioeconomic formation. Foreign ownership within the existing mode of production is also an important contributing factor. Rationalization of the use of resources stems from the profit objective of the capitalists and also determines the kind of production technique that is employed. Therefore, the employment of sophisticated technology in industry, ongoing capitalist rationalization of agriculture (sugar industry) via mechanization, the relatively low employment-generating capabilities of the hotel and manufacturing sectors and the low level of the mobility of labor, point to

features of the struggle between capital and labor under capitalism. For the capitalist to realize a higher profit, ways must be found to reduce the wage of the worker relative to his own profit. Since the growth of the power of labor unions has tended to rule out the traditional methods of extending the length of the working day or reducing the wage rate, the capitalist has had to turn to the use of more sophisticated techniques: he seeks to raise the productivity of the worker by employing more machinery and fewer workers. The main effect of this in underdeveloped primary-producing export economies is to reduce the demand for labor in production.

Employment opportunities in the so-called traditional export sectors -- sugar, oil, bauxite -- fluctuate and appear to be contracting while the new staples -- manufacturing (import substitution industries) and tourism -- are not providing levels of employment required to absorb new entrants into the labor force. We must also bear in mind that the so-called residentiary sector is weak, parasitic and pays relatively low wages and with wages also tending to be fairly low in some other sectors.[9] The historical tendency in these countries has been (and this in spite of migration) toward the existence of a more or less permanent "reserve army of unemployed." Best, Levitt and Beckford have provided useful insights into the problems of plantation economy and their concept of "plantation economy further modified" contain positive implications for the theory of underdevelopment as we perceive it.

Primary production characteristics help to explain why Caribbean economic growth and development have not been based on an internally propelled growth model. Also, the absence of a self-sustaining capitalism, and autocentric and exclusive capitalist formation, calls into question every aspect of postwar

capitalist economic growth strategy developed in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

It seems clear, therefore, that any reasonable discussion of the problem of emigration from the peripheral capitalist countries to the developed capitalist countries must begin with an understanding of the phenomena we have been discussing. The existence of so-called "surplus labor" and "unlimited supplies of labor" is not a natural occurence. None of this can be understood outside of the context of the nature and operation of the mode of production. It is incorrect to begin by perceiving an effect as the cause of a real problem. It should also be obvious, at least during the present period, that our primary production system, the new expanding sectors, the import substitution industries which have not been able to transform the consumer habits of the upper class and petty bourgeois elements (in whose favor the distribution of income discriminates) and the export of surplus value as profits are features that stand in the way of the development of a dynamic employment-creating economy.

In order for an economy to provide real productive employment, there must be a clear material and objective relationship between production and real income. Unfortunately, this kind of relationship has not generally characterized most of the government and private sector spending and economic activity in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This applies to the more depressed economies of the so-called Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and also to the MDCs. Thus, unemployment in these countries and the traditional practice of encouraging emigration as a safety valve for regulating unemployment are logical outgrowths and features of the political economy of underdevelopment in these peripheral capitalist formations. The solution of the population and unemployment problem is

bound up with the solution of the underdevelopment problem. It was partly the failure to realize this that led W. Arthur Lewis, over a decade ago, to arrive at the erroneous conclusion that economic development creates or can create unemployment.[10] (But, of course, Lewis could scarely have concluded otherwise especially since he was performing the function of idealogue and apologist.) Many of his assumptions were made with little or no regard to the foundation of the concrete problems in the economies he was studying. Clearly, then, this perspective which is rooted in the notion of "economic dualism" does not enable us to come to grips with the emigration problem. It should be understood that we do not mean to suggest that the foreign countries to which the migrants go are not involved in promoting or encouraging immigration. In fact, immigration helps to reduce if not to remove certain critical shortages of skills in these economies from time to time. Nonetheless, to claim that economic development creates unemployment and to argue that this unemployment is linked to the malfunctioning of the social system is to demonstrate the height of the false consciousness of "economistic" science.

Another dimension that has not been given adequate consideration is that which involves the type of relationship existing between labor organizations and political parties in the neo-colonial countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean. It is our view that this relationship is critical to the understanding of how both these governments and the labor unions approach and deal with the critical unemployment problem. Throughout these countries political parties are either directly affiliated with labor unions, as occurs in Jamaica and Guyana, or there is a close working understanding between the unions and the government as occurs in Barbados, for example. But,

further, in all of these countries control of the working class labor organizations is in the hands of petty bourgeois leadership and, in Jamaica and Guyana where the working class is organized and splintered along lines of political tribalism, the politicians have managed to relegate the objective interests of the workers to a secondary position. The class struggle in these countries has been divided between the economic class struggle under the supervision of labor leaders and the political class struggle headed by the politicians. The result is that the labor movement and the working class struggle are permeated by an economistic outlook that is essentially petty bourgeois.

It has been becoming increasingly difficult for the governments and petty bourgeois labor leaders to maintain their undisputed control over the workers, both rural and urban proletarians. This is partly a result of deepening economic crisis and political irresponsibility which is reflected in growing social disaffection among the masses. But, the working class is still plagued by a dominant false consciousness that stands in the way of the rapid development of a class consciousness that is indispensable for the recognition of its objective class interests. Economism, economic and employment insecurity, and institutionalized bourgeois ideology are some of the real impediments. It is all the more obvious why the proletariat remains divided on a number of critical issues including the kind of economic order that is necessary for the solution of the unemployment problem. The kind of polarization that takes place around the proletariat in these societies is reflected in measures such as enactment of anti-working class legislation which occurred in Trinidad and Tobago in 1965 and 1972, and in Jamaica in 1974. And there is the practice by governments of holding the working

class responsible for low productivity and, therefore, low level capital accumulation and investment. Of course, these same governments have entered into all manner of unequal economic arrangements with foreign capital in the name of sponsoring industrial development as can be seen from the various incentive arrangements that now crowd the statute books.

All of this is related to our present investigation, for control over the working class is reflected in the ongoing adjustment and adaptation to imperialism, hence the accommodation of the foreign monopoly capitalist high productivity "enclave" sector. Foreign companies in the primary-producing sector and those engaged in the manufacturing sector, for example, pay higher wages than many "local" industries. Unequal wage rates tend to reflect unequal production levels across firms and industries, notwithstanding the "politics" of wage determination in these open dependent economies. But the profit motive of capitalist enterprise has been the basis for the ongoing rationalization of the economic production process. In the presence of foreign domination, the gains from higher productivity, which come via the substitution of machinery and technology for manpower, tend to accrue abroad or, if reinvested, are used to deepen and reinforce the existing process of underdevelopment.

The high wage sector of the working population is therefore small and constitutes what is often described as the "labor aristocracy." This sector coexists with the mass of low wage workers and lumpen elements. The petty bourgeois outlook which is widespread in the working class leadership adds to the practice of tribalism that exists between the various categories of workers. Political victimization is a powerful weapon in the hands of the politicians and labor leaders when it comes to exercising control over

workers in an unstable economy with chronic unemployment problems. Some workers do not only come to believe that capitalism and higher levels of foreign investment are the answer to their problems but they also come to adopt a less than favorable attitude toward fellow workers. Therefore, the incidence of unemployment that is linked to the process we have been discussing cannot be separated from the broader political economic considerations with which migration is linked. In effect, the migration policy which a country adopts is also the legislative expression of the political economic and cultural character of the state and the country's place in the world system in which it participates.[11]

During the decade 1960-1970 a large number of West Indians emigrated to North America and Britain. Palmer gives figures of 150,000 such immigrants into the U. S. alone for 1962-1971,[12] and Beckford estimates that there were 280,000 emigrants for the 1960-1970 period.[13] For the latter period the annual average rate of emigration as a percentage of the natural increase in the population was as follows for Commonwealth Caribbean countries: Jamaica 55%, Trinidad and Tobago 53%, Guyana 27%, Barbados 87%, St. Lucia 53%, St. Vincent 73%, Grenada 78%, Dominica 76%, St. Kitts-Nevis 142%, and Montserrat 124%.[14] In spite of this exodus, the average rate of unemployment per territory during the same period (1960-1970) was between 15 - 20 percent of the labor force. Since 1970 Jamaica, for example, has had an average unemployment rate of 20 percent per year.[15]

Following upon the British government's enactment of the Commonwealth Immigration Act (1962) which drastically reduced the rate and flow of Commonwealth immigration into Britain, West Indian immigrants began to turn increasingly to the United States and Canada.[16] In 1965, however, the

Immigration and Nationality Act (1952), also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, was amended. The amended Immigration Act (1965) was intended to protect American workers while restricting immigration from the Western Hemisphere. It has been suggested that the introduction in 1968, of the annual ceiling of 120,000 immigrant visas for the Western Hemisphere has tended to negate the intent of the Immigration Act of 1965, and that a possible acceleration of the export of skilled labor from Western Hemisphere countries into the United States might be traceable to the labor certification requirement that was instituted under the same act in 1968.[17]

Research on the export of skilled labor from the Commonwealth Caribbean is only now beginning.[18] At this stage we cannot verify that the changes which were made in U. S. immigration legislation actually accelerated the "brain drain" from the Commonwealth Caribbean. First of all between 1965 and 1975, at least 50% of Commonwealth Caribbean immigrants to the U. S. have fallen into the category of those without jobs or those not declaring employment. Also the other 50% has included the highly skilled workers along with intermediate categories of skilled and unskilled workers. Generally, it is difficult to obtain data on specific employment skills --doctors, engineers, and others --from the Commonwealth Caribbean though there is much more data available on general categories of skills: administrative, technical, managerial, clerical, and others. Table 1 includes selected data on categories of Commonwealth Caribbean immigrants to the U. S. for 1966-1974. The information contained in Table 1 is revealing in light of the high level of unemployment in the region and the level of migration that has been taking place. We have already indicated that, apart from Guyana, no Commonwealth Caribbean country exported less than 50%

Table 1

Commonwealth Caribbean Immigrants Admitted by Country of Origin and by Occupation Year Ending June 30, 1966-June 30, 1974

	Admissions by Country of Origin									Total	Total by Occupation
Country	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1966-74	1966-74
Barbados	520	1037	2024	1957	1774	1731	1620	1448	1461	13572	8005[1]
Guyana	377	857	1148	1615	1763	2115	2826	2969	3241	16911	7742[2]
Jamaica	2743	10483	17470	16947	15033	14571	13427	9963	12408	13045	65141
Trinidad & Tobago	753	2160	5266	6835	7350	7130	6615	7035	6513	49660	24764[1]
Professional Technical & Kindred	346[3]	1824	2814	2842	1809	2081	1511	1282	1140	15649	
Professional Technical & Kindred as % of all Occupations	24.1[3]	18.6	12.1	15.3	13.6	16.5	13.1	14.2	11.8		

Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Reports

1: For Period 1967 - 1974

2: For Period 1968 - 1974

3: Does not include Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago

of the natural increase in population during 1960-1970.[19]

An average of 15.5 percent of all immigrants admitted during 1966-1974 have been professional, technical and kindred workers. Apart from a tentative study on Jamaica there is no data on the monetary contribution of Commonwealth Caribbean countries to the U. S. economy in terms of exported labor that was trained in those countries. Based on this very general data and the absence of more concrete infomation on the number of immigrants admitted by profession (doctors, dentists, nurses), the actual cost of training these professionals or the economic cost to the labor-exporting economies, it would be unwise to try to make any specific extrapolation from the data. Between 1961-1968, however, a number of high-level personnel emigrated from Trinidad and Tobago to the United States. In terms of the specific fields of study there were 33 immigrants from the natural sciences, 113 from education, 74 engineers, 39 from dentistry and medicine, 480 nurses, and 234 individuals from unspecified fields of study: a total of 973 immigrants.[20]

Another problem which Commonwealth Caribbean countries have experienced has been the visibility of expatriates in key administrative and technical positions in the private sector, especially in foreign owned and controlled enterprises. It was reported in an earlier study on Jamaica that this problem was indeed very serious and, furthermore, that Jamaica could be said to lack required human resources in the professional, technical and related areas.[21] This is an interesting point since Jamaica, like other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, exports high-level manpower. The problem involves two categories: expatriates in top positions in these occupations and those trained Jamaicans whose skills do not meet the stated skill

requirements and specifications of foreign enterprises. There is also the practice by these governments of importing foreign experts for various assignments including the preparation of development plans. The form of this problem is similar to that identified by Ernesto Pernia and which was referred to above: the training of skilled labor that is not being utilized because of the absence of jobs and/or the contextual basis for planning and programs where this labor could be used productively. This skilled labor migrates for these and other reasons. Moreover, Alice Casserly indicated that emigration has also been contributing to the shortage of required skilled workers because many of those who migrate are skilled.[22] This situation is reflective of a more basic contradiction: the export of labor results from underdevelopment and the intensification of underdevelopment is maintained from the export of labor that is necessary to facilitate development.

Even at this present stage of the heightening of the contradictions produced by imperialism in the periphery --those associated with underdevelopment and, in this case, the manifestations of petty bourgeois nationalism --it is necessary to be very careful about rushing to make conclusions about the benefits of the kind of nationalization and participation that is currently being practised. More specifically, the new nationalism has managed to obtain concessions from foreign capital including the transfer of managerial functions from expatriates to nationals as the process of adaptation to imperialism localization deepens. But it has been shown that this kind of participation with monopoly capital within the neo-colonial context is mainly a further adjustment to imperialism in which double loyalties are created and promoted among the nationals that replace expatriates in foreign enterprises.[23] This evidence suggests that

even the creation of jobs for high-level manpower should not necessarily be seen as "a blessing in disguise" because the skills of those who replace expatriates might not necessarily be used in ways that are conducive to the realization of productive development. These points help to elucidate aspects of a very complex problem and suggest that the solution to this problem is not compatible with adaptation to imperialism.

Some final comments are in order on other aspects of the emigration of skilled labor from Jamaica. It is estimated that the annual rate of emigration of professional and technical personnel has been about 16 percent during 1970-1975. According to Robert Girling, during that period about 10,225 persons were expected to emigrate from Jamaica out of a total of 15,000 persons that would have been trained in that country.[24] It was estimated that, based on this level of emigration of high-level manpower, the monetary value of Jamaica's gift of labor to the metropolitan economies was about J$9 million.[25] These economies of the Commonwealth Caribbean have therefore been making their contribution to world capitalism by exporting raw materials, surplus value and skilled labor. Girling also estimates that, based on the exportation of skilled labor alone, the approximate annual cost to the Jamaican economy in terms of production foregone ranges, in money terms, between J$6 million and J$30 million.[26]

There may be a valid question of whether additional employment and production would have been realized had not these emigration outlets been made available. It is possible that, without these outlets, the level of unemployment might even be higher. We are also aware that the availability of remittances from many of these emigrants has kept many dependents and able-bodied persons within the margin of

subsistence. However, to view this situation as salutary on pragmatic grounds is to condone underdevelopment and misunderstand the process of imperialism. These outlets can be cut off even if such action appears improbable. Clearly, then, we should not lose sight of the real problem: migration has to be understood within the context of international capitalism.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion on emigration and underdevelopment suggests the following state of affairs. First of all it is fruitless to approach the problem without a clear understanding of the nature and dynamics of the existing capitalist system as it functions within countries and on a world scale. It is the international situation of world capitalism that reflects the basic dynamic of the international division of labor. Within the peripheral capitalist socio-economic formations the problems of unemployment and emigration assume national forms but are international in content. It is the interaction of these peripheral economies with those of the center that provide us with the necessary insight into the workings of the world system. To appreciate this point one must be aware that the socialization of production is not restricted to the national boundaries of each of these countries but that it is essentially socialized international capitalist production.

The problem of migration and the methods that have been adopted to deal with it in the Commonwealth Caribbean cannot lead to any real solution. Population policy and government supported emigration do little more than to regularize the problem within a framework of balanced disequilibrium. This suggests that a meaningful solution is not to be found within

the existing socioeconomic context in which the problem arose in the first place. Furthermore, the problem must also be handled at the international level since it is bound up with and reflects the asymmetrical distribution of economic power within and between center and periphery: a manifestation of the content of imperialism.

The discussion also indicated that the policy associated with emigration cannot be studied in isolation from the governments that sponsor it. This says something about these governments. As so-called neo-colonial countries the Commonwealth Caribbean has been characterized by its propensity to adjust and adapt to the changing process of imperialism. Hence, the class nature of those States is reflected in the measures they adopt to deal with unemployment. These regimes participate in, and contribute to, the problem from which emigration arises.

The problems of the transfer of resources from the periphery -- raw materials and surplus value -- contribute to the transfer of skills and jobs to the center. This is a clear case of what we call the transfer of the "mechanisms of transformation". It is this transfer of the "mechanisms of transformation" that contributes to the export of labor in search of employment that should have been created in these peripheral economies in the first place. This factor is a feature of the very nature of the international division of labor within the international capitalist system. It is obvious that the real expanding productive sector for the absorption of this labor is to be found in the economies of the center. This does not always present itself in this way because the center economies also have their unemployment problems that originate from the contradiction between production and appropriation. Nonetheless, the dynamic of the center economies in which the internal market is

dominant, where the capitalist mode of production becomes exclusive and which absorbs labor and surplus value from the periphery is a reflection of the nature and direction of capitalist accumulation on a world scale.

The problem is therefore not merely an academic problem. It strikes at the heart of underdevelopment and mirrors the bankruptcy of the conventional wisdom and methods that have been used to deal with it. Not only is there a need for a theory of a political economy of development that can explain this problem. But, such a theory must also be rooted in the understanding that the problem can only be solved along with the other problems of international capitalism.

Footnotes

[1]Bernard Poole, *The Caribbean Commission: Background to Cooperation in the West Indies.* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1951) pp. 200-203.

[2]The categories of formations of the center and formations of the periphery are borrowed from Samir Amin's *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment.* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 2 vols. See especially vol. 1, part 1.

[3]*Ibid*, pp. 37-38.

[4]*Ibid*, p. 38.

[5]See for example *The Industrialization of the British West Indies.* (Bridgetown, Barbados: the Government Printing Office, 1951).

[6]Lloyd Best and Kari Levitt, "Externally Propelled Industrialization in the Caribbean." (Mineo) pp. 24-28 and George L. Beckford *Persistent Poverty*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[7]Robert W. Cox, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 344-365. Wilfred David, "The Brain Drain and Its Implications for Guyana's Manpower Requirements and Development: 1971-80 Development." Georgetown, Guyana: Ministry of Economic Development, 1970) pp. 6-8. See also United Nations Institute for Training and Research, *The Brain Drain from Five Developing Countries: Cameroon - Colombia - Lebanon - The Philippines - Trinidad and Tobago*. (New York: UNITAR Research Reports, No. 5, 1971) Chapter 1. See for a more useful treatment of the problem of unemployment in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Alister McIntyre. "Reflections on the Problem of Unemployment in the Commonwealth Caribbean," in A. W. Singham, ed. *The Commonwealth Caribbean into the Seventies*. (Montreal: McGill University, Center for Developing Area Studies, 1975) pp. 1-15; Norman Girvan, "Unemployment in Jamaica," in Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson, eds. *Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean*. (Kingston, Jamaica: New World Group Ltd., 1972) p. 270 ff.; Hla Myint, *Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Countries*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 223-237; Hla Myint, *The Economics of the Developing Countries*. (New York: Praeger, 1971), Chapter 6; Ransford Palmer, "The Migration of Human Resources from the Caribbean: Some Economic Implications." Paper presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Castries, St. Lucia, 7-9 January 1976; Ernesto Pernia, "The Question of the Brain Drain from the Philippines." *International Migration Review*, Vol. X, No. 1, January 1976, pp. 63-64.

[8]George L. Beckford, "Socio-Economic Change and Political Continuity in the English Caribbean." Paper delivered at the CLASCO-UNAM Conference on the Caribbean. Mexico City, October 28 - November 1, 1974, p. 5.

[9]Best and Levitt, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

[10]Referred to in Best and Levitt, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

[11]Frank A. Barrnet, "A Schema for Indirect International Migration." *International Migration Review*, vol. X, no. 1, January 1976, p. 6.

[12]Palmer, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

[13]Beckford, *op.cit.*, p. 11. Mortality and retirement were less than 50 percent of net migration, according to Beckford.

[14]*Ibid.*, p. 10.

[15]*Jamaica Economic Survey 1971-1972* (Annual). pp. 95-96.

[16]Ian R. H. Rockett, "Immigration Legislation and the Flow of Specialized Human Capital from South America to the United States." *International Migration Review*. vol. X, no. 1, January 1976, p. 48. Between 1968-1971 about 9,600 Jamaicans migrated to Canada. See *Jamaica Economic Survey 1971-1972* (Annual).

[17]*Ibid.*

[18]Wilfred David and Robert K. Girling, "The Migration of Human Capital from the Third World: The Implications and some Data on the Jamaican Case." *Social and Economic Studies*. vol. 23, no. 1, March 1974, pp. 84-96. Also see note 7 above.

[19]In 1975 Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were among the fifteen leading countries that exported labor to the United States. They held tenth and fifteenth positions, respectively. Reported in *U.S. News and World Report*, April 15, 1976, p. 27 and based on U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service data.

[20]*UNITAR Reports* No. 5, p. 140.

[21]Alice Casserly, "The Unavailability of Required Human Resources" in Jack Harewood, ed. *Human Resources in the Commonwealth Caribbean*. (Mona, Jamaica: University of the West Indies I.S.E.R., 1970) p. 5.

[22]*Ibid., p. 6*

[23]C. Y. Thomas, "Meaningful Participation, the Fraud of It" in Orde Coombs, ed. *Is Massa Day Done? Black Moods in the Caribbean*. New York: Doubleday-Anchor 1974.

[24]Robert K. Girling, "The Migration of Human Capital from the Third World: The Implications and some Data on the Jamaican Case." *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1974. p. 93.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

Migration From the Caribbean to the States: The Economic Status of the Immigrants*

Ransford W. Palmer

Introduction

Migration statistics clearly show that over the last ten to fifteen years, there has been substantial migration of human resources from the Caribbean to North America, in particular to the United States. The character of the migration to the United States is markedly different from that of the great migration of West Indians to Britain in the 'fifties in one major respect: migration to the United States has included a larger percentage of professional and technical people.

This migration of human resources goes counter to one of the most resounding themes being echoed by Caribbean countries, that is, ownership and control of their own resources. This theme has grown out of disappointment with the limited social benefits generated by foreign capital invested through large multinational corporations. In the Caribbean, the bulk of the foreign capital has gone to exploit mineral resources for export, while the growth of economic opportunities has barely kept pace with population growth. It is this fundamental condition which generates the thinking that if enough jobs

*Revised version of paper prepared for the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies, Smithsonian Institution, for presentation to the panel on "International Migration as a Policy Issue: The Western Hemisphere," XVII Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 25-28 February 1976, chaired by Dr. Roy Bryce-Laporte.

and opportunities do not come with the imported capital and technology, people ought to go to the jobs in North America where, as Michael Piore argues, the capitalist society needs labor to man positions at the lower end of the social structure.[1]

Patterns of Migration

According to the 1970 United States Census, 234,000 immigrants from the Caribbean were in the United States at that time,[2] comprising 2.4 percent of all the immigrants. As Table 1 shows, approximately 50 percent of them came between 1965 and 1970. From the English-speaking Caribbean alone, over 150,000 arrived between 1962 and 1971.[3] Of the Caribbean immigrants, 50 percent came from the English-speaking Caribbean, 33 percent came from the Spanish-speaking Caribbean (excluding Cuba and Puerto Rico), and 14 percent came from the French-speaking Caribbean.

Seventy-three percent of all Caribbean immigrants in the United States in 1970 lived in the New York City metropolitan area and comprised the second-largest group in that area. (The Italians were the largest, with an estimated population of 280,000.) The high concentration of Caribbean immigrants in New York City may be explained by the thesis that emphasizes the importance of the migrant stock variable as a determinant of the destination of new immigrants. "The new immigrant is more likely to receive information about those regions populated by relatives and friends, and he is more apt to receive temporary accomodations and to feel more at home in those areas."[4] This is strengthened by the fact that the majority of the new immigrants are admitted under the immigration categories which provide preference to relatives.[5]

Table 1

Economic Characteristics of Caribbean Immigrants by Year of Immigration, 1970

Year of Immigration	Number of Immigrants	Median Income of Families	Labor Force (16 and over)	% of PTK* Workers, Managers	Labor Participation Rate
1965 - 1970	112,657	$ 7,653	66,118	10.35%	58.7%
1960 - 1964	39,848	8,619	24,717	16.75	62.0
1955 - 1959	15,588	10,113	10,788	21.19	69.2
1950 - 1954	13,149	9,433	9,759	19.95	74.2
1945 - 1949	10,158	9,994	7,299	19.52	71.8
1935 - 1944	4,528	10,189	2,747	15.69	60.6
1925 - 1934	5,245	8,284	2,837	23.05	54.0
Before 1925	20,521	6,633	6,699	23.60	32.6
Not reported	11,613	7,781	6,387	10.44	54.9

*Professional, Technical and Kindred

The pattern of migration from the West Indies between 1962 and 1971, and the occupational distribution of the emigrants from the period, are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Thirty-six percent of the skilled workers (categories 1, 2, and 6 of Table 3) were professionals and technicians and more than half of them (Table 1) came from Jamaica. Of the professional and technical workers emigrating from Jamaica between 1962 and 1972, over 46 percent (9,000) were from medical and related fields, with nurses (3,000) dominating the list. This massive migration of nurses highlights the export of human capital to a developed country by a developing country.

Chief Determinant of Migration

The major factor influencing migration from the Caribbean to the United States is an economic one. The substantial income differential between the U.S. and the Caribbean has operated as a strong pull factor, while the limited expansion of economic opportunities for professional development in the Caribbean has operated as a push factor.

The extent of the income differential between the U.S. and the Caribbean may be illustrated by a comparison of the output per worker in Jamaica with output per worker in the U.S. Calculations for the period 1963-1972 show that, on the average, output per worker in the United States was ten times that of output per worker in Jamaica. The exposure of Caribbean countries to the demonstration effect of high income levels in the United States has made it difficult for Caribbean governments to effect any worthwhile income redistribution program. Many skilled people who view the labor market for their skills as a combination

Table 2 -- WEST INDIAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, 1962-1971[a]

Country	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Jamaica	1573	1880	1762	1837	2743	10483	17470	16947	15033	14571
Trinidad & Tobago[b]						2160	5266	6835	7350	7130
Barbados[b]						1037	2024	1957	1774	1731
Other West Indies	2720	2599	2771	2873	3402	2099	4494	2507	2940	3065
Totals	4293	4479	4533	4710	6145	15779	29254	28246	27097	26497
Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers (PTK)										
Jamaica	140	255	252	176	346	1357	1777	1704	1056	1078
Trinidad & Tobago[b]						330	555	622	472	496
Barbados[b]						137	207	215	159	172
Other West Indies	237	249	262	303	364	213	294	190	178	257
Total	377	504	514	479	710	2037	2833	2431	1865	2003
Percent of Total West Indian Migration to U.S.	8.7	11.2	11.3	10.1	11.5	12.9	9.6	8.6	6.8	7.5
PTK Emigrants from Jamaica as % of Total PTK Emig.	37.1	50.5	49.0	36.7	48.7	66.6	62.7	70.0	56.6	53.8

[a]Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Reports

[b]Figures for 1962-1966 are included in the category "Other West Indies."

Table 3 - OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF WEST INDIAN EMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1962-1971[a]

Group	Ten-Year Totals
1. Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers (PTK)	13,753
2. Farmers and Farm Managers	273
3. Managers, Officials and Proprietors	1,674
4. Clerical and Kindred Workers	10,686
5. Sales Workers	1,417
6. Craftsmen, Foremen and Kindred Workers	13,920
7. Operatives and Kindred Workers	10,193
8. Private Household Workers	28,045
9. Service Workers except Private Household	7,346
10. Farm Laborers and Foremen	1,116
11. Laborers except Farm and Mine	2,246
12. Housewives, children and others with no occupation or occupation not reported	60,064
Grand Total	150,733
Category No. 1 as percent of total workers	15.1%
Category No. 1 as a percent of Categories Nos. 1, 6, 7	36.3%

[a]Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Reports

of the local market and the larger American market are likely to emigrate with the slightest hint of a redistribution of portions of their income to lower income groups.

Economic Status of Immigrants in the United States

The figures show that Caribbean immigrants have been able to improve their economic position in the United States, even if their relative economic position vis-à-vis other immigrant groups is low. An examination of U.S. Census data for 1970 shows that the median income of Caribbean immigrant families (excluding Cuba and Puerto Rico) was $8,296.[6] In Table 4, this ranked nineteenth out of the twenty-three immigrant groups examined. Although this median income was substantially greater than that of black American families, it was below the $9,327 for all American families.

When we look at Table 1, a pattern of economic progress of the Caribbean immigrant emerges. The earlier immigrant families generally moved up the median income scale as the percentage of professional and technical workers in their ranks increased. This strongly suggests that both skill and experience are important factors influencing the median income of immigrant families. This hypothesis can be tested with the data for twenty-three immigrant groups in Table 4. When median income of immigrant families (Y_m) was regressed on the share of skilled workers (L_k) in each immigrant group, and the median age (A) of each group, the share of skilled workers was far more significant in explaining median income differences than the median age. However, together these two independent variables explained only 25 percent of the differences in income from one immigrant group to another.

TABLE 4

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANT GROUPS, 1970

Country of Origin	Median Income of Families (Y_m)	% Skilled Workers in Labor Force (L_k)	Median Age (A)	Labor Participation Rate (L_p)
Canada	$10,696	42.80%	50.8	45.59%
United Kingdom	10,347	42.80	54.6	42.76
Ireland	10,112	34.02	61.8	42.51
Netherlands	10,096	45.29	47.6	46.68
Germany	10,064	43.53	49.6	45.95
France	9,886	42.25	45.3	45.29
Yugoslavia	9,759	37.74	55.2	46.88
Hungary	9,750	47.37	62.8	42.76
China	9,660	38.06	38.4	59.45
Poland	9,631	37.64	64.5	40.32
Lithuania	9,619	44.08	68.1	37.07
Greece	8,846	35.37	45.4	48.24
Czechoslovakia	8,721	43.09	65.2	36.64
Cuba	8,684	28.00	36.3	53.84
USSR	8,571	39.64	68.8	35.35
Austria	8,496	43.36	68.3	33.45
Italy	8,397	33.27	63.2	38.64
Japan	8,374	32.69	39.5	38.52
Caribbean	8,296	25.82	34.4	57.68
Norway	8,252	49.83	67.2	33.28
Denmark	8,080	47.04	65.9	37.20
Sweden	6,931	45.23	70.5	27.23
Mexico	6,440	20.48	37.9	45.76

$$Y_m = 7495.39 + 96.02L_k + 40.47A$$
$$(6.49) \quad (2.60) \quad (1.81)$$
$$R^2 = 25$$

These results suggest that other factors -- many of which may well be non-economic -- play a critical role in explaining income differences among the immigrant groups. They also suggest that the relatively low share of skilled workers in the Caribbean group and the low median age of the group combine to give a rough explanation of the group's median income position vis-à-vis other groups.

The extremely high labor participation rate (57.7) of the Caribbean group coupled with its relatively low median income reflect the fact that a disproportionate share of its work force is employed in low-paying service occupations. This is reinforced by the fact that almost half of the labor force (49 percent) is made up of women, a substantial share of whom are employed in service occupations which are low-paying by American standards. Bryce-Laporte argues that generally jobs occupied by Caribbean immigrants are low-paying or low-status by American standards, or cannot be filled because of the under-qualification of the natives regardless of color. However, despite the relatively low salary and low status of these jobs in the United States job market, many West Indian nurses and secretaries, for example, earn "much more at their 'professions' here in the States than at home."[7]

Conclusion

It appears that the improvement of the economic position of the Caribbean group will depend significantly on the growth of the share of skilled workers in this labor force. This means that the cost of acquiring skills will be a critical factor in this

process. Since over 70 percent of Caribbean immigrants live in New York City, the cost of education there in the years ahead is of particular significance. The city's current fiscal problem points to increasing costs to its residents for education and training in the future. This is a development that may well make it difficult for Caribbean immigrants to improve their relative economic position.

In the end it will be far easier for the Caribbean immigrants to improve their economic position relative to what it was in their home country than to improve their relative position vis-à-vis higher income groups in the United States. The latter may appear less urgent than the former, but it is just as important if these immigrants are not to become an underclass occupying low-paying service jobs in a capitalist economy.

Footnotes

[1]Michael T. Piore, "The 'New Immigration' and the Presumptions of Social Policy," *Proceedings*, Industrial Relations Research Association 27th Annual Meeting, December 1974, p. 354.

[2]U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970 Subject Reports, Final Report PC(2)-1A, *National Origin and Language* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

[3]See Ransford W. Palmer, "A Decade of West Indian Migration to the United States: An Economic Analysis," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 23 (December 1974), pp. 571-587.

[4]James A. Dunlevy and Henry A. Gemery, "A Comparison of Migrant Stock and Lagged Migration as Explanatory Variables in Migration Studies," paper delivered at the Western Economic Association Conference, San Diego, California, June 1975 (mimeo), p. 1.

See also P. Nelson, "Migration, Real Income and Information," *Journal of Regional Science*, 1 (1959) pp. 43-74; and M.J. Greenwood, "An Analysis of the Determinants of Geographic Labor Mobility in the United States," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 51 (May 1969), pp. 189-194.

[5]U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1972 *Annual Report* (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 2-3.

[6]Ransford W. Palmer, *The Economic Status of Caribbean Immigrants in the United States* (mimeo).

[7]Roy S. Bryce-Laporte, testimony given at the *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, Second Session, September 1973* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 76-77.

Black Immigrants and the American Ethos: Theories and Observations*

Dennis Forsythe

A Model of Ethnic Achievement In America

Sociologists and historians for some time have attempted to document the forces and processes which underlie the assimilation, or non-assimilation, of the various ethnic groups in American society. That is, they have noted the general tendency of certain immigrant groups to be absorbed into the mainstream society and have tried to delineate factors responsible for differential rates of assimilation of the various groups.

The majority of these scholars have taken the conservative ideological position that there is a "natural history" or "life cycle" which all or most immigrant groups follow in their inevitable movement towards assimilation. The cases of European ethnics (Germans, Italians, Irish, Jews, Poles and others) are used as evidence in support of this theory. This immigration perspective implies that any problems encountered by other groups are merely temporary problems of immigrant adjustment. Given enough time, they, like other immigrants before them, will

*This paper was prepared for a panel discussion organized by the Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies on the topic, "Ethnicity, the American Ethos and the New Immigration: Theories and Observations," 7 November 1975. My thanks to Roy Bryce-Laporte, Director of the Institute, for encouraging me to systematize my thoughts on the topic.

progressively become incorporated and assimilated. Even Ira Reid's study of Black immigrants to America utilized this tradition.[1] The framework of this perspective rests essentially on acceptance of the image of America as a land of economic opportunity providing equalitarian opportunities for all to rise from "rags to riches."

The most vociferous critics of this theory have come from a racial-nationalistic perspective: they point to the present plight of Blacks in America as the clearest refutation of this thesis. Blacks are one of the oldest immigrant groups in America, yet they remain like permanent outsiders. Even in Britain the immigration perspective voiced by sociologists such as Sheila Patterson and Michael Banton,[2] has come under heavy attack. One "West Indian Briton" has stated that Blacks in Britain or the United States will be viewed first and foremost as outsiders regardless of how long they live in those countries. That this belief is valid insofar as the British are concerned can be borne out upon examination of the philosophical congruity underlying Enoch Powell's question: "How can a Black man born in England be English?" and the fact that, without exception all the statutory and voluntary white agencies in England have now adopted the label 'second generation' immigrants to refer to Black Britons.[3]

Both the advocates of assimilation and their racial critics have elements of truth in their particular assertions; but both sides have gone astray because of their failure to develop an adequate definition or model of American (metropolitan) society and American culture. Had this been done the natural history advocates perhaps would have developed a more accurate theory of ethnic assimilation based upon the values and adaptive capacity of immigrants in relation to the values and socio-econ-institutions of the host

society. And, the racial critics would have come to view "race" as an important factor because of the havoc it has historically wrought on Blacks. Our theory comes somewhere in between these two aforementioned approaches as it takes into account race, class and immigration so as to accord each a more correct place within the total explanatory scheme.

As a first step in this analysis we must develop a typology of American society as it has manifested itself to immigrants; a typology that will express the essential core and dynamics of the American reality.

What is America? When people migrate to *America* what are they migrating to? How should we characterize American society and American culture? American society is the most highly developed capitalist system, defined as one in which the rational and systematic pursuit of economic gain has reached its highest point. Max Weber's conception of the "Protestant ethic" is a particularly appropriate concept when attempting to understand the development of capitalism in the United States for it incorporates the values and attitudes most conducive to the efflorescence of American capitalism. Weber chose the American patriarch Benjamin Franklin to personify the Protestant ethic. Of Franklin he wrote that the "virtue and proficiency" of earning money in a calling are "the real Alpha and Omega of Franklin's ethic." It seems not unreasonable to state that the type of money-work ethic conceptualized by Weber has long been the motive force in American culture. As a justification of wealth, this work-discipline-spending ethic has been voiced by leading capitalist stalwarts such as Andrew Carnegie and have become secularized and integrated into the major institutions of American society. Thus, it is quite clear that the only common American culture is the culture and ethic of

capitalism which arose out of what de Tocqueville (*Democracy in America*, 1835) referred to as "the peculiar and accidental situation which Providence has placed on the American, namely: the absence of any great Capital city and of warring neighbors, the diverse social origins of the settlers, the abundant land and other resources, the desire for riches and expansion which kept the people on the move, and a great commercial passion."

The core value-components of this culture include the ethic of crass materialism, the "cult" of rugged individualism and acquisitiveness, aggressiveness, ruthless competitiveness, pragmatism, rationalism and anti-traditionalism. Commenting on the economic conditions of his time, Weber noted that capitalism had come to dominate American economic life and in the process educated and selected the subjects it needed through an "ethic" he referred to as economic survival of the fittest.[4]

While many white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (W.A.S.P.'s) claim this capitalist culture as their very own, the truth is that this culture was a supranational form generic to the socio-economic movement called Industrialization which happened to have emerged in fullest form first among W.A.S.P.'s of Europe. But now the John Birchites, the Minutemen, the Ku Klux Klansmen and other white American radical rightists are claiming that it represents "American" ideals and culture, a form which they think must be protected at all costs from Communists, Jews, Negroes and "foreigners."

This "American" culture is one in which human beings swing to the jingle of coins and to the mechanical beat of machines, where living men are dominated by dead matter (money); it is a culture in which time and discipline are central. It is a cultural orientation which sociologist Talcott Parsons euphemistically

has called "Instrumental Activism."
Parsons characterizes America's instrumental activism as being vested in the interest of range and quality of adaptation, with greatest emphasis on economic production. Such production, he further asserts, is highly valued as *the* most immediate focus of adaptive capacity.[5]

Accordingly America has functioned primarily as an economic reality offering unequal economic opportunities to diverse peoples. The American War of Independence, the American Civil War and most other significant turmoils have been primarily economic struggles. Thus, the most unifying and common cultural elements in America, which have united the various groups, have involved their actual or expected participation within this common economic culture. This has been the meaning of "America" and this was how America was viewed.

Ethnic groups have used America as an instrument for their economic advancement, and in spite of the leveling effects of this urban materialist culture, they have often attempted to retain their traditional cultures as cushions and psychological refuges against the conforming and overwhelming might of the American social landscape. Thus, above and beyond the overriding Capitalist "Protestant" culture, sub-cultural clusters exist but only as expressions and adaptations to the particular economic realities (success or failure) of various groups (e.g., the culture of poverty of Blacks) and of the modified cultural importations of the incoming ethnic groups (for instance, "African survivals").

What does all of this mean for the adjustment levels and positions of the differing ethnic groups in America? If indeed American society conforms fairly closely to the above picture of a competitive, acquisitive, materialistic and technological culture, then

one would naturally expect that this cultural pattern would dictate standards for assimilation. One would expect that those immigrant groups traditionally possessing a cultural orientation fairly similar to that of America, or who had a very adaptive culture, would assimilate or merge at a quicker pace than groups with values antithetical to capitalism. Groups with a greater adaptive capacity vis-à-vis the basic capitalistic reality are bound to emerge as dominant groups. Sociologists have broadly defined adaptive capacity as: relying upon elements of a minority group's cultural heritage which provide (a) bases for effective competition with the dominant group, (b) offers protection against exploitation, and (c) may either foster or retard the minority's adaptation to the social milieu by facilitating or impeding the group's upward advancement.[6]

Thus, American *immigrant groups* have fit in with and become organic parts of U.S. society in proportion to the degree to which they could socially, culturally and psychologically adapt to the overriding capitalistic imperatives of the American reality. By no means, however, should this historical descriptive assessment of the history of United States society be taken as the author's prescription for the solution of America's racial problem, for as Lerone Bennett once stated: "nothing is worse than failing in America than succeeding in America." What does it profit a people to gain the whole world (economically) but lose their group soul? Moreover, all the evidence increasingly reveals the mounting disintegration of American society which makes naught of any long term efforts of the Afro-American collectivity to "make it" in the system by becoming more capitalistic. Additionally, "succeeding" on the individual level is becoming less rewarding as American wealth, during these "last days," has become more and more concentrated in the

hands of a few monopoly capitalists.

This general theory becomes more convincing when we compare a number of ethnic and color groups and find that the most consistent factor underlying group success or failure was the presence or absence of what sociologist Max Weber has called the "Protestant ethic." A cursory analysis of the cultural patterns of the various ethnic groups can serve to highlight this argument.

Among the "old" ethnic immigrants the Irish were initially disdained as much for their newness as for their being Catholic, their poverty and their illiteracy. They were, however, endowed with language and political skills, and fired on by memories of Irish famines. They became so dominated by the urge to succeed in America that in time they came to equal the W.A.S.P. in terms of financial success and thereby came to be regarded as the "most pushy" of the Catholic groups. One observer has described the general orientation of Irish politicians. According to him the general success of the Irish politician is due, in part, to having more of an interest in winning elections and solving difficult problems in an informal off-the-record manner as opposed to being a political 'purist' which could lead to situations of explicit confrontation.[7]

Likewise, Jews have moved up within American society by utilizing such middle class values as orderly conservation of capital, high valuation and use of education and a strong family base. They have accordingly become one of the models of ethnic success in America.

In America the Japanese, Mexican-Americans and Native Americans are roughly of the same racial status -- non-white coloreds -- yet their economic status varies tremendously. Why?

The Japanese have ceased being a "yellow

peril" and today constitute white America's "model minority." From the 1950's onwards the Japanese have attained tremendous occupational and economic success, so much so that many sociologists no longer regard them as a minority. Ironically nowadays it has become common to see white Americans driving Japanese-made cars with such stickers as "Love America or Leave It." Yet, the story of the Japanese experience in America is one entailing much grief, much hurt and much racism. Like the Blacks, they have been the object of color prejudice; like the Jews they have been feared and hated as hyper-efficient competitors. And, more than any other group, they have been seen as the agents of an overseas enemy. In America in 1942 some 117,116 Japanese (two-thirds of whom were born in America) were dispossessed of over $200 million worth of property, isolated in concentration camps and curfewed. Their businesses were picketed in San Francisco and no firm in San Francisco's financial district would hire a Japanese-American. Japanese were assaulted on the streets, and until 1952 no Japanese could be naturalized. As non-citizens they were denied access to any urban professions requiring a license and could not own agricultural lands. However, every attempt to hamper their progress resulted in enhancing their determination to succeed. What explains the success of the Japanese in coping with social degradation, denial of citizenship rights, and deprivation of the means of achieving economic success?[8] One study has drawn attention to the "significant compatibility of values which gives rise to a similarity in the psychological adaptive mechanisms which are most commonly used by individuals in the two societies..."[9] The Japanese emphasize personal achievement of long-range goals at all costs -- even if one is tired and puzzled and the outer world presents great obstacles, one must keep on

and never give up. High value is placed on attainment of such long-range goals as higher education, professional success, and the building of a spotless reputation within the community. For these reasons, since 1940, the Japanese have had more schooling than any other minority/ethnic group in America. Among persons aged 14 years or older in 1960, the median years of schooling completed by the Japanese were 12.2 compared with 11.1 years for Chinese, 11.0 by whites, 9.2 by Filipinos, 8.6 by Negroes and 8.4 by Indians. It is said that Japanese educational careers were conducted like a military campaign against a hostile world, with intelligent planning and tenacity. Their pragmatic vocational approach meant that their degrees were in business administration, engineering and optometry and rarely in the social sciences. Besides this cultural orientation, it must be remembered that the Japanese came from a homeland that was already becoming industrialized. In Meiji, Japan, diligence in work combined with frugality, had an almost religious imperative, which resulted in a kind of psychological preparedness for the rat-race of modern capitalism. Moreover, unlike Blacks, they were nurtured by ties with their fatherland. Pride in their heritage and shame for any reduction in its legendary glory helped to sustain the group during travails in America.

The Mexican-American minority, in contrast to the Japanese, are much closer biologically to the Caucasian "race" and often benefited from prestigious Spanish surnames, yet they are the very epitome of economic failure. Why? Mexican-Americans, like other captive peoples (native Americans and Afro-Americans) who involuntarily have been made into colonial subjects, and have been boxed in on plantations, into ghettoes or on reservations have become socially and psychologically crippled so that they are at a disadvantage in the competitive "Protestant" world. To be

sure, the ghetto is a competitive and aggressive arena but with a lesser degree of rational and systematic commitment to and pursuit of, money (the "mighty dollar" or "Green Power"). The cultures of poverty of these groups retard their capacity to deal with America. Colonialism has meant that the conquered groups become the victims of racism and are rendered politically and economically powerless, partly because of the institutionalization of this external relationship of dominance.

The Mexican minority is still loyal to the Spanish language as the mother tongue and often shows resistance to the use of English, a tendency which is reinforced by residential segregation. This often leads to academic failure and the lowering of the self-image of Spanish children. It is indeed a vicious circle. In proportion to their populations, four times as many Anglos are found in professional and technical occupations as Spanish-speaking persons. One-third of the Spanish-speaking men are engaged as laborers or farm workers, while only 7% of the Anglos are so employed. And, of all workers, Spanish-speaking farm workers occupy the lowest rung on the employment ladder in the five southwestern American states.

The Native American has also been caught up in a matrix of traditional values which violates many of the premises of aggressive and individualistic capitalist society. Traditionally, he saw himself as part of a harmonious mystical whole consisting of his fellow men, Nature, and the gods. A person molded in such a culture is not equipped to readily adjust to an individualistic anonymous existence that is the atomized nuclear-family and the self-sufficiency pattern of the city-dweller. As one sociologist so aptly noted: A number of anthropologists have pointed out that among the Native American tribal groups almost all had and still retain some common values that differ

from or are completely contrary to those of the dominant society. And, whereas the dominant society's system of values dictates the need for an individualistic outlook as preparation for competition in striving to acquire material possessions, Indians for the most part, are not aggressive towards one another, and have a tradition which endows a man with more prestige in direct relation to what he has shared with and given away to others.[10]

West Indian Immigrants and the American Ethos

Where Afro-Americans (the Black Muslims are the best case study) and other Blacks (West Indians) have shown a greater Protestant orientation, they have likewise shown a tendency to attain a modicum of economic success, which places them above the general economic level of the Black masses.

Every phase and aspect of the West Indian experience (specifically their background and migration experiences) have imbued them with the Protestant "spirit." As a result of their schooling within the British educational system, their majority status in the Caribbean and the wider role frontier available there, West Indians (even land-toiling peasants) have historically emerged with a highly secularized Protestant ethic which finds expression in a strong belief in self, discipline, drive and determination, which was the means by which poor and deprived British colonials could supposedly attain some degree of social mobility in the Caribbean. Thus, one grew up with the feeling that anything was possible, that "God helps only those who help themselves," and that through education, thrift, discipline, hard work and planning, one's lot in life could be improved. Of course, this is not to say that West Indian immigrants have not benefited from the fact that they were Blacks

from the Caribbean and were accordingly given preferential treatment by whites. But, such favoritism by itself is not a sufficient explanation. And, if West Indians did in the end prosper abroad, it was not due to the lack of racism. Studies in Britain and the United States have shown that most West Indians initially suffered downward social mobility because they had to accept jobs abroad which were relatively more menial and less prestigious than those which they left at home. The fact that they did improve their status upon migration was due partly to the fact that the economic opportunities and rewards in America were relatively and absolutely greater so that West Indians automatically improved their absolute living standards in spite of the low levels of their new jobs. But, since they were upwardly mobile we have to comment on their personal drive, education, motivation and discipline. Moreover, relative to Afro-Americans, West Indian immigrants were a *select* group of young, able-bodied, educated men and women, less encumbered by large extended families, and fiercely driven by their determination to "make good" in America. Since they regarded themselves as sojourners their relationship to the American environment was strictly specific and instrumental: they hoped to acquire quick wealth and status, return to the Caribbean, and to live as respectable members of the West Indian colonial elite or just respectable members of their village communities.

Official immigration figures reveal that some 233,146 West Indians migrated to the United States for the years 1820-1910. This report shows a steady increase in the annual rate of West Indian immigration from 164 in 1820, to 3,171 in 1850 and 11,244 in 1920.[11] Of the 40,339 "foreign-born" resident Blacks listed by the official census for 1910, 24,426 were from the West Indies.[12] For the years 1920, 1930, and

1940 there were respectively a little over 36,901, 49,310, and 41,970 West Indians in America.[13]

Between 1900 and 1930 it was estimated that some 300,000 West Indians migrated to the United States.[14] West Indians were pulled to America by the great labor shortages created by the War and the unprecedented prosperity which characterized the industrial boom of the period. At this stage the West Indian immigration quota was included in the British quota which was a generous 65,000 a year limit which was never fully met. During the war years, more than 100,000 workers from the British West Indies were recruited for agricultural and industrial work in the United States on a temporary basis,[15] but many found ways of making their stay more permanent.

Except for a decrease during the decade, 1930 to 1940, the West Indian population has constantly increased numerically since 1870. According to the Census Report,

> The decline of 14.9% which occurred between 1930 and 1940 can be attributed to mortality losses and to the depression. The effect of the depression is indicated by the fact that the number of Negro immigrant aliens admitted to the United States was smaller than the number of Negro immigrant aliens who left the United States. In the more prosperous twenties, the number of Negro aliens who entered the United States was far in excess of the number who departed, and the change in the direction of migration of Negro aliens noted in the thirties occurred despite the increasing restrictions against foreign workers in the Caribbean.[16]

However, the *McCarran-Walter Act of 1952*, among other things, substantially limited the number

of West Indians able to enter the United States to a quota of only *800 per year* from the Indies *per se*, apparently as a way to guard America against Third World radicals and Communists. The result was that West Indians turned to Britain. Nearly 11,000 went to Britain in 1954. The peak was reached in 1962 when more than 34,000 West Indians arrived in Britain, and constituted what was cynically regarded as "an unarmed invasion." Before the McCarran-Walter Act, for every West Indian migrating to Britain, at least nine went to America; after the Act, the ratio was reversed. The 1965 Immigration Act reopened America once more to Caribbean peoples. Altogether, a sizeable number of West Indians entered the United States, and of the 45,162,638 aliens who entered the United States between 1820 and 1970, 1,000,000 or 2% of them are estimated to be West Indians.[17]

At no time, then, has the West Indian population in the United States amounted to anything more than 1% of the total Black population, and before 1910, the proportion was significantly less than .5%. Yet in spite of this small numerical size they have made their presence felt and their voices heard in America. References are constantly made to certain observed tendencies and patterns in West Indian immigrant behavior: (a) their over-proportionate achievements in a wide number of areas, (b) their leadership roles in a wide spectrum of group activities, and (c) their tendency to play significant roles in protest politics, though this is oftentimes combined with a noticeable degree of conservatism. Hence, it used to be said that: "As soon as a West Indian gets ten cents above a beggar, he opens a business;" and that "a radical is an over-educated West Indian without a job." West Indians in popular stereotype and in fact were pushing upwards and occupying enviable positions, and thus their presence was perceived by many Afro-Americans as

inhibiting their social mobility rather than fostering it.

C. L. R. James challenged his readers to look at any of the morning papers in England, in the United States or on the continent of Europe. His bet was that "you will see West Indians winning distinctions in every field of endeavour... You will see that in the fields of art and letters we are as distinguished as in the field of sport. No small people anywhere produces so remarkable a body of gifted men."[18] West Indian newspapers have often addressed articles to the same point. The *Jamaican Star* declared that "the West Indian-New Yorkers are more numerous and prominent than their proportions of the total population."[19] The *Jamaican Times* confidently speculated that "perhaps more than any other group, natives of the West Indies... have and are playing vital leadership roles in the business and political lives of Negroes in the ghetto section of New York."[20] Among other things the *West Indian-American* (a weekly newspaper started in 1959 in New York) chronicled the deaths of "prominent" West Indians in New York. On an average, four deaths were reported in each issue for the year 1959. Essentially, its requiem for the deceased was: "He came here young and made it big."

In 1926, *Opportunity* magazine, an organ of the Urban League, undertook a survey of "prominent West Indians in America." A. M. Wendell Malliet was given the task of documenting the most outstanding West Indians whose reputations and prominence stood out both in the Caribbean and in America. Altogether, Malliet listed a total of 144 such British West Indians extending through the nineteenth and twentieth century.[21] Writing for the New York *Amsterdam News* in 1936, Arthur Schomburg declared that "the West Indian Islands... have given to America many worthy sons and daughters."[22] The November 27, 1943, special issue of

People's Voice commented on West Indians in America: "Their immigration here dates back to the slave days and many are the West Indian families dotting the Carolinas, Floridas and the country in general. Marriage and inter-marriage have practically wiped out all bounds, until today the American and the West Indian stand shoulder to shoulder in their fight for advancement." In 1950, *Our World* magazine had a feature article about "The Proud West Indians" who were supposedly "enriching America with their fine culture, enterprise and race awareness." Written in the spirit of facilitating a greater understanding between West Indians and Afro-Americans, the paper editorialized that:

> A million enterprising people from the West Indies have brought with them to America a great wealth of economical and cultural attributes from which the nation is benefiting. The Negro race, in particular, is being enriched by this contribution. This dominant force has been made manifest along the Atlantic seaboard and Gulf coast where the majority of the Caribbean Negroes settled half a century ago. The enterprising manner in which the islanders have accomplished this in such cities as New York, Chicago, Charleston and Boston has gained for them a respect on the part of Americans.[23]

The New York *Amsterdam News* in 1951 affirmed that "even a casual glance about... will show that a considerable number of leading attorneys, surgeons, businessmen and labor leaders are West Indians," and that "they have made a distinctively valuable contribution to the whole scheme of things....Today we see every manner of leader and businessman of West Indian descent. Their value to this country may never be

estimated in dollars and cents."[24]

Similar conclusions have been reached by people outside the journalistic community. One early sociological study of Blacks in Boston concluded that West Indians have had less difficulty of access to "the higher avenues of accomplishment." However, the attainment of those higher accomplishments is attributed to characteristics, allegedly, not as developed in the southern Afro-American: a high degree of independence, more stamina, sense of progressiveness, and cooperativeness.[25] A much more recent study reported that "it is generally believed that Black professionals are of West Indian extraction in far greater proportions than could be expected by chance," and then proceeded to elaborate in a footnote that Glazer and Moynihan (1963), in comparing the Black professional population of the 1930's with that of the 1960's, constituted as much as one-third of that group.[26]

A series of available *Who's Who* were also consulted in our effort to acquire information on the quantitative extent of West Indian success in the United States. The earliest and most comprehensive study of Black leaders, conducted in 1887, catalogued some 178 "eminent, progressive and rising" leaders, nine of whom were clearly West Indians.[27] This number represented 5.5% of the total leadership, and when one considers that West Indians at the time represented only .4% of the total Black population in America, this proportion was very high indeed.

Data was extracted from *Who's Who in Colored America* for the period 1928-29. This volume contains information on the Black elite living in the United States in 1928. According to its compilers, "eligibility has been based on achievement, due latitude being allowed those persons whose efforts show promise of future accomplishment or who, by reason of establish-

ing a precedent in some particular work make it arbitrary that a record be made of the fact."[28] Of the 1,589 names listed in this volume it was clearly ascertainable that 1,342 were born in continental America, 93 born in the West Indies and 154 were of unknown origin. West Indians therefore represented 6.5% of this compendium of achievers of whom origins are known. This percentage was indeed significant against the backdrop that West Indians constituted only 1.0% of the total Black population in 1930. This figure of 6.5% was in fact an underrepresentation because it was most likely that a large proportion of the 154 unplaced entries are West Indians, due to the practice of many West Indians to "play down" the fact of their West Indian origin. Further, since classification was on the basis of birth-place only, Blacks born of West Indian parents in America were listed as Afro-Americans. Following the census procedure, such individuals (writer-scholars like Ira Reid and William Braithwaite) should be added to the West Indian list. The 1950 *Who's Who in Colored America* was co-edited by a West Indian, G. James Fleming, and amounted to a much more comprehensive survey of the Negro elite in America. In selecting individuals, the authors studied and reviewed contemporary books, learned journals, labor union publications, and minutes of conventions of national organizations along with the specialized knowledge of a number of known individuals.[29] Altogether, a total of some 3,065 individuals were included, 147 (or 4.8%) of whom were born in the West Indies. The only other volume of *Who's Who* available and which we examined was that of Harlem for the years 1949-1950.[30] Here we found that of the 158 Black notables listed, 30 (or 18.1%) were West Indians.

We then turned to United States census data, where these were available, in order to get further

quantitative indication of the relative economic status of West Indians. An analysis of census figures for 1940 shows two significant facts: (1) that a larger proportion of the West Indian population was employed compared to Afro-Americans, and (2) even among those employed, West Indians proportionately had a larger number of high ranking jobs. West Indians significantly outdistanced Afro-Americans in the professional and semi-professional, proprietors and managers, clerical and craftsmen categories, whereas Afro-Americans were over-represented in the lower ranking categories such as farmers and farm managers, farm laborers and general laborers. This conclusion was true for both urban as well as rural areas.

The 1960 United States Census also makes possible a systematic comparison of the relative occupational and monetary achievements of West Indians and Afro-Americans in both rural and urban areas. The figures reveal a significant concentration of West Indians in occupational categories which carry higher status: professions, managers, officials and proprietors, clerical, sales, crafts and foremen. Afro-Americans, on the other hand, had a larger proportion of their employed population concentrated in less prestigious and less rewarding occupations - farmers and farm managers, operatives, private household workers and laborers.

One may conclude, therefore, that in 1960, the median income for employed West Indians was $2,326, while that of Afro-Americans was $1,519. A breakdown according to sex categories reveals that the median income of employed West Indian *males* was $2,868 and that of Afro-American males, $2,254. For the *females*, the median income of West Indian women was $1,745, while that of Afro-American women was $1,000. When we control for urban-rural differences, we still find that West Indians have reached a higher economic level.

All of this was of course, extremely functional for the American social system. American society was hard pressed to give the impression that Blacks, too, like other ethnic groups, were sharing in capitalist democracy and influence, especially as Afro-Americans had aided America in fighting several wars specifically for democracy, freedom and equality. In commenting on the American "Protestant Establishment," author Digby Baltzell has expressed the opinion that there is a crisis in moral authority in the United States today. And, that situation largely is attributed to the WASP establishment's unwillingness and inability to absorb talented and distinguished members of minorities into its ranks. Baltzell also points out that because American society is opportunitarian and mobile those in the upper echelon can maintain their position and its powers and privileges by making certain that its membership is representative of U.S. society as a whole.[31]

Jews, Catholics and others, even the Nazis, have found a place in America. The existence of a large Black Afro-American population who were economically outsiders is a visible flaw in the myth of Democracy (i.e., the right of all groups to take advantage of the economic opportunities afforded them as Americans.)

The "Protestant" Black West Indians, imported to the U.S. were generally submerged within the Black category ("African, Black"). Thus they served as proof that Blacks in general were also making it in America. And, if their "foreignness" was stressed, it was with the implied notion that if Afro-Americans were more like West Indians they, too, could make it.

Conclusions

What has the presence of Black immigrants as Americans

meant for their Afro-American kinsmen? Through their aggressiveness and also as a result of the demonstration effects of their attainments, Black immigrants have prodded Afro-Americans to continue their struggle to gain a greater share of the American capitalist culture, and to substantiate their claim to American citizenry. This has been the main role of Black immigrants. An Afro-American scholar has noted that in 1865 newly emancipated Blacks in America were possessed by the need to achieve two ideals: attainment of the knowledge that comes from formal education and receipt of civic and political recognition as full citizens of the United States. Blacks in America were fervently supported by West Indians who, used to being treated as men, were enthusiastic about Black American pursuit of educational and political ideals.[32] Again, the noted Black historian, John Henrik Clarke, has on several occasions, made the same historical observation: "Prior to the Civil War, the West Indian contribution to the progress of Afro-American life was one of the main factors in the fight for freedom and full citizenship in the northern part of the United States."[33]

Based on his personal observations, W. A. Domingo, writing in the 1930's, argued that "it is they (West Indians) who largely compose the few political and economic radicals in Harlem; without them the genuinely radical movement among New York Negroes would be unworthy of attention."[34] He pointed out that the opening of the needle trade in New York to Black women was due largely to the militance of West Indian women who refused to tamely accept a subordinate status. The reminiscence of a West Indian woman reports that "they had signs saying colored were not wanted. We took them down and marched right in to apply. You bet, we got the job." For Domingo, the essence of the West Indian contribution was "the

insistent assertion of their manhood in an environment that demands too much servility and unprotecting acquiescence from men of African blood -- the unwillingness to conform and be standardized, to accept tamely an inferior status and abdicate their humanity."[35]

All of this had profound implications for the race-class debate which has become the number one intellectual issue among Black intellectuals. Those who stress a simplistic theory of race have argued that all immigrant groups (barring Blacks) have become assimilated, thereby implying that the prejudices against blackness has prevented Blacks from being accepted into the society. These advocates do not stop to analyse the processes and bases of assimilation of the various groups, the differences between these groups, and factors other than race which distinguish Blacks from others and could possibly explain, at least partially, why Blacks remain outsiders. To be sure the system of slavery, upon which American society was originally founded, was based upon racism. And, it is equally certain that modern capitalist societies like America continue to need exploitable groups; but there is no longer any imperative necessity for this group to be Black. The system of exploitation could conceivably shift back to class exploitation which had characterized European societies before the emergence of Black exploitation. It is true that in America, Blacks are still like permanent outsiders. It is also true that the institutionalization of white racism and white economic and political power have made it extremely difficult for them to achieve group mobility. But this cannot be the complete explanation. Other groups (like the Japanese and Jews) who have historically encountered severe stigmas, ostracism and racism have "made it" in America and their newly acquired wealth eventually neutralized racist stigma.

It seems clear, then, that race and color have become decisive only to the extent that they were mediated through the resulting Black cultural experience. Stress should be placed not on the strength of white racism, but on the adaptability and "Protestant" orientation of the group. Of course, this is not to deny the existence of "strengths" in the Black family, in the Black woman, in the Black man or in Black culture, generally. But such "strengths" served mainly as the necessary basis of Black survival as opposed to serving as springboards into the capitalist system. Where Afro-Americans (Black Muslims, for instance) and other Blacks (West Indians) have shown a greater Protestant orientation, they have likewise shown a tendency to break out into the capitalist world -- a world in which race and color are secondary to economic power and the color of money. Racism was important insofar as it functioned historically to fix Afro-Americans (and Blacks generally) within a particular non-capitalistic culture and economic orientation within which they are still enveloped because of the self-perpetuating nature of that culture -- not to mention the forceful nature of this subjugation. The early encounter with slavery and colonialism has systematically crippled their competitive zeal and entombed them within a stagnant culture of poverty, just as the apartheid system has done to Blacks in South Africa. This culture has resulted from Black efforts to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair which developed from the realization of the improbability of achieving success in terms of the values and goals of the larger society. They were aware of middle-class values, and often claimed them as their own, but they were unable to faithfully adhere to them.

In America racial groups have constantly battled each other to gain control of wealth, status and power. Indeed American society may be depicted

as a process of ethnic competition in which "ethnic ins," "outs" and "in-betweens" jockey with one another to gain entry and move up or seek to preserve the superior positions and way of life they enjoy. In this struggle, whites, through slavery and colonialism, have practically eliminated or neutralized Blacks as competitors. Boxed in tightly by segregation and racism, Afro-Americans have worked out a far less rational-capitalistic pace and way of life.

The events of the 1960's to the present lend support to the general framework sketched here. The Civil Rights-Black Power Movements were basically political attempts to tilt the economic balance in the favor of Blacks. It was a tacit recognition that Blacks and whites could not run in the same race because whites had historically accumulated certain economic and institutional advantages which operated in their favor while Blacks were handicapped. Thus, Blacks began to place emphasis on political power and political demands as a means to wrestle certain economic concessions from whites thereby giving Blacks more adaptive power in the struggle for group advancement.

One must add, as a final note that throughout their struggles Afro-Americans have always had the support of their West Indian counterparts. And, as was stated in an editorial in the *New York Amsterdam News*, the vigorous, insistent voices of West Indians are heard "wherever the battle for status rages, and much of the credit for victory in these wars of freedom is due them....West Indians perhaps more than any other segment of our population have created a consuming awareness of the strong link which exists between all persons of African origin."[36]

Footnotes

[1]Ira Reid, *Negro Immigrants*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1939.

[2]Sheila Patterson, *Dark Strangers*, Tavistock Publication, London, 1963; Michael Banton, *Race Relations*. Tavistock Books, London, 1967.

[3]Chris Mullard, *Black Britain*. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1973.

[4]Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (New York, 1958), pp. 54-55.

[5]Talcott Parsons, "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Party System," in Burdick and Brodbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 82.

[6]M. Harris and C. Wagley, *Minorities in the New World*. Columbia, New York, 1958, p. 264.

[7]Andrew Greeley, "The Irish," in Peter Rose, *Through Different Eyes*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973, p. 136.

[8]William Petersen, "Success Story, Japanese-American Style" in Minako Kurokawa, *Minority Responses*, Random House, New York, p. 170.

[9]William Caudill and George De Vos, "Achievement, Culture and Personality: The Case of Japanese Americans," in Kurokawa, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

[10]Joan Ablon, "American Indian Relocation: Problems of Dependency and Management in the City," in Kurokawa, *op. cit.*, p.203.

[11] *Reports of the Immigration Commission* - Abstracts of the Reports of the Immigration Commission, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, Doc. No. 747, Vol. I, (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1911), p. 65. These Census figures, and those following, must be taken as suffering from the usual limitations of underestimating the number of immigrants.

[12] Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1915* (Arno Press and *The New York Times*, New York, 1968). Table 5, p. 63. These figures include as "West Indians" all Blacks born in the United States with one or more parent from the West Indies. This proportion is insignificant for in 1910 it formed only .4% of the West Indian element.

[13] From 1920 onwards West Indians were lumped as "Foreign-born" Negroes, but this category also includes foreign Blacks born in Europe, Asia, Africa and South America. In 1920, 1930 and 1940, all "foreign-born" Negroes amounted to 73,803; 98,620 and 83,941, respectively. In 1910, West Indians constituted a little more than half of the foreign-born Negroes; we have therefore assumed the same proportionate share of West Indians in 1940. These figures are extracted from *The Sixteenth Census of the U.S.A: 1940. Population*, vol. II. (United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census), Table 4, p. 19.

[14] Michael Kraus, *Immigration, The American Mosaic*. (Van Nostrand, 1966), p. 97.

[15] James Wickenden, *Colour in Britain* (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 5.

[16]Vera C. Foster and W. Hughes, *Negro Year Book*. (Foote and Davies, Inc., Atlanta, 1947), Quoted p.5.

[17]Roy Bryce-Laporte, "Black Immigrants" in Peter Rose, *op. cit., p. 47.*

[18]C. L. R. James in an Editorial in *We the People*, July 9, 1965, Port-of-Spain.

[19]*The Star*, December 18, 1970, Kingston.

[20]*Jamaica Times*, June 14, 1958.

[21]A. M. Wendell Malliet, "Some Prominent West Indians." *Opportunity*, November 1926.

[22]Arthur Schomburg, New York *Amsterdam News*. August 29, 1936.

[23]*Our World*, "The Proud West Indians," January 1950.

[24]New York *Amsterdam News*, September 8, 1951.

[25]John Daniels, *In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study of Boston Negroes*. (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.) Republished by Negro Universities Press, New York, 1968, p. 170.

[26]Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, "Positive Effects of the Multiple Negative: Explaining the Success of Black Professional Women." *American Journal of Sociology*, volume 78, no. 4. The author notes in a footnote that Glazer and Moynihan found that in examining the 1960 census half of the male college instructors and presidents were listed as non-white foreign-born. Approximately 20% of the natural scientists, approximately 40% of the doctors, and about 0.8% of the

lawyers fell into this category. Among women classified as non-white foreign-born almost 11% belonged to various college faculties, 26% were in natural science fields, approximately 60% of them were doctors, but no lawyers were listed.

[27]W. Simmons, *Men of Mark*. First published in 1887. (Johnson Publishing Company, Chicago, 1970.)

[28]*Who's Who in Colored America, 1928-29*. Second Edition. J. Boris (Editor). (Who's Who in Colored America Corporation, New York.)

[29]G. James Fleming, Y. Christian Burckel, *Who's Who in Colored America*. (Christian Burckel & Associates, New York, 1950).

[30]B. S. B. Trottman, *Who's Who in Harlem, 1949-50*. (New York Magazine and Periodical Print and Publishing Company, New York, 1950.)

[31]Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*. (Vintage Books, New York, 1964), p. x and p. xl

[32]William Ferris, *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 28, 1928.

[33]John Henrik Clarke, *Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa*. Vintage Books, (New York, 1973), p. xviii.

[34]W. A. Domingo, "Gifts of the Black Tropics," in Alain Locke, *The New Negro*, p, 346,

[35]*Ibid*.

[36]New York *Amsterdam News*, September 8, 1951.

Puerto Ricans in the U.S.: Growth and Differentiation of a Community

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Introduction*

This brief account of the development of the Puerto Rican community in the United States is part of an extended first statement of a research plan for the historical study of Puerto Rican migration to the United States. In that plan migration is viewed as an integral feature in the development of capitalism in Puerto Rico from its very beginnings in the last century (around 1873) and as a major component in development strategies since the 1940's. The inner dynamic of that migration and other population changes are seen as responsive to the successive reorganizations of productive forces on the Island brought about through the combined activity of U.S. investors and the U.S. and native bureaucracies that have sought to provide secure conditions for accumulation and industrial expansion.

*This introductory note was written by Mr. Frank Bonilla who, in his capacity as Director of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, granted permission for use of the material which follows. That article is excerpted from *Taller de Migracion -- Conferencia de Historiografia, abril 1974.*

In its present advanced stage migration assumes complex and contradictory patterns reflecting processes of economic absorption and convergence between the Island and U.S. economies but also of differentiation and resistance to further assimilation among the migrant population.

Discussion

The work of documenting the growth and the process of class differentiation of the U.S. based Puerto Rican community is only beginning. In general, only the contours of these changes in size and complexity can be substantiated given the gaps and other defects in census and other official statistics and limitations of other surveys, especially for earlier years. The recent appearance of extensive reports on 1970 census data and 1974 population survey figures on Spanish origin population in the U.S. do help in rounding out the preliminary analysis that has been undertaken here.[1] However, the extraordinary theoretical and practical difficulties that a clear delineation of classes and their sub-components present in a situation characterized by such intense movement and change counsel great caution in a preliminary statement of this kind.

The Puerto Rican migration has been characterized in these pages and elsewhere as the massive displacement of contingents of a single class. This is substantially correct, but can only be the point of departure for an analysis and not a definition for all time of the social placement of an entire community.

The work of historical reconstruction yet to be done requires a more refined understanding of the social composition of successive migrant flows, the forces that set specific class sectors in motion, and the mode of their insertion into the economic activity at their point of arrival in the U.S. This means, as well, tracing the process of internal differentiation within the migrant community and the diversity of ideological orientations and concrete political practices that have evolved over time and that have coexisted within the group and in its relations with key external forces, both back on the Island and in the U.S. This is a painstaking enterprise that will take some years. These brief pages can only help bring home to the reader how much remains to be done.

As early as 1930, census figures reported Puerto Ricans residing in the 48 contiguous states. But in 1940 nearly nine in ten were still in New York City, and ninety-five percent of the migrants in the following decade settled there.[2] As World War II approached, the Puerto Rican community already had a complex structure and a rich history of involvement in the work and politics of the city, a history that is now beginning to be recovered. It was a small community that had wrested a foothold for itself in the city in the 1920's only to be plunged by the depression into the most menial of factory and service jobs and onto the relief rolls. Many returned to the Island in that decade; others remained and were part of the political struggles of the depression years. The first post-war wave of newcomers thus came into a community that had been lifted from a long siege of joblessness by the war, but that already had its own informal network of coping institutions and small organizations for dealing with the larger society.

This organizational background is important, not only because it has largely been lost from sight,

but because it demonstrates that from a very early moment Puerto Ricans in the U.S. constructed organizations aimed at clear political objectives with a class and national content. During the prosperous decade of the 1920's, when the Puerto Rican population in New York City shot from a little over 8,500 to more than 45,000, there were already organizations putting forward such positions in very explicit terms. One of these, the Puerto Rican Brotherhood of America (Hermandad Puertorriqueña), organized in 1923, articulated in its program of action many of the persistent orientations that continue to characterize many such groups to this day:

1. Self-awareness concerning the working class base of the membership or constituencies.
2. A concern for mutual assistance and ethnic defense within the framework of the city's ethnic politics.
3. Involvement in Island political issues and a commitment to the advancement in the U.S. of the cause of Puerto Rico.
4. A special sensibility to issues connected with the U.S. role abroad, particularly in Latin America and, most of all, the Caribbean.
5. Autonomy and self-reliance -- an assertion that Puerto Ricans themselves will define their problems and needs and devise their own remedies.[3]

This was a remarkably comprehensive organizational and ideological projection coming from a small, new community of workers, a fragment of a class, torn loose from its class moorings at home and engaging the

imperial power on its home ground, in new and unfamiliar forms. In the very act of affirming Puerto Rican rights to self determination, this class fragment was also expressing a primary contradiction of its existence, for it affirmed these rights on the basis of the very citizenship it was implicitly repudiating as an imposed and watered down version of full U.S. citizenship.

What kind of a community base was there for organizations like the *Hermandad*? The migrant population of the twenties included more males, more whites, more townfolk and tradesmen and more people with craft skills and experience of factory work than the Island average. But the community in New York was overwhelmingly working class, especially that living and organized in the heartof "*la colonia*" (East and South Central Harlem). Median earnings of Puerto Rican workers at the time are reported at around $21 a week though half that was not uncommon. There was no hesitation in organizations like the Brotherhood in stating the class differences between those Puerto Ricans clustered in East Harlem and the even poorer Brooklyn Navy Yard neighborhood as against the few dispersed in higher income, white neighborhoods around the city. Some 500 small businessmen, mostly *bodega* and restaurant owners and perhaps a hundred professionals rounded out this truncated projection of the Island social structure in the New York of the period.[4]

Political organization and activity continued in this vein into the depression years with local politicians then beginning to seek active links to Island leaders and issues as the presence of Puerto Ricans, especially in East Harlem politics, became more visible and insistent. In 1934 two thousand Puerto Ricans marched behind Senator Antonio Barceló in support of a local candidate, Lanzetta. These streets

were later to ring with the name of Don Pedro Albizu as another local figure, Vito Marcantonio, came to the defense of imprisoned Nationalists and won the backing of independence-minded Puerto Ricans. Puerto Ricans in the thousands marched and demonstrated during these depression years in protests against unemployment, relief administration, and in the cause of Spanish Republicans. A Puerto Rican was elected to the state legislature in 1937; others were implicated in the street violence around elections that still broke out in street rallies and campaigning in the tough, ethnically mixed district. The Marcantonio organization provided a well-staffed service to Puerto Rican constituents with job, relief, health and other problems, a service that he closely monitored himself.[5] Similar events and developments, still to be chronicled, were taking place in other political organizations and districts around the city, especially in Brooklyn.

The first migrants to come after the war, like those already here, were mainly family people -- young men and women in their most productive years. Almost all were literate and came from urban places on the Island. A majority came with some skills and experience of work in manufacturing and related activities. Only a few were unemployed on departure, and a sizeable majority reported full time employment during the year before migration. Their average schooling (around eight years) was twice that of the Island population at large. Almost all found work in semi-skilled or unskilled factory work and services. The 1948 Mills study notes that most migrants increased their earnings but took a status drop in the nature of the work performed (i.e., they did not find jobs to match the skill levels they had attained on the Island).[6] Though this population flowed heavily into the clusters of settlement already established in

various parts of the city, there was a quick fanning out from the core neighborhoods. By 1950 at least a few Puerto Ricans were living in every health district but one in New York.[7]

As the migration approached its peak years in the 1950's, then, this remained an overwhelmingly working class community (85 percent were in blue collar or service occupations). The migration flow was still apparently being fed largely from the ranks of active workers and the most ready reserve of intermittently employed urban labor on the Island (Marx's "floating reserve"). Existing data on migrant characteristics are neither very reliable nor very extensive, but, as noted earlier, a marked change in the composition of this flow seems to have occurred by the end of that decade and especially by the early 60's. This second flow was younger and more rural, more diverse in skill levels, with heavy contingents of farm and service workers. The migration, by the end of this major cycle thus seemed to be directly tapping a "latent" labor reserve in farm and other non-industrial work. Parallel to these flows there was a steady traffic of farm workers, northward in the Spring and returning in the Fall. Between 1951 and 1964 an average of about 13,000 agricultural workers made this trek each year under government contract.[8] Uncounted numbers were traveling this circuit on their own or through private arrangements with crew chiefs and recruiters engaged directly by U.S. farm operators.

Nevertheless, at the end of the 50's eight out of ten Puerto Ricans in the U.S. were still in blue collar and service jobs; fully 53 percent were semi-skilled operatives.[9] Official unemployment rates for these workers were already very close to Island levels (9.5 for men and 11.0 for women). Over the decade there had been a slight increase in white collar work (entirely within clerical and sales jobs) and a

miniscule gain in the proportion at the craftsman and supervisory level in industry. Though fewer than four in ten women were in the labor force, their extreme concentration among operatives (61.9 percent) and clerical workers (13 percent) put them shoulder to shoulder with men in the work force. Men only slightly outnumbered women among clerical workers, and there were three women operatives for every four men in the factories. (It will be remembered that in Puerto Rico, despite a smaller relative presence of women in the work force, females outnumbered males in both clerical work and among operatives by 1970.) In both contexts earnings for women are below those for men. The idea that Puerto Rican women have been at an advantage, either in access to the labor market, job status or earnings, in ways that would undermine family relations or the manhood of male household heads thus seems to rest on a slim foundation. What these crude figures do convey is a sense that women have been migrating and taking jobs, not as occasional or privileged earners, but as a mobilizable reserve driven by need to hard factory and clerical work at very low wages.

This community continued to build its organizations from the bottom up, through a mushrooming of "hometown" and neighborhood clubs and a sprinkling of more purposively oriented social service and political groupings, the latter dominated at first by Island political orientations and neighborhood issues and being drawn more directly into city-wide politics during the 1950's.[10] The establishment in 1948 of an office of the Migration Division of the Island's Department of Labor provided a base from which city-wide coordination of community activity was first undertaken. The close links between Muñoz Marin's *Populares* and the Democratic Party in the U.S. oiled the wheels for the wresting of small concessions and token recognition of Puerto Rican interests in the

scramble of ethnic politics in the city. But by the late 1950's a break-away from the dominance of the Commonwealth office, with its pattern of paternalistic dealing with the city administration over the heads of the community was in full swing on several fronts. Rival efforts to "federate" the grass roots, social and hometown clubs were under way. Individuals and small groups were building independent power bases in political clubs and fighting their way through the party structures into appointive jobs and a few elective positions in city and state government. An emergent younger, college trained circle was trying to forge still another base of ethnic defense through organizations such as the Puerto Rican Forum, ASPIRA, PRACA (first organized as the Hispanic Youth Association), and others. The accent in this group was on reaffirming the Puerto Rican identity of the few who were trickling through the city's high schools into higher education.[11] Vaguely modeled on agencies such as the NAACP and numerous Jewish service organizations, these ostensibly "non-partisan" individuals moved on the premise that professional and technical talent could be trained within the community and effectively focused on issues and power relationships affecting Puerto Ricans. They were, in any case, moving in reaction to the self-seeking and subservience that marked much of the city's political life, especially within the party machines. Implicit as well was the assertion of the primacy of local issues as against a politics dominated by the status question and Island based political organizations.

These evolving lines of leadership and organization went through three critical changes in the 1960's. The first was the militancy and violence of the civil rights struggle and the subsequent mounting of a federal anti-poverty apparatus that deployed resources, programs, jobs, and new political

opportunities and forces around the city. The anticipated out-pouring of federal funds for local anti-poverty programs opened the way to a new opportunity to centralize and coordinate Puerto Rican organizations on a city-wide basis with a resource base many times that ever before available. Two rival formulas emerged. Both started from the premise that the pattern of dispersion of the Puerto Rican population around the city required centralized control and command by Puerto Ricans of programs designed for our community in order to break out of the established pattern of being a minority within a minority. The very dispersal of the Puerto Rican population throughout the city put the group at a disadvantage in the fight for local control of decentralized programs that was sure to ensue. One plan, advanced by the Puerto Rican Forum, proposed to attack poverty chiefly through raising educational levels and strengthening the family, cultural, and organizational life of Puerto Ricans. The Forum proposed ten functional programs in eight neighborhoods to be administered through sixteen or so existing organizations and others to be created in neighborhoods as needed. Control was to lie in a city-wide board of citizens drawn from the small circle of Puerto Rican professionals, politicians, city officials, clergy, and organizational leaders then prominent in the community.[12]

The counter proposal came from an *ad hoc* group including numerous individuals originally behind the Forum proposal. The essential shift in emphasis was on the generation of grass-roots engagement and substantial decentralization through a "block worker" approach and the assigning of a central role to neighborhood organizations and councils. "Programs and projects will only minimally emanate from the central organization," said the proposal; "the major portion of undertakings will be conducted on the most

intimate community level...". It was in effect a coup against some of the professionals and intellectuals in control of the Forum by the federations of local neighborhood organizations and hometown clubs together with the leadership more concerned with "practical politics," that is, with direct control of resources and jobs, votes and political clout. These leaders were still largely based in neighborhood organizations.

These "civic and social" clubs were by far the most numerous Puerto Rican organizations, and the PRCDP proposal contains a revealing tabulation of some 263 organizations that were registered in June 1965 at the Office of the Commonwealth. (Only a month later the New York City Anti-Poverty Board had registered 421 Puerto Rican organizations in just five neighborhoods.) More than three in five of the 263 organizations were local or hometown clubs. Six were city-wide or borough federations of local clubs. There were three sports clubs, eighteen religious, and seventeen political organizations. Fifteen were said to be "instrumental," i.e., issue oriented groups, promoting rent strikes, voter registration drives, and similar actions. There were ten professional and nine business associations. An estimated 7000 small businesses were in operation (up from 500 in the 1920's). Forty-nine locals in the AFL-CIO Central Labor Council were said to have significant Puerto Rican membership and forty Puerto Ricans were holding elective office in unions. A third of the Catholic parishes in the city had Spanish-speaking clergy as did about 15 percent of the Protestant and Orthodox churches. This did not include, however, the hundreds of Pentecostal and other storefront Churches, many of which were moving into more solid quarters.[13]

These figures are, of course, rather meaningless by themselves. They were mustered by PRCDP to demonstrate the vitality and enterprise of Puerto

Ricans and their capability to respond organizationally to opportunities for self help. "The Puerto Rican middle class," said the proposal writers, "has been created and has risen like the phoenix during the past twenty years out of the very contradictions of an emerging new automated and cybernetic world."[14] It is unclear how seriously the assertion about the rising Puerto Rican middle class in this proposal was meant to be taken. In any case, such a class had little to do with the concrete struggles into which the managers of the poverty war plunged with their locally-recruited forces and, sometimes, in opposition to them. By most accounts, the energy, drive and leadership in that contention came directly from the streets and tenements.

It is significant that as these programs got under way in earnest Republicans were taking over control of the city and that this involved a major reshuffling of local Puerto Rican leadership and some efforts to reformulate issues in terms of this realignment. Thus yet another comprehensive stocktaking and programmatic design for Puerto Ricans in the city followed close on the heels of the late 1964 anti-poverty proposals, involving many of the same individuals, but on this occasion under the auspices of a Republican mayor.[15] This was the second major change affecting Puerto Rican leadership and organization in the 1960's and faced them with the task of reconstructing lines of communication and reshaping the "organization of organizations" that had emerged over the long years of Democratic-Popular collaboration.

However, it was the youthful explosion of militancy in the colleges and neighborhoods, two years later, that would bring out in a most dramatic way the contradictions and divisions as well as the bonds of continuity and unity building up within and between the maturing Puerto Rican community in the

U.S. and those Puerto Ricans making their homes on the Island.

This was far more than an unexpected upsurge of nationalism from a generation puzzled about its identity. On the surface it looked like just another youthful assault on U.S. institutions, mimicking on a far less threatening scale the actions of Black peers. The deeper meaning, however, struck home to many Puerto Ricans. A generation, substantially the first completely formed in U.S. working class communities, was laying its sense of crisis on the line for other Puerto Ricans. Something essential and valuable that they knew as a life sustaining force to which a passionate attachment could be felt was seen to be slipping away. Yet it could not be recaptured or even known except by throwing into stark and angry relief all the cleavages of class, language, race, and ideology that had come to divide Puerto Ricans as a consequence of colonization and migration.

Thus, the fight for institutions that has continued in the U.S. since the first takeovers of schools and churches in 1968 has been as much a contention for spaces in which to test the limits of our unity as for havens from which to strike back at oppression.[16] The movement of students and young workers and its collateral political expressions have placed these issues squarely in the consciousness of Puerto Ricans in every context. What remains of our nationality? What historical role lies ahead for us? What is it that we can ask and expect from one another?

That process of internal testing of the self and each other and the testing of ourselves against encircling institutions in practice lies at the heart of the national question as it confronts us in daily living. As our numbers in the U.S. grow, do the complex forces that divide us become an insuperable

obstacle to unity? According to the most recent estimates Puerto Ricans in the U.S. now number from one and a half to two million. Seven in ten are still in New York and environs, but that proportion is declining, with growing concentrations in New England, the Mid-West and California. Four in ten of those identified as Puerto Ricans are U.S. born, but this part of the population is so young that household heads are overwhelmingly Puerto Rican by birth. The average 1973 income of Puerto Rican families is a little more than half the average for all U.S. families even though Puerto Rican women earned more toward their own support and that of their families than other women in the country. Unemployment in early 1974 was reported at nine percent (8.6 for men, 9.8 for women) though, as on the Island, labor "maladjustment" (i.e., underemployment) is still placed at 33.3 percent in poverty areas and is higher for some groups, especially youth.[17]

The most notable change in the U.S. Puerto Rican work force over this final decade, as on the Island, is the continued growth of white collar and service employment. Among women white collar occupations alone now almost match the numbers in factory work; among men there are as many operatives (close to fifty percent) as service and white collar workers together. Small gains in job status and income as in education are still being hailed as evidence of progress up the social ladder and advancing assimilation. At the same time, the objective degradation in function, relative pay scales, working conditions and job stability of white collar and much service employment in the U.S. is being widely exposed. Similar questions regarding education and employability are being raised. In a real sense, then, as this kind of educational and work opportunity opens up for a small number of Puerto Ricans, the material benefits

and social conditions that formerly went with these statuses are deteriorating.

Recent reviews of these facts by specialists on our migration are less optimistic than in the past though they remain as barren as ever of critical reflection or theory. Kal Wagenheim, having registered the steady decimation of blue collar jobs in New York over recent years and the zero growth in real income among the U.S. poor between 1940 and 1970, brings us what can only be called stale news: "...all groups who now inhabit the inner cities will face a grim struggle for economic survival in the coming decade."[18] Jaffe and Carreras, counting on some further mobility gains among second generation Puerto Ricans, if they can be induced to "disperse," cling to the hope that time will still vindicate migration as a solution. "Conceivably in another 30 years," they tell us (that is, in 2015), "increases in employment and population growth will become synchronized to the point where migration will diminish considerably."[19] Both analyses seem blind to the convergences and spiralling character of the pressures on the Puerto Rican work force at every point of its insertion into the U.S. economy.

The shallowness and ideological bias of such assessments should now be clear. Without over-reaching the data in hand or understating the difficulties that lie ahead in pursuing a scientific understanding of our situation, we feel a rather different set of statements needs to be made about the Puerto Rican migrant in the seventies. The last few pages have sketched the growth, diversification and increasing scope of political organization and practice as the migrant community in New York expanded in numbers, took on new economic roles and established a significant presence in a broadening range of local institutions. These transformations have defined new needs

and interests, new capabilities and, as has been seen, a new combativeness and resistance to assimilation. Does this community or any part of it constitute a social force of any account within the overall framework of national and class domination from which it springs? The following summary observations are not presented as inferences fully documented in the foregoing pages. They do, we believe, flow logically from the data and theoretical underpinnings of the exposition to this point.

1. The fluidity, circularity and impermanence of migration have been emphasized in these pages as giving a particular cast to the Puerto Rican presence in U.S. territory. That fluidity is, however, a symptom of the advanced degree of integration of the Puerto Rican labor force into the U.S. economy. Within that movement and instability, especially in New York, but also in other U.S. settings, there has been a sedimentation of experience and settlement that is reshaping national forces in complex ways. Unquestionably, in some instances assimilation has occurred or is quite advanced. Being Puerto Rican in the U.S. as in Puerto Rico has produced varied cultural expressions that differentiate themselves in terms of class, language, generation, racial sentiment and identity, as well as the recency and frequency of movement. Because these different expressions of Puerto Ricanness arise through the experience of separation but also enter into intense interaction with each other, an intricate dialectic of social forces results. The national status or

definition of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. must, therefore, be realistically viewed as a problematic issue rather than a given. The matter cannot be settled by theory alone, but only by the concrete unfolding of political practice growing out of the changing social formations in which Puerto Ricans are placed as actors, wherever they find themselves.

2. Within the diversity of these expressions, national identity and commitment now remain high among the concentrations of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. and are reinforced by the direct experience of new forms of economic, political, cultural and racial domination they encounter there. The Commonwealth design has been successful in establishing on the Island an intermediary class, well integrated into the dominant U.S. power bloc, and equipped with a large, domestic bureaucratic apparatus to administer local government with technical assistance and political supervision from the U.S. No such formal apparatus exists in the U.S. extensions of the colony, but it is significant that Commonwealth representatives have at times assumed these functions informally and that Governor Hernández Colón has recently proposed to U.S. foundations that a long term plan be worked out in which the Commonwealth government would join with U.S. private and public entities to "develop" and service areas of high Puerto Rican concentration in the U.S.[20] What this

means is that in contrast to the juridical genius and inventiveness lavished on the Commonwealth superstructure, it has not thus far been found necessary to devise any specialized parallel structure for Puerto Ricans in the U.S.

3. Three fifths or more of Puerto Rican workers in the U.S. are in blue collar, factory employment. The large service sector (around 36 percent) is also preponderantly doing menial tasks of cleaning, hauling, delivering, and so on. The fifteen percent in white collar work are heavily weighted with sales and clerical workers in retail trade, notably in the mass, discount and working class shopping districts. The social conditions of work and daily living are, therefore, very similar for the mass of these workers. The small and very slowly growing number in professional, technical or managerial jobs, as well as a few of the self-employed, may have an option of stepping out of the community. An uncounted number have done so. Many forces also combine, however, to retain these individuals within the circle of Puerto Ricanness and direct their energies into the multitude of organizations defending Puerto Rican interests.

4. For all practical purposes, then, this remains a working class community. It has generated a complex organizational life and political practice. This has had only a very partial expression through the direct organization of workers as a class at the work place. The experience of Puerto Rican workers in major U.S. unions has been

if anything, more frustrating than that of Puerto Ricans with U.S. based internationals on the Island.[21] Modes of participation are, of course, very much affected by the dominant patterns of external manipulation, cooptation, selective inclusion, forced competition and self-serving individualism promoted from the top in every sphere of action in the U.S. These remain viable paths of accommodation and self-advancement for a few. But the contradictions of this process itself have operated to keep much potential leadership tied to and responsive to the community. The most authentic part of this leadership has been projected outward from its own ranks by the community, increasingly in recent years from its second generation, many of whom reached college in time to propel and live through a fundamental renewal of national and class consciousness whose effects are still being felt. This movement ideology of the late sixties, which reactualized many of the strands of national and class orientation with which the community surfaced politically in New York fifty years ago, has had diffuse effects. Despite frequent breakdowns, evasions and violations of these standards -- this is part of daily experience, familiar to all who move about in the community -- norms of unity, discipline, collectivism, accountability and self-reliance have become informally operative in a broad range of organizational settings. This is an important legacy of the movement in the colleges and *barrios* that is being carried, even though

in modified forms, into many areas of community life as these young people mature and move into new arenas of action. Key organizations that embodied the movement ethos disappear from view; the norms of political practice to which they gave life remain alive.

5. In the established, liberal framework of ethnic competition and minority affirmation in the U.S., the resolute national thrust and implicit separatism of Puerto Rican claims jar the sensibilities of dominant groups and other minorities, including some sectors of other Third World communities. People who can chime in sympathetically with cries of "Black Power" will gag on "Viva Puerto Rico Libre!" That is because in the U.S. today the liberation of Puerto Rico is an unambiguously revolutionary proposition, and concessions on even small matters locally may seem to legitimize ever larger claims. The national content of this thrust is nevertheless what carries Puerto Rican claims inexorably beyond simple appeals for inclusion, increased participation and reform. The linkage of national and class goals to socialist objectives is an inevitable outcome of the conjunction of forces that define the present situation of Puerto Ricans.

6. But what do revolution and socialism have to do with the concrete, day to day struggles of this community, which seem to center on modest goals of recognition, inclusion, equity and the winning of small spaces of relative autonomy in U.S.

institutions? These are, after all, only secondary contradictions of U.S. society today, residual inequities in education, housing, health and the sharing of all other values. The system holds out the hope of eventual equality in two forms: 1) dispersal and dissolution, and 2) under the new label of pluralism, an internal simulation of the commonwealth idea. In this vaguely formulated corporatism, national and cultural minorities would be free to cultivate their languages, life styles and institutional preferences within a common economic and political framework. To the extent that Puerto Ricans, in resisting assimilation and affirming their democratic rights reject both these solutions, their movement inevitably takes on a revolutionary cast. The combination of national and class goals can find no resolution within the existing U.S. structure. Daily experience drives home this reality to Puerto Ricans in unmistakable ways in every sphere of activity. It becomes in this way harder and harder to imagine a state of the world satisfactory to us without an essential, socialist transformation. As awareness develops that we do not wish merely to join forces with or trade places with our oppressors, nor to administer for them improvised imitations of their institutions, the revolutionary content of this struggle is revealed to us. The extraordinary surge of cultural production in the visual arts, poetry, theatre and music among young Puerto Ricans in New York in the

last few years conveys the excitement of this self-discovery. This self-discovery is, as has been stressed, not merely the revival of a national tradition or a clinging to a faded identity, but the revelation of a potentially significant historical role for a submerged sector of U.S. workers who have only begun to make their presence felt.

This struggle, of course, unfolds within real historical and institutional limitations. Revolutionary goals do not make a revolution, and the existence of root contradictions and local crises do not signal the collapse of a world system. For the moment, Puerto Ricans in the U.S. are practically invisible at the national level. It will take every ounce of political, professional and community influence and muscle, for example, merely to get a single agency, the Census Bureau, to take the minimal steps to obtain an adequate count of Puerto Ricans in the 1980 census. Literally scores of such single issue struggles will be engaging Puerto Ricans at any given moment. The coming together of Puerto Ricans from various parts of the country to discuss Puerto Rican issues from the perspectives of the diverse settings in which concentrations of our population now exist have just begun to occur. The first U.S. wide political organization of Puerto Ricans is being achieved through the creation across the country of units of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and the circulation of its daily newspaper, *Claridad*. Many other kinds of coordinated action bringing together Puerto Ricans throughout the U.S. and the Island will be required before any genuine engagement of other than localized issues can occur. In the meantime, defensive actions against established institutions will continue to be channeled primarily through the loose coalitions of organizations and individuals of many ideological positions

that are rallied successively around issues as they arise. This is a high cost mode of political action that takes a heavy toll on individuals and the meager resources that the community controls. It reflects real limitations in our midst. We have in fact much to learn about the institutions we attack and reject. But no one who gets closer to this community than the census statistical charts can really believe this is a nationality on the path to self-liquidation.

The foregoing sketch has stressed the elements of continuity in the national and class content of the ideological orientations and political action of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. over the last several decades. At the same time an attempt has been made to bring out how the growing size, dispersal, occupational diversity and the range of institutional involvements of that community have progressively projected its political action from a neighborhood, to a city-wide and presently to a national level. Earlier sections sought to place these changes within the larger context of the design for development applied in Puerto Rico since 1940, in which industrialization and migration have been coupled as central strategies. The main difference for Puerto Ricans in the two settings is the construction over this period of a very specialized political-bureaucratic superstructure on the Island that is as yet absent in the U.S. The total process, is, of course, far from played out. As it advances, the historical importance of the Puerto Rican case is more and more forcefully brought home. Central questions of theory and practice, with import extending far beyond a narrow, national interest flow from this analysis and the concrete situations in which Puerto Ricans now find themselves. The political struggles of Puerto Ricans have been propelled to a higher level because the material conditions of our insertion into the main economic and political

structures of U.S. capitalism have advanced beyond those of any other colonized nationality. These same necessities propel our intellectual work into difficult and uncharted areas. What roles can language and culture play in the struggle for liberation of a nationality so deeply penetrated and so widely dispersed within the territory of the dominant power? Can the unity of class and national content in ideological orientations be maintained as the sectors among the colonized who join capitalists in the realization of capital rather than commodity production grow in number? What is the role of youth and successive generations to be in any further resistance to assimilation? How does the present state of the Puerto Rican movement compare in leadership, organization, ideological clarity and effectiveness with earlier stages? Sound analysis along these lines does not exist and cannot be improvised. This schematic review may at least show that, despite the satirizers and ridiculers of Puerto Rican Studies, this is indeed an intellectual agenda worthy of our best efforts.

Footnotes

[1] For an extended analysis of the census undercount of the Spanish origin population in 1970 see *Counting the Forgotten*, A Report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, April, 1974. The New York City Health Population Survey has attempted corrected estimates for Puerto Ricans in the city. (Morey J. Wantman, Morton Israel and Leonard S. Kogan. *Population Health Survey*, New York: Center for Social Research, City University of New York, 1972.) The Bureau of the Census has recently formed a committee in which Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are represented to advise it on the 1980 census. Whether this group can have any impact in improving

census performance remains to be seen. Legislation has also been proposed calling for federal agencies to report statistics on the Spanish origin population regularly, especially with regard to unemployment. The 1970 data on Puerto Ricans in the U.S. is presented in considerable detail in Jaffe and Carreras, *op. cit.*, and Kal Wagenheim, *A Survey of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. Mainland in the 1970's*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. See also the *Current Population Survey: Persons of Spanish Origin in the U.S., March 1974*, Wash., D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1975.

[2] Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Migration Division, *A Summary in Facts and Figures*, New York: January, 1959.

[3] This information is taken from a May, 1926 souvenir dance program of the Puerto Rican Brotherhood of America. The Brotherhood at that time estimated the Puerto Rican population in the city at 100,000 (i.e., over twice the 1930 census count). They claimed that 5,000 Puerto Ricans had registered and voted in the 1926 elections. The dance program contains advertisements by the Caribe Democratic Club and the Club Estrella de Borinquen (a unit of the *Juventud Nacionalista Puertorriqueña de Nueva York*). It also mentions an *Alianza Obrera Puertorriqueña*. The Brotherhood stated: "It is our duty to expose the injuries suffered by our colony so that they may be aired in a purifying atmosphere and be healed by the remedy that we ourselves . . . and no one but ourselves . . . may apply to them."

[4] Lawrence R. Chenault, *The Puerto Rican Migrant in New York City*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. Chenault notes that the largest employers of Puerto Ricans in the 1920's were a biscuit and a pencil factory and numerous laundries. Domestic service and home needlework were the main occupations for women as in Puerto Rico during those years.

[5] The political flavor of the district in this period is well captured in Alan Schaffer, *Vito Marcantonio, Radical in Congress*, New York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1966. The Marcantonio Papers held at the New York Public Library are an unmined source on the Puerto Rican community between 1930 and 1950. An unpublished document by George Charney (*Puerto Rico Visited*) also brings to life some of the political activity of the time.

[6] Mills *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 71. See also Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Migration Division. *A Summary in Facts and Figures*, New York, January, 1959. The data given on migrant characteristics were for 1948 and 1950.

[7] Welfare and Health Council of New York City, *Population of Puerto Rican Birth or Parentage*, New York City: 1950, New York, September 1952. The district without Puerto Ricans was in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn.

[8] Senior and Watkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 703-717.

[9] STACOM, *Status of Puerto Rico* (Report of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico), August, 1966, esp. pp. 176-178.

[10] The post-war resurgence of *independentista* and Nationalist activity, expressed, on the one hand, by the constitution in 1948 of the *Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño* and, on the other, by the Nationalist insurrection of 1950, had very concrete projections in New York politics. In 1945, for example, it was Vito Marcantonio who sponsored a House bill providing for Puerto Rican independence and incorporating amendments to the Tydings Bill that were proposed by the *Congreso Pro Independencia* (the CPI was the forerunner of the PIP in Puerto Rico). These events led up to the break within the Popular Democratic Party from its more resolutely independence minded wing.

The strong repression of Nationalists and radical activity generally in the fifties has shrouded this aspect of the community's political history from general view. A compact account of events in Puerto Rico at this time is given in Robert W. Anderson, *Party Politics in Puerto Rico*, Stanford, Ca.; Stanford University Press, 1965, chapter 6.

[11] This group brought together second and "bridge" generation individuals. Bridge generation persons, as defined by Joseph Monserrat, are Puerto Ricans with some education and real life experience in Puerto Rico but U.S. trained and comfortable in English and U.S. organizational modes. In the Puerto Rican case, of course, these "generations" are continuously renewed and straddle broad age groups. Joseph Monserrat, "Symposium on Puerto Rico in the year 2000," *Harvard Law Journal*, Washington, D.C. Fall 1968, XV, No. 1, pp. 12-27.

[12] These proposals constitute the first attempts substantially controlled by Puerto Ricans to formulate comprehensive programs for the community based on extensive analysis of the state of the population and its needs and resources. They were produced under great pressure and tailored to the ideological and program requirements of the city's Anti-Poverty Operations Board but they are rich in information and insights into the political and ideological trends of that moment. See Puerto Rican Forum, Inc., *The Puerto Rican Community Development Project*, 1964.

[13] Puerto Rican Community Development Project, Inc., *A Puerto Rican Community Development Proposal*, 1964. See especially the chapter on organizations.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[15] *Puerto Ricans Confront Problems of the Complex Urban Society: A Design for Change*, proceedings of a community conference

sponsored by the Hon. John V. Lindsay, April 15-16, 1967. One of the few studies of local Puerto Rican leaders was made around this time (John W. Gotsch, *Puerto Rican Leadership in New York*, an unpublished master"s thesis in sociology at New York University, 1966). Gotsh remarks in this leadership's dependence on recognition from outside the community and a lack of projection to state or national levels. He saw most of the few persons he studied as bent largely on self-advancement.

[16] Alfredo Lopez sets out to tell this story from the perspective of a young participant in *The Puerto Rican Papers*, New York: The Bobb Merrill Co., 1973. Lopez subtitles his volume "Notes on the Re-emergence of a Nation."

[17] As this is written, official unemployment figures for New York City are at just over 12 percent (the highest in 25 years) and in Puerto Rico at 18 percent. The estimates of labor maladjustment are from the works cited in footnote.

[18] Wagenheim. *op. cit.*

[19] Jaffe and Carreras, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[20] This plan is detailed in the *Congressional Record*, Washington, D.C. Vol. 120, no. 130, August 22, 1974.

[21] See Herbert Hill, "Guardians of the Sweatshop: The Trade Union. Racism and the Garment Industry", in Adalberto Lopez and James Petras. *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974. Additional discussion of labor market shifts in New York City can be found in C.E. Rodriguez, Unit 3 in this volume, and New York City Council on Economic Education, 1974 *Fact Book on the New York Metropolitan Region*, New York, 1974.

Haitian Immigrants in Boston: A Commentary*

Pierre-Michel Fontaine

Introduction

It is not without significance that with one exception, the Black men who were assaulted by white crowds in South Boston in the fall of 1974, at the height of the school desegregation disturbances, were Haitians from the adjacent community of Dorchester. These incidents showed graphically that, in spite of the proximity of their places of residence to the locus of racial confrontation, the Haitians had failed to inform themselves accurately about the nature and intensity of racial feelings in the city. This is symptomatic of a type of behavior approximating what one study of Haitian émigrés has characterized as "autarkic," and which consists of a complete disinterest in, and ignorance of, the host society.[1]

On the other hand, the Haitians' misfortune would perhaps be perceived as resulting from another type of behavior, which the same author has

*These preliminary reflections are part of a developing research project entitled: "Third World Immigration into Western Societies: The Case of Haitians in the United States and Canada." They include certain themes discussed earlier in an unpublished paper, "Haitians in Boston: An Alternative View" (Department of Political Science, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass., 1971). A modest grant from the Harvard Graduate Society Fund (Joseph Clark Bequest) for 1975-1976 has helped in the current work. I am grateful to Mr. Gerdès Fleurant, Director of Black Studies at Salem State College, for information and suggestions in the preparation of this essay.

labeled "Westernized" and which is purported to be more characteristic of Haitians in France. One of the components of the "Westernization" syndrome is a denial of the existence of racism in the host country.[2] Although the full syndrome is difficult to conceive of in the American context, the attitude of denial of racism by some Haitians in Boston has been specifically reported.[3]

A possible variant of the latter explanation might be that the Haitian victims of assault, while cognizant of the existence of racism and of racist violence, did not think that they, as foreigners, had anything to fear. It is inconceivable, however, that an individual in tune with the happenings around him would not have been alerted by the publicity given to the first incidents of beatings. Thus, the first hypothesis -- the "tune-out" -- seems the more plausible.

The Genesis and Development of Haitian Emigration

The purpose of this essay is to explore the forces that push Haitians to emigrate in ever-increasing numbers and, more especially, their adaptation to the host society in the United States, particularly in the Boston area. To be sure, Haitians have been emigrating from the very beginning. Even before independence, large scale emigration of French planters, in many cases accompanied by some of their slaves, had been provoked by the bloody slave insurrections which exploded in 1791 and led to the almost total expulsion of the French population by Independence Day, January 1, 1804.

Earlier still, a fur trader from Saint Domingue (the colonial name for Haiti), Jean-Baptiste Pointe du Sable, founded the settlement that later became the city of Chicago. There were also temporary "visitors" to North America, such as that contingent of freedmen from St. Domingue who fought at Savannah

under General Lafayette on the side of the patriots in the American War of Independence. Until the 1960's, however, there was no significant flow of Haitian immigration into the United States. Ira de Augustine Reid records the presence of 500 Haitians in New York City around 1937.[4] He also notes that in 1925 two of the most radical members within New York's fur workers union were Haitians.[5]

The periods of massive Haitian emigration have been periods of major crises in the political economy of the country. The flight of French *colons* mentioned previously signaled the transformation of the rural economy from one based on plantation slavery to one worked by an independent, free-holding peasantry, and the transformation of the polity from colonial to "independent" status. During most of its independent history, however, Haiti was a receiver of immigrants, as in the 19th and early 20th centuries -- Germans, French, Syrians, Lebanese, Italians, Chinese and West Indians flocked to its shores. The two major periods of emigration in the post-colonial era have a great deal in common. The first occurred during the American occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. The second corresponds with the hardening of the Duvalier regime beginning in the early 1960's and has continued ever since. Both periods have been characterized by extreme use of coercion, considerable inroads by foreign economic interests, and above all by grievous despoliation of the peasantry.

The American occupation of Haiti led to the acquisition of hundreds of thousands of acres of land by U.S. agribusiness companies. The resultant landless and impoverished peasantry had no alternative but to emigrate. The direction of the emigration was not to the U.S., however. The occupation authorities directed this despoliated mass to Cuba and the Dominican Republic where they went to work under

conditions of extreme exploitation and deprivation as cane cutters in American-owned sugar cane plantations. Three hundred thousand Haitians are said to have abandoned the country during the 19 years of occupation.[6] The traffic of Haitian labor to Cuba was ended in 1928, but in the Dominican Republic the Haitian demographic pressure led to the massacre of several thousand Haitians by Trujillo's forces.

Apart from the politicians and military officers who lost out in the electoral and barracks struggles of the period from 1956 to 1958, it was the intellectuals and professionals who first began to feel the pressure to emigrate. The first major contingent went to the former Belgian Congo (now Zaire) in the early 60's, where at the time of the crisis there they made up some of the teaching, professional, and administrative corps. Others went to Canada, France, and Latin America. Important contingents of Haitians settled in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and even in much larger numbers -- some say as many as 300,000 -- in the Dominican Republic.

At the beginning, the Haitian immigrants to the U.S. were mostly of an urban middle class background. By the late 50's and early 60's, the urban upper class began increasingly to join their ranks. By the mid-60's the phenomenon had spread upward and downward to practically all sectors of Haitian society, including members of the rural sub-proletariat. This is true also of Canada (essentially Quebec Province) and now even France, which traditionally attracted only intellectuals (students and professionals).

The early Haitian immigrants into the United States, even those who could have done better, found jobs mostly in factories. As they became more numerous and, above all, more knowledgeable about the milieu, some began to move into white collar jobs (e.g., banking) while a very few others went into

business on their own, opening gas stations, setting themselves up as repairers, electricians or cleaning contractors. The women went to work in hospitals and nursing homes, as nurses' aides and, in increasingly large numbers, particularly in New York, as registered nurses. Many of them, of course, are still working as maids. By the 60's, many were employed as secretaries in private firms and a few in African missions to the UN and at the UN itself. More recently, they have been embracing the computer field -- particularly keypunching -- and accounting.

Meanwhile, by the mid-60's, the professionals could be found in this country in increasing numbers. This became more evident with the beginning of the end of the Congo experiment. As their contracts with the Congolese (now Zairian) government came to an end, many of the Haitian teachers went to Canada, but large numbers came to the US also, either directly or through Canada.

Around the same time came a number of engineers, lawyers, agronomists and doctors. While the lawyers and agronomists have had some difficulty of adjustment, having had to accept jobs outside their fields, the engineers and doctors have for the most part worked in their fields for private and public organizations. An increasing number of the doctors have started their private practice upon passing their medical board exams. Finally, there is to be found a not negligible number of college and university professors not only in the South, as previously, but also in the North and West.

At first, the Haitians settled in New York on the upper West Side of Manhattan -- between Broadway or Amsterdam Avenue and Riverside Drive, and between the mid-70's and the lower 100's -- and in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn. Those neighborhoods still contain the largest concentrations of Haitians in the country. After a while, however, as they began

to know their way around, some started moving to other areas of Brooklyn, to Queens -- particularly to Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, and Flushing -- and, more recently, to Long Island. Meanwhile, others were moving to other cities and towns, such as Nyack, New York, various urban areas in New Jersey, and also to Chicago, Miami, and more recently, Boston, though New York City still remains the major center of attraction, with at least two-thirds of the estimated 300,000 Haitians in the U.S.

Haitian Immigration To Boston

The Haitian population of Boston has grown considerably over the past few years, from an estimated 5,000 in 1970 to a figure between 10,000 (according to the Immigration authorities) and 15,000 (according to the Haitian community leaders). Yet, to a significant extent it has remained a cultural appendage of New York and, to a lesser extent, of Montreal. Lately, however, it has begun to move toward standing on its own.

Haitians have been moving to Boston in significant numbers only over the past decade or so. They were attracted primarily by the prospect of a quieter life than in New York City, as well as by access to better-paying jobs, and better and cheaper housing. Those who have children expected also that the schools would be better there. These hopes have not always been fulfilled, but once the critical number of newcomers was settled, the process acquired a high momentum and continued unabated.

The first to move to Boston arrived mostly from New York. But soon the Congo contingent began to join their ranks, and by the late 60's people were coming directly from Haiti, though a few made the move from Canada. The bulk of the Haitians here are to be found in Dorchester, Mattapan, Roxbury, and Jamaica

Plain. There are also significant clusters in Cambridge, Somerville and Waltham. There are, of course, individuals and families scattered all over the state of Massachusetts, but predominantly in the vicinity of Boston. Their occupations and economic activities run the whole gamut mentioned above.

An article in a New York newspaper characterized the Haitians there as "the invisible minority."[7] This description is more true of the Haitians in Boston than it is of those in New York. Even though their number is growing very rapidly, they are not yet sufficiently numerous to be readily noticeable. It is important to note, however, that this invisibility which Bryce-Laporte discusses as being a double one for the Black immigrant -- that of being black and that of being a black foreigner[8] -- is only a matter of white perception. For the native Blacks in whose midst they live, the Haitians and other West Indians are all too visible.

Both as a natural inclination and at times as an effort to break out of this invisibility, Haitians often talk loudly in public places using Creole or French, the two languages of Haiti, as instruments of social differentiation, a phenomenon which has also been observed among other black immigrants in the United States.[9] The peculiar linguistic situation of Haiti is such that French (the language of a small minority of no more than 10 to 15 percent) is endowed with prestige, recognition, and official status, whereas Creole, the universal language, has traditionally been relegated to a secondary status -- though much less so under the Duvalier regime. This situation serves to push the linguistic maneuvers one step farther. It happens sometimes that two people conversing in Creole automatically switch to French as soon as they notice the presence of a white person within hearing distance -- raising the voice in the process,

if deemed necessary. A variant of this behavior is to continue to speak Creole (especially when one does not know French) -- and, when the white stranger inquires as to which language one is speaking, to say that it is French.[10] This poor man's version of the linguistic effort would seem to suggest a triple invisibility of the black foreigner who speaks what is mistakenly thought of as "broken French," or at best an undistinguished dialect, instead of the (French and West African derived) language which it is.

Another natural method of attempting to achieve the visibility that counts is to dress soberly and conservatively, wear one's hair short and one's moustache neatly trimmed. There is, however, no serious evidence that Haitians are necessarily at all times and in all circumstances more subdued in their behavior and deportment than the native Blacks, as alleged by some commentators.[11] This is all rather circumstantial. It is more likely that the Haitians, quite a few of whom are labeled illegal aliens, are unsure of their position in the society and prefer not to call undue attention to themselves when they are outside their immediate neighborhoods.

Most important still is the fact that, among the younger Haitians, even those who were born in Haiti, there is a lesser fear of "making waves" and a greater tendency to approximate the dress, appearance and behavior codes of their American counterparts. For them, the problem of invisibility is either negligible, or it is resolvable through affirmation rather than denial. It is remarkable how these issues are often discussed without reference to the generational and the class factors. Patterns of belief and behavior are assigned to native blacks and foreign blacks *in toto* as if each group were monolithic along all dimensions. It would be more fruitful to determine how such patterns are distributed along generational

and class categories.

On the question of class, it should be pointed out that the Haitian community in Boston is much less blatantly stratified than that of New York. This has a great deal to do with the smaller size of the Boston Haitian population. In New York, the "elite" live in Queens and the "masses" in Brooklyn, especially in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area, and the so-called "middle classes" in various sections of Brooklyn and Manhattan. Although this is not entirely true, it is quite true that the better off, fair-skinned and fair-haired people tend to cluster in Queens. A Haitian journalist is reported to have alleged that "...'the poor Haitians in Manhattan and Brooklyn are all yearning to get to Queens'," home of the "homeowners and naturalized American citizens."[12] While there are homeowners and citizens in Brooklyn too, it is well known that the people from Queens do not generally visit Brooklyn, even to see relatives, in some cases. While similar class lines may be found in the Boston areas, they are not accompanied by the blatant ideology that underlies color-class relations in New York. In any case, there are few representatives of the traditional Haitian elite in Massachusetts. Whatever elite may exist there, it is one that attained its status through professional achievement rather than through replay of the old country's ascriptive system in the host society. And at any rate that putative elite has no *esprit de corps*, no sense of a collective existence apart and above the rest of the community.

Adaptation To the Host Society

Adaptation here refers both to one's adjustment to the human and physical environment and to the ability to make it work to one's advantage. Adaptation need not mean complete integration into the host

society or even a determination to do so, but it may. This was the option identified at the beginning of this essay as the "Westernization" syndrome.[13] As also indicated earlier, while such an option may be contemplated in France where possession and mastery of the elements of high French culture go some way toward mitigating the ascribed status derived from one's race and color, the blunt and direct nature of American racism does not readily offer such an opportunity. At any rate, the opportunity, even if present, would be accessible only to the educated classes (elite and middle class) which until very recently were the only ones represented in France. Clearly, in addition, the problem of adaptation here is not a mere one of black foreigners dealing with white natives. One must also deal with a very substantial, strong and active minority of black natives, one that has very definite and at times rather intolerant and ethnocentric ideas about blackness as viewed from the standpoint of the foreign black.

Still, a very small minority does attempt the "Westernization" approach to adaptation. There are two principal modes of approach to this. One could be called "Franco-Westernization" and is characteristic of those few people in Boston who organize French-oriented cultural groups where they recite French poetry and sing French songs. They also celebrate Bastille Day at the French Consulate, even to the point of providing the live music and entertainment.[14] The other mode could be called "Americano-Westernization" -- a term which I admit to be somewhat cumbersome. This behavior is attributed to some of the naturalized American citizens of Queens, but of course only the very lightest-skinned among them can be successful at such attempts.[15]

The other type of behavior, mentioned above, (also from the work of Bastide, Morin and Raveau) is

the "autarkic" behavior, which Morin identified as being characteristic of the Haitians in New York -- as compared to those in France. It is the contention here that Haitians as a group in the Boston area are more engaged in this behavior than those in New York. Yet, as in New York, this observation holds true for those who live among large concentrations of Haitians -- such as in Dorchester, Mattapan, or Roxbury.

A third type identified for France is that of the "identity-seekers." But in the French context, it is defined not as a choice of the African heritage in rejection of the European element in the Haitian middle-class culture, but rather as a transcendence of the two in search of a progressive ideology.[16] In the context of this paper, which focuses on the United States, the category should be modified to encompass two modes of behavior. One seeks identification with the aspirations and struggles of the native blacks in a spirit of Pan-Africanism. This behavior is associated with some of the intellectuals, especially among those involved in Afro-American studies programs in the colleges and universities. The other mode opts for a revolutionary leftist ideology, a Marxist stand. Both modes are sparsely represented in the Boston area, although the second is represented by a political group that has other chapters in New York, Paris, Brussels, Spain and Montreal. In Montreal where the conditions faced by the Haitian immigrants most closely approximate those of France, the question of black identity is usually framed not with respect to native blacks, who are very few in number, but with respect to the historic black-mulatto antagonism in Haiti; hence the debate over *noirisme* ("blackism") and *mulatrisme* and their Marxist opponents,[17] which is really a version of the old class *vs* race (or color) debate.

A fourth type of behavior isolated by the

Bastide-Morin-Raveau team is called the "pragmatic type."[18] Those who engage in this type of behavior in France are students who take the fullest advantage of the educational and other opportunities offered by the host society without worrying over issues of identity or integration since their objective is to go to the United States for professional specialization and work. In Boston, as elsewhere in the United States, this attitude would be found in most Haitian college students with the difference that the objective for most of them is to stay in the U.S. and work. A smaller number, from upper class or bourgeois backgrounds, study in the fields of business or engineering with the intention of returning to Haiti to carry on the family tradition or business.

For most of the older Haitian immigrants, too, the objective, ideally, is to go home. This is why a transient mentality continues to dominate the psyche of most Haitian immigrants across all the behavior types, although probably to a much lesser extent in the "pragmatic" category. This yearning someday to be able to pack up and go home, though it is becoming less and less realistic, is very strong among those who were involved in politics back home, and also of course among the members of the political organizations presently operating in the U.S. of which there are two in Boston.

Yet, this transient mentality is under strong challenge by the circumstance of events. More and more Haitians are acquiring American citizenship. In New York City alone, there are thought to be about 50,000 naturalized citizens. This is why New York Representatives Percy Sutton and Shirley Chisholm have been interacting more and more with the Haitian American Citizens Society and other organizations and individuals. A Haitian vote is lurking on the horizon. This leads us to an examination of the second aspect of

adaptation, that is the ability to use the environment to one's advantage, the first aspect discussed above having been one's identification with the elements of the environment or host society. Acquiring U.S. citizenship, however, is not only useful in granting access to more potential tangible and intangible rewards in the United States itself. Haitians are in the uniquely unenviable position of needing foreign citizenship to protect them at home from arrest, imprisonment, death, and other forms of harassment from the various security forces and powerful individuals. United Stated or Canadian citizenship is the best guarantee of a trouble-free visit back home.

This reinforces a process which is the opposite of nation-building, a functional mode of national disintegration characterized not by ethnic or other forms of sectional or segmental conflicts, but by the inexorable sapping of national loyalties, the total alienation of large sectors of the national society, the valorization of foreign citizenship and the corresponding devalorization of one's native citizenship, because it brings few symbolic rewards, no material rewards, and plenty of trouble on a mass scale.

At the other extreme on the scale of instrumental adaptation from the naturalized citizens are the illegal aliens and the refugees. The Boston area Haitian colony has a very high percentage of illegals. Of course, with their economic crisis, their ever precarious situtation has become even more so. They live under constant fear of being discovered, arrested, and deported. They are at the mercy of their employers. They dread the periodic immigration raids on places of work in the area. The least that can happen to them is to be dismissed from their jobs. When this happens they find it almost impossible to obtain new employment. Yet, they are not eligible for unemployment compensation, food stamps, welfare, or any other kind

of benefits. This, of course, undermines their capacity to adapt and to integrate into the society by making them fearful of the authorities, of organizations and agencies, and of any kind of involvement. They are truly invisible, for a low profile or, better, no profile at all is their best mode of approach to the host society -- an extreme form of "autarky."

Although the refugees are concentrated in Miami, not in Boston, their case deserves discussion, because of its importance and its tragic nature. Their lot is worse than that of the ordinary illegals most of whom come here on a tourist or other temporary visa, go to work, then overstay their permitted time and thus become illegal aliens. The refugees also enter the country illegally, usually crowded on small, leaky boats which barely make it to the shore in Southern Florida after a dangerous and trying 800-mile voyage. When these people land on shore they immediately claim political asylum. Instead, they are promptly arrested by the agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In some cases they are released on bail, especially the women and children. The men are usually put in detention where they stay an average of 6 to 8 months. Some are deported after hearings. Only a few return voluntarily or are permitted to stay.

According to Leonard F. Chapman, INS Commissioner, from December 1972 through August 1974, 1,158 such unfortunates arrived in the United States. As of June 28, 1976, there were 123 asylum cases pending, and 525 Haitians involved in court cases without being detained.[19]

The issue as defined by INS is whether these people are political or economic refugees. In the former case -- which requires proof of persecution for reasons of race or political, social or religious affiliation and of great danger if returned home --

the refugee is entitled to asylum. The INS argues that there is no basis in domestic or international law for granting asylum on grounds of economic deprivation. In this, it is supported by the State Department which maintains that the Haitians are indeed economic refugees.

The other aspect is humanitarian and it was raised to the fullest during the 1974 debates on the illegal Haitian aliens in Quebec Province. There, by virtue of its significance for Francophonic ethnonationalism in Quebec, that issue achieved a political and media salience that the plight of the Haitians could never achieve in the United States,[20] in spite of the interest manifested by some members of Congress, notably Joshua Eilberg and Peter Rodino.[21] It has been argued on humanitarian grounds that these people, who would not have braved the ocean in skimpy boats and faced all those dangers if they had not been confronted by extreme deprivation, should be granted asylum. Even a Congressional report acknowledges that in present-day Haiti, where the extractive and coercive functions are practically the only ones fulfilled by Government, the distinction between economic and political oppression is irrelevant and impractical.[22] Yet, it still concludes overall that most of the individuals are economic refugees and therefore they should not be granted asylum, unless they can prove otherwise, which the report itself admits may be impossible in the "best" of cases because of the highly decentralized and even individualized nature of the system of repression in Haiti.[23]

The problem here is racial/ethnic and political. As black refugees in an Anglo-Saxon dominant society without any significant nationalistic white group with any affinity with them, linguistic or otherwise, the Haitians fail to achieve salience in the country. Of course, they do attract the support,

not only of their fellow Haitians here, but also of various American organizations and volunteer individuals who have given generously of their time and energy. But they have failed to become the subject of a national debate of the kind that occurred in Canada.

Such a debate might have focused attention on the other aspect of the issue: the political-security aspect of the United States refugee policies. Two obvious cases in point are Cuba and Vietnam. Given the current U.S. support for the Duvalier government, which the conventional wisdom alleges to be in process of liberalization, the chances of any responsiveness to request for mass asylum are slim. Thus, the U.S. government is caught between the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, its relations with Duvalier require rejection of the argument of political persecution. On the other hand, since the period of the Occupation, as we saw earlier, emigration has been used as a safety valve in periods of crisis to allay the pressures of economic, social, and political demands which threaten to blow up the system. Therefore, the solution adopted is one of tough muddling through. Be tough with the refugees in upholding the law and maintaining deterrence, humiliate and brutalize them all, deport a few, grant a few requests for asylum, pressure the rest to return home voluntarily, keep a number in prison, drag the hearings and court proceedings along, allow bonds to a large number and let them abscond and disappear into the urban jungle.

Conclusion

Most of the estimated 300,000 Haitians in Boston and other parts of the U.S., while better off than the refugees, face very difficult problems with respect to employment, housing, education, health care, and the like. Yet, they manage to adapt.

In Boston, the community is in a state of

rapid change, as there has been considerable growth of cultural, political, mutual help, sports, and religious organizations over the past few years. The dependency on New York and Montreal for cultural sustenance of which I spoke earlier is diminishing. Boston now has its own band, soccer teams and basketball team. There was also a short-lived newsletter, which may be started again. There is even a dance and theatre group sponsored by Haiti Culturelle, a cultural organization, which has given successful performances both in New York and in Montreal. Boston still has a long way to go. But it shares with New York the situation of having a majority of its Haitian immigrants toiling in factories and other menial jobs, adapting, adjusting, surviving.

Footnotes

[1]Françoise Morin, "Migrations haïtiennes et ethnicité," (Paper presented to the Applied Anthropology Congress, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 19-22 March 1975), p. 11; Roger Bastide, Françoise Morin and François Raveau, *Les Haïtiens en France* (Paris: Mouton, 1974), p. 202.

[2]Françoise Morin, *op. cit.*, p. 9; Roger Bastide *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-200.

[3]See, for instance, Fred Hapgood and Fred Woods, "Haitians in Boston," *Boston Sunday Globe Magazine*, August 29, 1971, pp. 27-30.

[4]Ira De Augustine Reid, *The Negro Immigrant: His Background, Characteristics and Social Adjustment 1899-1937* (New York: Columbia, 1939; Arno Press, 1969), p. 97.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 96.

[6]Suzy Castor, *La ocupación norteamericana de Haïtí y sus consecuencias (1915-1934)*,(Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno editores, S.A., 1971), p. 83.

[7]*Daily News*, January 11, 1971, p. 32 (my emphasis).

[8]Roy Bryce-Laporte, "The Black Immigrants: The Experience of Invisibility and Inequality," *Journal of Black Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, September 1972, pp. 29-56.

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 40.

[10]I am indebted to my wife, Edesse, for calling my attention to this phenomenon.

[11]Fred Hapgood and Fred Woods, *op. cit.*

[12]Jervis Anderson, "The Haitians of New York," *The New Yorker*, Vol. 51, No. 6, March 31, 1975, p. 55.

[13]Roger Bastide, Françoise Morin and François Raveau, *op. cit.*, Françoise Morin, *op. cit.*

[14]The growing success of New York-based Haitian musical groups (the so-called mini-jazz) in Paris, other European capitals, and the French Antilles, has opened whole new vistas with respect to this mode of "Westernization."

[15]Another possible mode of "Westernization" which is quite rare, and probably no longer occurs could be called "Hispano-Westernization" or "Ibero-Westernization," found among those who hispanicize their names and claim to be from a Latin American country.

[16]Bastide, Morin, Raveau, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-202; Morin, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-16.

[17]See, for instance, Jean-Richard Laforest, "Notes autour d'un article de René Piquion, *Nouvelle Optique*, no. 8, October-December, 1972, pp. 113-124; and Benoît B. Joachim, "Sur l'esprit de couleur," *ibid.*, no. 9, January-March 1973, pp. 149-158.

[18]Bastide, Morin and Raveau, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203.

[19]U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, *Haitian Emigration* (Washington: GPO, July 1976), Appendix 7, pp. 34,35.

[20]See Emerson Douyon, "Les immigrants haïtiens à Montréal," (Paper presented to the Society for Applied Anthropology, Amsterdam, 19-22 March 1975).

[21]U.S. House of Representatives, *op. cit.*

[22]U.S. House of Representatives, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[23]*Ibid.*, p. 12.

West Indians In Los Angeles: Community and Identity*

Joyce Bennett Justus

West Indian immigration to the United States dates back to the mid-nineteenth century and has occurred in two major waves. The earlier wave encompassed the first two decades of the twentieth century, showing a steady increase in the number of immigrants until passage of the Immigration Act of 1932. The Second Wave begins in the mid-1950's (with the modification of existing immigration laws) and has shown a consistent increase ever since. During the decade 1961-1970, more West Indians entered the United States than the total number which entered for the sixty-year period 1891-1950. (See Table I).

TABLE I

West Indian Immigration to the U.S.

1891-1900	33,066
1901-1910	107,548
1911-1920	123,424
1921-1930	74,899
1931-1940	15,502
1941-1950	49,725
1951-1960	123,091
1961-1970	470,213
1971-1974	251,052

Source: Annual Reports, Immigration and Naturalization Service

*This essay is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the annual meeting, American Anthropological Association, Mexico City, November 1974. I am grateful to my colleagues, F. G. Bailey and Ted Schwartz for their comments on earlier versions of the paper and acknowledge the research assistance of Bruce C. Harris, graduate student, Anthropology Department, UCSD.

Most of these immigrants settle, at least initially, in the New York metropolitan area. Indeed the official reports suggest that a mere trickle of this wave of recent immigrants give California as their ultimate destination in the United States.[1] Before 1950 there were reportedly only 500 West Indians in Los Angeles and though the number has increased some hundred-fold during the past twenty-five years, the size of the settlement is still small compared with West Indian communities in New York, Detroit and Chicago. It is difficult to estimate the actual size of the Los Angeles population since the question of illegal aliens, though perhaps of less importance numerically than the illegal aliens of *West Indian origin* in New York, is nonetheless important. Furthermore, there are second generation persons born in the United States or Panama who, though they may in fact perceive themselves as West Indians, do not appear in the census data on West Indians.

An overwhelming majority of the recent migrants are professional or technical workers. The few who are working class or blue collar are for the most part skilled or semi-skilled. Of the working class segment, most are of rural background; few are from major urban centers of any of the islands. In my own sample some seventy-six percent of those interviewed are from major urban centers. There is reason to believe that for understanding of migrants' subsequent behaviors the rural-urban dichotomy may not be as significant as is generally assumed.[2]

The Los Angeles population is young: forty-eight percent of all males and forty-one percent of all females of West Indian origin and appearing on the census data for the Los Angeles standard metropolitan service area are in the 15-45 age group; the next largest group is under fifteen years of age. The largest segment of

this population consists of persons who entered the United States either at New York, Boston or Miami. After an initial period of adjustment, acquisition of additional education and/or formal training, reunification of families or acquisition of families, members of the 15-45 age group migrated westward in search of higher wages, improved standards of living, better opportunities for children, improved weather conditions and such like. A second segment within that group is made up of immigrants who came directly to the area from the Caribbean. Included in this group are students in colleges and universities in the area and recent graduates of these institutions who have decided to remain. The population can further be divided in terms of length of time in the area. Nonetheless, both recent and long-term residents see themselves as middle class and originate from all the islands of the English-speaking Caribbean as well as the Spanish- and French-speaking Caribbean. (Jamaicans claim to be the largest component of this group.) Also included in the group are Panamanians and Central Americans of West Indian parentage, many of whom are very active in West Indian cultural affairs.

Structure of West Indian Migrant Society

One important feature of the Los Angeles West Indian community is that it is not localized. There are no clearly demarcated spatial boundaries between West Indians and non-West Indians. Few live in close proximity to fellow countrymen. Nonetheless, there is a collective consciousness of West Indianness which finds expression in a multiplicity of Caribbean organizations. These include cricket clubs, social clubs, student organizations, civil rights groups and groups with a strong political orientation. Some are middle class exclusively recruiting members from professionals and highly salaried technicians; others

recruit members from the working class. One association is regional in orientation, recruiting members from among those persons who had settled in New York prior to migrating to the West Coast. In another, persons living in the area for more than thirty years predominate. Some display a marked longevity having worked well for more than twenty-five years; others are less effective, plagued by factionalism and these function intermitantly.

Some of the attitudes and beliefs which maintain class differences in the West Indies have been transferred to the Los Angeles area by both middle and lower class migrants. In friendship relations and associational contacts, middle and lower groups are socially segregated, and *lower class* groups are often rebuffed in their attempts to make social contacts and associate themselves with the middle class. Regardless of that situation, however, there are occasions when social class distinctions are ignored. Carnival is the major annual affair, co-sponsored by several of the groups. Everyone is involved in a ritual of renewal, where all West Indians are indeed West Indians and apart from everyone else with Carnival serving as an annual, visible, reaffirmation of their special identity. Efforts are made to recreate the island atmosphere in food, drink, costume, and music, and everyone is caught up in the frenzy of a *creole bacchanal*. Other occasions, less universal in appeal, are the annual Independence Anniversary Celebrations of each of the territories, celebrations which mark the visit of a major West Indian dignitary to the area, receptions for new West Indian students at area universities and inter-association cricket competitions.

How do the West Indians perceive themselves? For most, the Caribbean area is still home, and they look to home for definitions of not only who they are but more significantly, what they can become since,

despite the persistence of social class distinctions in the Caribbean, there are at least two avenues of upward mobility: education and wealth. Some associations sponsor annual trips to the West Indies although the distance (e.g., from Los Angeles to Port-of-Spain T.T.) results in a greater frequency of contact with Jamaica and Panama than other places. Most cling to their "West Indianness," talk about returning home to settle, read the overseas edition of their local papers and maintain a lively interest in Caribbean politics.

In summary, the heterogeneity of West Indian society, both along lines of class and place of origin in the West Indies, tends to be pervasive and to obstruct overall unity of the group. Thus, internal stratification creates horizontal lines of cleavage, but the total size of the community as a whole effectively prevents vertical divisions based on country of birth. Although there are in fact competing island loyalties and rivalries, the socio-economic cleavages are by far the more significant. Notwithstanding those distinctions, the entire group is caught up in an attempt to maintain their West Indianness. This sets the community apart from other groups, including the Black American society. The question of identity therefore implies the problem of American racism. The effort to successful escape of these interconnections underlies the responses adopted by the West Indians in this study.

The data presented in the following pages have been selected to illustrate how the West Indian immigrant's behavior in the public and private domain is influenced and modified not only by the demands of each particular situation but also according to his migration ideology.[3] Migrant ideology is, in fact, reinforced by the socio-cultural framework found in the host society. The normative requirements of particular

social institutions and organizations may allow or require movements by the immigrants to and fro between polar types of bicultural behavior.[4]

How do West Indians accommodate to life in Los Angeles? In what sense can they be said to be integrated into U.S. society? In order to answer these and subsequent questions the study relies on intensive interviews of a few individuals rather than on broad sample surveys.[5] The goal here is to identify the significant social networks within which these individuals act out aspects of their existence. For that reason the insights and information it yields do not lend themselves to extensive statistical generalizations.

The Private Domain: The Family

The core of the social network of most West Indian immigrants is the family. West Indians are preferred as marriage partners. Many Los Angeles West Indians marry other West Indians prior to migrating, send money to pay passages for prospective brides or bridegroom, or choose partners from among other West Indian immigrants. The hierarchy of choice is fellow islanders, other West Indians, Americans of West Indian parentage, other foreign non-whites (especially Africans) and last, Americans black or white.

The family at home in the West Indies displays at least two divergent forms: the one matrifocal extended -- highly correlated with low status, seasonal plantation labor, and the economic marginality of men; the other patrilineal nuclear, associated primarily with the middle and upper class.

In Los Angeles men appear to be increasingly involved in family life (e.g., domestic chores, socialization of children), and the family is predominantly nuclear, although there are reports of close interaction among female kin.

Some of the families interviewed had close relatives (brothers, sisters) residing in the Los Angeles area. One family had all of its members -- mother, father, brothers and sisters, residing there. Others had chosen Los Angeles because of the presence of an older relative in the area. There is a high degree of interaction among these families and three of the families among the thirty-five with whom I talked reported little or no social interaction outside relatives. Even if one has no relatives in the area there are many West Indians willing to serve as functional equivalents; new immigrants to the region tend to be adopted by one of the older residents of the area, and students find West Indian families willing to provide them with a home away from home. (One family with whom I spoke compared the experience of familial interaction to that of a rural child migrating to Kingston to school.)

An often mentioned concern was the problem of bringing up children in the area. Few regarded the schools as inferior, yet some had sent children back to the islands to school. Others spoke of persons who had done this and deplored the fact that they were unable to do so. The main concern here, however, was not so much education *per se*, but the desire to bring up children as West Indians, with West Indian values. Often mentioned in interviews were attitudes to family, respect for elders, concern for siblings, willingness to assume responsibility and not having too many friends. Indeed, the peer group influence concerned the parents most, and they feared that their children's desires for peer acceptance would outweigh attempts to bring up another generation of West Indians

West Indian Associations

West Indian associations in the Los Angeles

metropolitan area claim as members over seventy percent of the resident West Indian population. Some are active members. Others are nominal, paying dues intermittently. Some West Indians belong to more than one of these clubs at the same time.

The single largest group is comprised of the cricket clubs. These exist mainly to foster an interest in the sport and to offer West Indians an opportunity to play the game. The only requirement for membership is an ability to play cricket, a skill that every make West Indian possesses to a greater or lesser extent. In these clubs social class distinctions are far less obvious or seemingly important. However, a few upper-middle class professionals belong to clubs which do not have exclusive West Indian membership but include individuals from fellow Commonwealth nations (Britain, India, Pakistan, or New Zealand). An important feature of the cricket club is the tour to the West Indies (Jamaica annually, the eastern Caribbean intermittently). Tours have functioned not only to maintain a lively interest in cricket but also to strengthen the ties between the communities of Los Angeles and the communities in the insular Caribbean. One result is an apparent decline in inter-island rivalry since members of the Los Angeles community get the chance to visit sister islands for the first time, rather than always going home to their own island communities.[6]

Social clubs are more homogeneous, membership being recruited from among persons with similar educational or occupational backgrounds; in short, from the same social class. Since membership tends to be more exclusive, it can be more prestigious to belong to one social club rather than to another. Furthermore since leadership is recruited from among upper middle class professionals, there has been conflict between membership and leadership in regards to goals and

means for achieving them. This has, on occasion, led to individuals withdrawing and starting a rival club, but invariably after a time leadership reverts to the upper middle-class professionals.

Social clubs appear to receive strong support from second and third generation West Indians in Los Angeles. Participation in social clubs does not decline with length of residence in the United States. On the contrary, the more successful the West Indian becomes (success here defined in socio-economic terms), the more likely is he to become active in West Indian affairs.

In summary, clubs have become an important means for the preservation of cultural pride and West Indian national identity. They provide a locus of non-familial interaction. Members say that they receive counsel, support, assistance in time of need, and friendship and sympathy from fellow members. Family and friends at home are said to use the clubs to locate relatives with whom they have lost contact. And, true or not, the significant fact remains that members perceive this as an appropriate function for the club This suggests that such organizations may also be viewed as a means for ensuring that one's obligations to family at home are met, for example, in regards to remittances. And, finally, it was also reported that club members have helped other members to reconsolidate their families by writing letters to appropriate authorities in the United States and abroad, and, by personally serving as escorts for young children in transit from the Caribbean to join parents in the Los Angeles area.

The Public Domain

What is the involvement of West Indians in the wider society? To what extent do they participate in American institutions?

The most extensive involvement of the West Indian in Los Angeles is in the area of employment. Most enter the labor force in positions which afford them better than average working conditions and better than average salaries. A minority, though striving to become para-professionals or skilled workers, are not yet at this stage. This latter group cheerfully accepts jobs which would be considered demeaning or at least less than desirable by American standards and which they themselves would not have accepted in the Caribbean, the key being that the wages they receive are higher than those received by persons of relatively high status in the West Indies. Additionally these migrants accept such jobs because they see them as part of a temporary phase -- steps on the way towards some clearly defined goal. The salary advantages contribute significantly not only to their sense of well-being, but also to their ability in fact to achieve their stated goals.

It is in employment that the greatest accommodation to American norms has to be made. The West Indian comes in contact with American attitudes towards Blacks and it is here that he strives to maintain his sense of self as West Indian, while at the same time conforming to standards of work for Americans. Reports of discriminatory acts by fellow workers are treated in a cavalier manner and when pressed for specific information as to how the individual West Indian actually felt about these incidents and how he actually coped, several interviewees reminded the interviewer that the reason for migration was to make money, not to make friends.

Education

For many West Indian immigrants to the United States availability of education and possibility of obtaining professional training was a compelling

reason for migration. California, with its network of state-supported, relatively inexpensive colleges and universities, provides many an immigrant with the opportunity for achieving at least one of his stated goals. Historically in the Caribbean area education has been the *sine qua non* for upward mobility, although access to education was restricted initially *de jure* and later *de facto*. Persons of West Indian origin still accept (perhaps rather naively) the folk belief that everyone can achieve, that lack of educational success is attributable to the individual: he failed to work hard, did not study enough, spent too much time with friends or the like. West Indian families continue to place great stress on the acquisition of education both for themselves and their children. During the period of the interviews, every one of the families was involved with educational institutions and the educational process: one had as many as three members in evening classes, working toward advanced degrees.

Given the West Indian attitudes toward education, few reported problems with educational institutions. One difficulty reported by the adults in post-secondary education was the differences in orientation between American educational systems and British-derived West Indian systems.[7] But here again the problems were viewed as individual, not systemic and solvable by each person with hard work and in his own time. Parents of children in elementary, junior high and, more especially, high schools, complained that not enough was demanded of the children and that as a result they were endeavoring to make sure that their children were challenged, and that they did more than the schools required of them. Consequently, informants reported little conflict with the schools, and several of the parents maintained a lively interest in school affairs, were active in P.T.A. and

generally supported the schools as much as their own schedules would allow.

Other Institutions

Only two of the West Indians in my sample had acquired United States citizenship. Although I have no means of evaluating this in terms of the total West Indian immigrant population in the area, reports are that the majority of the West Indians have not acquired United States citizenship, despite the fact that all former British colonies allow their nationals to hold dual citizenship. One result of this is that few are active participants in the political process and few maintain an active interest in American politics.

Beyond the political arena, there is little need for effort to acquire American norms and value orientations. Contact with institutions such as banks and post offices require minimal understanding of the processes involved. English-speaking West Indians are at an advantage in that though there are indeed differences between West Indian English and American English, the educated West Indian has little or no difficulty comprehending what is involved in transactions with institutions and officials. In addition, West Indians can look to other West Indians to mediate initial contact or explain the "rules of the game," the "hidden agendas," metaphors frequently employed by West Indians in discussing their interactions with the public sector.

In general, West Indian involvement is confined to education and employment and even in these spheres attitudes and values are significantly influenced by West Indian cultural values: it is doubtful whether one can speak of absorption. The reasons for this may be due less to West Indian cultural conservatism than to the structure of U.S. society, in particular the

perceived advantages or disadvantages of assimilation. The fact that even successful West Indians, second and third generation born outside of the West Indies (in the United States mainly), continue to maintain a lively interest in West Indian affairs seems to suggest that for many there are advantages perceived in maintaining their identity as West Indians, and that in the private domain there is conscious effort to preserve this sense of identity, thus retarding the process of assimilation.

West Indians and American Blacks: Racial and Ethnic Identity

Why do West Indians strive to preserve their position as "strangers" in Los Angeles?

As ethnics of color, West Indian migrants to the United States are not only caught up in a quest for identity but also in an attempt to develop and foster a positive group or self-image. As blacks and migrants they are caught up in the quest for an identity which does not deny their racial heritage but neither does it undermine their search for a positive group or self image. Given their racial features and heritage to assimilate is to be confused with Black Americans -- an ethnic group which has suffered traditionally from a less than equal or positive group or self image in the United States.[8] As an option some West Indians choose to retain or stress their "stranger-ness" a status which is less threatened by the stigma associated with being black *and* American.

The West Indians' quest for identity involves concerns quite similar to those of Black Americans. Despite the potential advantages of identification or association with Black American groups involved in similar quests and in spite of the dispersed settlement pattern and numerical smallness of the West Indian community in Los Angeles, they have rejected

this option.

The rejection, I believe, is based on the costliness of identification with a group which in their minds (1) have been assigned a less than desirable status and deprived of equal opportunities to employment, education and the other very tangible goals of self improvement for which the West Indian had immigrated; and consequently (2) whose self or group image has been generally negative. The decision to reject assimilation involves a guarding of socio-cultural and psychological boundaries in order to insure that a distinction is maintained between the two groups. It involves not only avoiding the disadvantages of unidentifiable association with a historically stigmatized group but an effort to avoid similar experiences of stigmatization and victimization because of such association. In that respect, despite their blackness, they subscribe to a conservative pattern of avoidance behavior that had not been unfamiliar in the relations among ethnic minorities of differing statuses in the United States. However, many of the younger elements in these various minorities have now begun to engage in parallel or cooperative actions towards changing the larger society.

Given their immigrant status, distinct socialization experiences and oft times transient orientations these West Indians may adopt instrumental attitudes and psychological distance towards the American society, its institutions and even its black community. This enables them to tolerate and withstand even anticipated forms of prejudice and discrimination in the pursuit of their objectives. But in doing so, generally, they do not accept the view of themselves as negative individually or as a group.

It is perhaps this sense of personal worth and ability to achieve in the face of great odds which

impelled them to migrate in the first place. The average migrant came in search of a means to improve his own economic position and, by extension, his status within his own society. He completely rejects the host society's definition of members of his racial group as inferiors to be spatially segregated and members of a pariah caste. Consequently, apart from competitive involvement in the public domain, he tends to surround himself with fellow West Indians, maintains strong ties with the Caribbean area and, for the most part, actively participates in a community which includes those at home and those abroad. Behaviors in both the public and private domain together help to maintain this community.

CONCLUSION

Those members of the West Indian community studied by the author reveal a high degree of integration and a high degree of compartmentalization at one and the same time. This should not be surprising for West Indian society is itself highly compartmentalized and each West Indian exists in a world within which there are clear distinctions between cultural norms and structural realities. Indeed all but the upper class must learn to cope with two separate realities, so to speak, and all are socialized into a world within which there is ambivalence towards blackness of skin, since this has come to be associated with poverty, distrustfulness and a less than favorable social position. Indeed, as R. T. Smith suggests:

> ....eventually we will have to make decisions about such questions as what is the meaning of blackness in societies integrated around the dominance of whiteness....(Smith 1963: 46).

Smith suggests that we require a discussion of the mode of integration. In my opinion what has been emerging

is compartmentalization, with integration occurring only on very specific levels. This background allows the West Indian migrant in Los Angeles to reject out of hand any felt pressures toward total integration into an alien society which would then cause him to be classified as inferior.

The West Indian looks to his homeland and to the local West Indian community in the United States for much of his acceptance or rejection, praise or blame, recognition for past achievements and support for his aspirations. Migration increases potential for mobility and provides each migrant with increased access to education and wealth. It also provides the opportunity for approximating more closely the culturally defined goals and ideals brought from home. Yet, for reasons such as those stated above there is no incentive for full structural and cultural integration into American life. Succeeding generations of West Indians will perhaps continue to reaffirm their West Indianness in the face of increasing pressure from the host society (as well as segments of the community at home) to examine what is the meaning of blackness and by extension what is the relative value of being Black West Indian or Black North American, in a society of abundant wealth and opportunity but where institutional racism restricts participation and mobility for non-whites

Footnotes

[1]There may be some reason to believe that this situation will change over the next few decades. See, e.g. Cardona and Simmons (1975), for a discussion of how 'stepwise' migration gradually becomes 'direct migration' with the progressive establishment of kin and ethnic groups in the destination area.

[2]This is especially true in the later stages of major social migratory movements. See Cardona and Simmons

(1975) for a discussion of the psychocultural and physical 'costs' of migration. They note that as more and more people migrate there is a mutual influence for change exerted by the rural and urban areas. This leads to a leveling of the gradient between rural and urban psychocultural demands and processes, thus decreasing the importance of the rural-urban dichotomy for explaining subsequent migration. See also T. G. McGee (1975) for a discussion of the need to keep the city in proper perspective as a socializing influence. See also Green (1975) for a discussion, in an international context, of the effects of migration on the consciousness of the population remaining at home.

[3]Migration ideology is the cognitive model which the immigrant holds as to the nature and goals of his migration. See Philpott (1963) for a more detailed discussion of the concept.

[4]For African, e.g., see Epstein, Gluckman. In fact "detribalization" may be a misleading, or at best, Eurocentric concept. See Southall (1975) for a compelling statement of the thesis that what have been regarded as ancient tribal groups are actually of much more recent origin and, in many cases, may be primarily figments of the western imagination.

[5]Thirty-five West Indian families were interviewed over a two-year period. Twenty-five single women and ten single men have been added to the initial sample of families for purposes of comparison. As participant-observer and West Indian I have come in contact with other members of the West Indian community (as a member of two West Indian clubs since 1962) and these contacts have served to improve my understanding of the processes involved in preserving

"West Indianness" in Los Angeles.

[6]See Green (1975) concerning the racialization of West Indian consciousness as a result of experiencing British and U.S. social life.

[7]One instance frequently cited was the fact that students had to *choose* new classes every six months. Another was the fact that students had freedom to avoid the "harder subjects" -- mothers complained that children were "choosing" woodwork and auto mechanics instead of taking more mathematics and English.

[8]See N. Gonzalez (1975) for a discussion of the problems presented to Black migrants to the United States. See also J. Schreiber (1975) for an example of how pariah group designation may be avoided in the context of international migration.

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The Caribbean Expatriate: Barriers To Returning. Perspectives of the Natural Scientist*

Theodore A. Bremner

The enormous technological imbalance between industrial and agrarian societies places the nations of the Caribbean at a disadvantage in their attempts to produce effectively and competitively. In addition, world shortages of food and industrial raw materials, rampant inflation, and the steadily increasing cost of industrial fuels all combine to intensify the struggle for economic survival. Furthermore, their attempts at economic transformation have been met with cynicism and hostility by their metropolitan "benefactors." Slowly, but inevitably, Caribbean governments are coming to the realization that internal control of the means of production is a vital prerequisite to the realization of their national goals, and the only means of giving substance and viability to political independence. But, ownership of modern industrial facilities requires both the willingness and foresight to reclaim these resources as well as the technological competence to operate them successfully. Many attempts at nationalization are frustrated by a lack of any real control of external markets, an insufficiency of scientific and technological resources to initiate the research and development required to keep industries competitive, and finally by mismanagement. The second factor is perhaps the most crucial since it provides ready access for those forces who would subvert the national interest. The truth is, Caribbean nations are involved in a costly battle with industrial societies, in which each increase in the price of their product is met with an even

*This paper is an edited version of a presentation made for a program convened under the auspices of the Caribbean-American Intercultural Organization in Washington D.C. on 19 October 1974.

greater increase in the price of the technology needed for the continued functioning of industry. But even the limited scientific and technological resources are continually being lost to metropolitan societies, either because scientists trained abroad are reluctant to return, or because those trained in the Caribbean are eager to emigrate. The brain drain, we are told, is a very serious problem, and in order to understand its causes we must examine those forces, both personal and societal, which tend to attract Caribbean scientists to metropolitan societies, as well as those which tend to repel them from their homes. In other words, the Caribbean diaspora may be the result of two sets of forces, one attractive, the other repulsive.

The motives which actuate a person in his choice of profession, or country of residence, are usually quite complex and involve elements which defy classification into any rigid grouping or hierarchy. Nevertheless, at the risk of doing violence to the motives of some of my colleages, I will attempt to examine these under the following headings: (1) Economic, (2) Political, (3) Existential.

In the first category I include both personal and societal dimensions; in the second I will speak to the issue of the role of government in promoting trends within the society, as well as to the individual's political beliefs. And finally, in the third, I will examine those factors which, in my opinion, are under the exclusive control of the individual scientist, although this assertion is certainly debatable. I use the word existential (with profound apologies to any existentialists and/or semanticists) not in the esoteric, philosophical sense of the word, but to refer to the individual scientist's conception of reality, his search for meaning, and the manner in which his profession becomes a vehicle for realizing his emotional objectives.

There are many people, politicians included, who believe that all human behavior can be explained as

reaction to economic stimuli, that the desire for wealth determines what people do, and where they do it. It would be difficult to prove such people wrong, if only because wealth is a major factor in determining the lives of many people, and scientists are no exception. We are the products of generations of capitalist thinking and it is therefore perfectly understandable that our thinking should conform to those of our governing institutions whose very concept of national (not to mention personal) development is that of the western capitalist model. It is for this reason that some people will sell their services to the highest bidder, since working for wages in one's home, lower than those which could be earned elsewhere, is seen as a sacrifice. Some scientists see no reason why they should be required to make sacrifices, especially when the persons exhorting them to such heroism do not seem to be at any economic disadvantage.

It is a contention of some Caribbean governments that their economies cannot afford the unreasonably large salaries demanded by some people, and in some cases their refusal is justified, because the society is not sufficiently differentiated, technologically, to utilize all of the skills of some highly trained scientists. A government's reluctance to pay for skills not currently utilizable, is understandable. But the scientist who feels that his many years of costly study and experience entitle him to enjoy a life style "appropriate to his status" is not likely to be convinced by such arguments. There are powerful economic and political forces which reinforce such behavior. Despite a great deal of rhetoric to the contrary, the prospect of being poor in the Caribbean is not a pleasant one to contemplate. There may be dignity in labor, but there is also a remarkable correlation between highly paid labor and dignity. It is my belief that as the Caribbean continues to pursue the western model of development and its concomitant commercialization of life, the resulting loss

of community will intensify the desire for personal wealth. When a society becomes a market place, the dollar becomes the ultimate arbiter of value. I submit that as the quality of life in the Caribbean becomes more commercial, more emotionally and axiologically attenuated, the pursuit of wealth will acquire importance far beyond the purely economic, and may well become a substitute for all meaningful activity. There is good reason to believe that unless there is some fundamental change in the organization of our societies, expatriate scientists are likely to demand more, rather than less, in the future. One contributing factor to this attitude is the belief that governments are unwilling, rather than unable, to pay the salaries required. The differentials in pay between Caribbean expatriates and American, English, or Canadian expatriates, whether real or imagined, is a frequently mentioned complaint.

In regard to political motives, the very close ties between government and industry in government owned industries, which in the Caribbean means party and party owned industries, place severe strains on the relationship between the scientist and his institution. Not only is scientific competence a requirement, but in some cases is even a demonstrated commitment to the aims and objectives of the party in power. This requirement limits severely the freedom of the scientist to speak and act on political issues. There has developed an almost morbid hatred of scientists who speak out on political issues. Mention the name Capildeo to a member of the PNM in Trinidad and observe carefully the curious behavior which results. The behavior is indicative of an attitude towards the scientist; he is viewed as a technician, competent to pontificate on purely scientific matters, but lacking the insight of the unlettered citizen in matters of politics and economics. Most scientists find this view rather unflattering.

Other factors which contribute to the heightening disillusionment of scientists in the Caribbean would include governmental mismanagement, meddling by party hacks in the purely technical aspects of their work, unlimited promotional opportunities for incompetent but obsequious colleagues, and a general antipathy -- at the highest levels of government -- toward scientific research which does not promise quick political gains. Allow me to quote from Andrew Salkey's book *Georgetown Journal*. The Prime Minister at the end of an address to the Writer's and Artist's Convention expresses his concern for their intellectual waywardness:

> "Let me give you an example from experience in my own work of what I mean. The young University student comes along to me, and says he is doing some 'Pure Research.' 'Pure Research?' I ask. 'Why are you doing it?' 'Oh, because I am at the University of California, and they are interested in that sort of thing.' 'And what is it going to do for Guyana?' I ask. 'Oh,' comes the answer, 'I just get a kick out of it, a satisfaction out of involvement in this Pure Research.'
>
> This is what I mean by the 'disinterested aberration,' *mutatis mutandis*, which we cannot afford."

This exchange epitomizes the prevailing attitude of government to the so-called "Pure Sciences," unfortunately, it is based on a profound misunderstanding of science. The history of scientific discovery is replete with such "disinterested aberrations," but they have been the sources of the most revolutionary conceptual and technological advances. Perhaps only the practicing scientist knows how much of scientific discovery is serendipity. Governments are usually impatient with the leisurely approach of research scientists since their ordering of priorities does not usually coincide with the government's. But no one can really set a time table for discovery, if only because the very nature of discovery precludes timetables. If a scientist knew exactly what he was looking

for and where to find it, then there would really be no point in looking. The genius of a creative scientist lies in his ability to recognize and exploit to the fullest, an accidental discovery. I seriously question whether the expressed commitment to finding something is any guarantee of finding it.

Certainly, in the area of applied science, the limiting of the research focus may increase the probability that a problem will be solved, if it can be solved at all, with the current level of scientific knowledge. But to suppose that a society can build up a resource of applied scientists whose activity is directly and immediately relevant and instrumental to the realization of national goals without some foundation in the "Pure Sciences" is innocence of the purest kind. But this attitude is not new. Writing about Guyana more than 133 years ago, Schomburgh observed:

> Scientific Institutions have from time to time been projected, but they perished either in the bud or if they were established, they lingered a miserable existence and died a natural death. A spirit of apathy pervades the Colonists with regard to the encouragement of scientific discoveries and inquiries.

To make this statement contemporary, substitute antipathy for apathy.

A more recent observer analyzes this phenomenon somewhat differently. Observe the subtle change in the locus of responsibility.

> No, we've been slow with science. Not only in Guyana. In the whole Caribbean, in fact. Not our fault, either. You might call it one of the bad things we've inherited in our system, from history, from certain attitudes that people took up towards us, and so on.

And as a proposed solution to the problem:

> The incentives I mean must be more lasting than money, more influential than promotion and status. I think that the very best of incentives, which we could ever hope to find in a country like ours, at this stage of our

> history, as well, would be a set of new public examples . . . The incentives should come from the two sectors where there is real power. I mean that they should come from the top and from the people themselves, those who are not in the jerk-and-stop middle position in the society. I will put it plainer for you. The examples must come from the leadership and from the poor people, all at the same time.

In a proposal submitted recently (July, 1974) to the IDRC for the funding of a research project on the role of science and technology in the economic development and regional integration of the Caribbean, the Caribbean Regional Study Group on Science and Technology sums up the matter:

> In the Caribbean, the creation, dissemination, and application of new knowledge to productive process is hampered by attitudes which are heavily weighted in favor of traditional ways of doing things. There is a general fear of risk-taking and innovation and there has really been no indigenous scientific tradition. The scientist and engineer are not accorded the same esteem bestowed upon the older professions, and to a large extent, research work is regarded as esoteric and thus meaningless.

The proposal also criticises the educational system for its emphasis on "grammar school type" education, and the lack of integration between educational policy and the current or future skill demands of the economy.

I have deliberately refrained from discussing the role of private industry in creating favorable conditions for attracting expatriate Caribbean scientists under the heading of "economic factors", since such industries, where they are large enough to employ scientists, are usually the subsidiaries of multinational corporations whose research and development are done in the metropole, either because of the prohibitive costs of duplicating research facilities, or of their determination to reinforce the international division of labor which is

a vital component of the imperialist posture. If the latter alternative is correct, then this becomes largely a political matter.

Even after the political and economic barriers are removed or explained away, there remains still the matter of the individual's emotional ties to his/her community or origin. For many, the life of voluntary exile is a search for meaning, a search for dignity, an episode in the unending Odyssey. Many of our Caribbean scientists have come from the lower socio-economic strata of their respective societies. They enjoy the satisfaction of working in a society where their activity is considered important, where there is greater understanding and appreciation of science, and where they are accorded a dignity which they feel they have been denied in their communities of origin. It is not surprising then, that many would simply not want to return to the Caribbean, where the assumption of worth is not automatic, and where one constantly has to convince an indifferent or hostile community of the importance of scientific investigation. Thus there are many Caribbean expatriates who simply do not want to return to the Caribbean, regardless of monetary or other incentives.

In addition, there is always the fear of becoming isolated from their communities of interest, of practicing their science in less than adequate conditions, of losing access to the scientific and technological literature, and finally of becoming obsolete. These fears are not imagined, they are real. The lack of any substantive regional cooperation between scientific institutions in the Caribbean contributes to this feeling of isolation. Truly regional scientific organizations which encourage the sharing of ideas and facilities may help to alleviate this problem, but the establishment of such groups will require more than the verbal support of regional governments. Scientists want to be free to create and to criticize. It is the very stuff of which science is made,

and there is bound to be some carry over into private life, if such a distinction can be made. They cannot do this in a society where criticism is considered a subversive activity and where paranoid politicians and administrators would deny the scientist, because of his position of influence, the fundamental rights of citizenship.

I have attempted to describe, from my perspective as a natural scientist, some of the barriers to returning. I have refrained from attempting to devise strategies for removing them with the hope that there will be disagreement, and, that the ensuing dialogue will prompt the exploitation of diverse perspectives.

Perspectives on the Total Utilization of Manpower and the Caribbean Expatriate: Barriers To Returning*

Edwin H. Daniel

Any discussion of the Caribbean expatriate and the barriers that s/he faces in returning would not be complete without an analysis of the circumstances and underlying causes precipitating emigration. In this paper I propose to look at the barriers faced by former residents of the Caribbean domiciled overseas (especially those in the metropolitan centers of the U.S., Canada, and Europe). We shall look at the "brain drain" as it affects Trinidad and Tobago and discuss the practical barriers of re-entry affecting Trinidadian nationals. In an attempt to place these re-entry problems in perspective I will identify possible solutions to these problems. I believe that countries must view emigration within a framework that sets the "total utilization of available manpower" as its goal and recognizes that development is a dyadic process that necessitates simultaneous attention to acquiring both physical and human capital.

STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF THE "BRAIN DRAIN"

The desire of students for higher education represents one of the permanent stimuli to emigration. Available evidence indicates that the number of students who do not return is large. A UNITAR report indicates that educators, returning graduates, officials, parents, and students in Trinidad and Tobago and Toronto, Canada,

*This paper is an edited version of a presentation made for a program convened under the auspices of the Caribbean-American Intercultural Organization in Washington, D.C. on 19 October 1974.

reveal the following:

a) Non-return ratios of 30 to 50 percent and higher are generally found;
b) The greater the length of the stay abroad decreases the probability of eventual return;
c) The existence of students already abroad helps to attract new emigrants; and
d) The exodus is reinforced by expectations of higher income abroad.[1]

General patterns of emigration reveal that at least 60 percent of emigrants from Trinidad and Tobago can be classified as technical personnel. The motivation of professional emigres derives in part from expectations of higher income abroad and the desire to receive further education and training. The highest proportion of emigration is in the professional fields of science, medicine and education. Emigration among nurses is very high. Between 1960 and 1964, for example, 57 percent or 269 of 459 who graduated, emigrated.

Faced with a shortage of skilled manpower at the available salary level, employers adopt makeshift solutions. Some firms contract out functions for which no staff is available. This is particularly the case in publicity and accounting. This often results in operations being scaled down, a process which results in further unemployment of unskilled workers.

Estimates show that there is a shortage of 7,600 supervisory workers, 40 percent of the 1968 supply, a situation that employers regard as serious. Because such workers are unavailable, their places are taken by any highly literate clerical or unskilled worker who can be found. Firms replying to a survey questionnaire reported problems with the replacement personnel who were used to fill vacancies created in their organizations through emigration. In a manpower survey undertaken in 1968, 40 percent of the firms interviewed stated that a shortage of skilled and professional

labour was hindering plans for expansion. The shortages are not only affecting the expansion of existing businesses but also new private investors are discouraged because of reports of difficulties in obtaining an appropriate labour supply at reasonable cost. Professionals and skilled workers know that they can usually earn higher salaries abroad, a fact demonstrated by foreign managers working in their midst who receive salaries related to the higher scale of their own countries.[2]

Even within the context of low over-all productivity, the salary structure of the public sector, in particular, and also of many private organizations, does not give due recognition to the professional. The salary of an engineer, for example, is related to that of a clerk. Because the administrative class holds a preeminent position, a highly trained professional often has to accept an administrative post rather than one in a department more suited to his profession to gain an adequate salary. Thus, the inability to properly utilize professional training repeatedly has been given as a factor motivating emigration.

Trinidad and Tobago, as a country, has become an extension of the international operations of the metropolitan countries particularly through their large corporations. As a result, the production system is dictated by the demands of the international market which in turn determines the level of manpower utilization. The U.N. Report further suggests that this satellite relationship between the developing country and the metropole results in extensive foreign control and domination of key sectors of the economy, which has a tendency to restrict the employment of local professionals in favor of foreign representatives. In addition, due to the limited managerial opportunities, local firms operate as "very private companies" tightly controlled by families with very few managerial

opportunities open to nonfamily members. The resulting impact is a very obvious hindrance to upward mobility in the managerial system of the private sector. This contributes to the outflow of trained personnel and the prevailing lack of enthusiasm among expatriate managerial talent to return home.[3]

Since major planning and development of foreign firms tend to be centralized in the main office located in metropolitan centers, managerial talent including the techniques and processes of development is imported with negligible input from local professionals. Large scale projects involving the use of foreign capital very often demand the use of foreign firms with foreign managerial talent and this is done notwithstanding the availability of capable local institutions.[4] In addition, there is ample evidence that even international institutions find it difficult to modify their requirements in favor of the utilization of local institutions. While these circumstances contribute to the outflow of trained personnel, they also add to the frustrations of the expatriate who must negotiate gargantuan barriers on his return.

Some Practical Aspects Concerning Re-Entry for the Returning National

Once the decision to return is made, the expatriate must overcome legal barriers and the psychological obstacles generated by the process of acculturation in his adopted country.

a) In developing countries where dual citizenship is acknowledged there is usually no major problem except the legal formalities of reintegration. In extreme cases where the emigrant has taken on the nationality of the adopted society, he may be considered a foreigner in the land of his birth and this necessitates activating the formal process of re-adopting his birthplace.

b) Upon re-entry, the resolution of problems concerning interpersonal relationships depends upon the emigrant's level of awareness of the psychological barriers inherent in the process of acculturation. Very often the expatriate is quite critical of many aspects of the society and provokes reciprocal criticism for his foreign attitudes. The resources the re-entering emigrant brings in terms of training, skills, etc., may be viewed as a threat to elites who feel the safety of the status quo.

c) There invariably must be an adjustment to the prevailing work ethic. This may be very difficult for the expatriate who may have internalized certain basic attitudes towards work and the achievement of objectives which may not be present in the developing society. To prevent frustration of the expatriate, he must adjust to the rate and pace of development and the differing ways in which things are done.

d) The expatriate must come to grips with available possibilities for maintaining a reasonable level of professional growth. If he views the developing society as one that will stifle his own professional growth, he may be very hesitant to attempt re-entry. Not only does the expatriate need to adjust his expectations, but the developing country must ensure that consideration is made for this need. Encouraging expatriates to return and to remain usually requires a major restructuring of professional opportunities.

e) The whole area of family consideration is very important because very often the national's decision to return is not totally his own. Thought must be given to the acceptance of wife or husband. The first factor is one of the degree of readiness for returning by either partner. In addition the question of school age children and their education and future nationality are all matters for reflection. Coming to grips with these issues is often insurmountable.

The "Push" and "Pull" Phenomena

One of the reasons for the continuing existence of the problems that have been identified in this paper is a lack of effective policies resulting from inadequate analytic perspectives. Historically, scholars have tended to study emigration from the point of view of its effects and not its causes. Not until emigration has been studied causally can policy questions be properly addressed. One must inquire as to the "why" of emigration to unveil its harsh underlying realities before identifying policy prescriptions necessary for a solution.

Two phenomena herein labeled "push" and "pull" can be identified for developing countries. The push phenomenon lies in the economic structure and economic opportunities available in countries growing through the mode of capitalist economic development. The less developed countries of the capitalist sphere are developing with the aid of foreign capital and educational resources. But, the development of these countries has not been uniform for all classes. A developing country becomes increasingly stratified as one segment develops and leaves a large portion of the populace behind to subsist upon more traditional forms of economic organization. Even within the developing segment progress is far short of optimum because of available professional opportunities, the existence of superior opportunities in the developed countries, and the freedom to emigrate.

In nearly every case the first major social effort of the government of a developing country is to promote literacy and education through large allocations of the budget to education. While 20 to 40 percent of public monies are targeted for education, the concept of education has retained the classic form. It has focused upon educational content directed toward preparation for a university rather than toward a skill.

This tendency originates in and is reinforced by attitudes shared by governmental and social elites in the developing country who place high status on university education.

The result has been an educational system that serves only the elite's needs. With open emigration trained nationals faced with limited opportunities and remuneration can seek employment in the developed countries. Thus, the educated and potentially most useful members of the developing country are "skimmed off" -- taking with them their accumulated human capital. For example, in 1968 the total loss of investment in education in Trinidad through the outflow of professional and skilled personnel was calculated at $21.2 million.

Also, there are circumstances which tend to pull the national toward the developed countries. My major concern here is that the foreign pull on the skilled emigrant exists because the developing countries are indeed satellites of the capitalistic metropolitan centers or metropoles. In the era of the Roman Empire, members of the barbarian states greatest hope was to journey to Rome. The pull of Rome was very strong because Rome was the center of activity. In like manner, mass communication media through promotion of the products of international corporations create appetites that are artificial or foreign to their environment. This produces an unrealistic view of life in the metropole. Nationals of a developing country are influenced by the mass-communications of the international corporations and the motion picture conglomerate of the United States and acquire tastes, appetites, and desires that can be satisfied in American cities. While they live in the developing countries their aspirations are in the metropoles. If one considers the push and pull forces on the national of the developing country, it is a wonder that so

many trained and educated people remain in the developing countries.

In the final analysis, the barriers which the nationals face in returning to their native land can only be lifted by Governmental action and leadership at the highest echelons of the developing country. These barriers become endemic in the developing society since they are fostered by the interlocking arrangements with the metropolitan country of which the developing country is a satellite. It is simplistic to assume that these problems can be corrected by reorganizing the educational system, increasing salaries or any other superficial measures. The push phenomenon is based upon the lagging state of economic development brought about by the imperialistic economic arrangements between the developing countries and the metropole through its agency, the international corporation. The pull phenomenon is based upon the mass communication media employed by foreign companies which create appetites and desires that cannot be satisfied in the local environment. Therefore, it is no mystery why a population fed and nurtured on the delights of the metropole insists on maintaining a high school system geared towards entry into metropolitan universities. This is not only done as an avenue of escape but is a normal reaction to the appetites and desires created by the pull phenomenon.

Promotion of Emigre Return and the Need for a Conscious Effort to Fully Utilize the Available Labor Supply

The developing countries should recognize the danger of maintaining large numbers of professionals for whom no suitable employment is available. Before any country initiates steps to encourage its trained nationals to return, it should be in a position to guarantee appropriate employment. Efforts to reduce emigration at the source can be effective only with a

concommitant drive for socio-economic development, involving a series of coordinated economic and social measures. The political and adminstrative climate and the examples set by top leadership within the developing countries are very important. If these factors favor the development of strong social solidarity and a marked sense of commitment and self-sacrifice by the entire population, it is likely that professionals and other trained persons will be much less inclined than at present to seek new opportunities abroad, even though remaining at home may involve the sacrificing of certain economic advantages. This potential can be realized only within a wide framework of social mobilization.

The importance of an integrated long term plan of manpower development cannot be overstressed. Countries should review their manpower planning policies with special reference to the need for stimulating the return of expatriates and effectively utilizing the trained personnel locally avaiable. Allowance should also be made for the individual's needs to find satisfactory and suitable rewards. In some countries institutions have been established to attract professionals and enable those living abroad to return to develop their professional skills and to form professional organizations. Both Turkey and Iran have well designed, well administered, and largely successful programmes to attract nationals from abroad for service in modernized local institutions, such as universities and hospitals. Feelings of isolation from professional colleagues and a lack of intellectual stimulation and sufficient sources of new information are experiences common to many professionals who have returned home to developing countries after study abroad. If legislation to restrain the outflow of trained personnel is adopted by any country, it should be with the awareness that the freedom of movement is

being contained with the possible implication of discrimination against the individual's rights.

Compensatory steps must be taken to encourage voluntary cooperation with government manpower and emigration policies.

While many of the effects of emigration have been enumerated thus far, it is not enough to simply identify the problem. A new perspective on the worth of human beings and the possibilities for investment in human capital through a conscious policy of total manpower utilization must be achieved. One of the reasons why the developed countries have tended to ignore the value of human capital investment is because their economists have tended to ignore this factor in their theories. It is well established that economists' estimates of the cost of rebuilding Europe after World War II were much too high. This is because the wealth of a nation was measured in terms of its plant and equipment capital and not in terms of the existent investment in human capital. This problem arises from the difficulty of gathering accurate data on human capital investment and the moral resistance to the placing of economic value on a human being, something reminiscent of the moral revulsion to slavery.

Despite these inhibiting intellectual factors, countries must make a commitment to the full development of their human resources and not be content to leave large segments of society behind. People interested in effective economic development must begin seriously to recognize that development is a dyadic process wherein development of both physical and human capital must go hand in hand to be successful. While a number of Third World countries have shown impressive growth rates, not one has "taken-off" without leaving a large segment (usually a majority) of the population in poverty and despair.

As the developing countries search for

developmental models to emulate, the capitalist mode of production and development is seen as having a tarnished record. Nowhere has a country been able to develop all its human resources through the market mechanism. In the psychological battle between the capitalist and socialist modes of development the socialist mode in its differing forms utilizes labor resources more fully. The capitalist mode must solve this problem if it is to remain competitive.

I believe that this can be achieved by setting the goal of the total utilization and employment of human resources. There must be a kind of social contract between the government and citizenry that commits the government to such a policy. An integrated national policy can do much to arrest the social and economic dislocations which accompany rapid industrialization and urbanization. A unified approach will reduce fragmentation and facilitate the democratic process since national economic decisions can be better assessed in terms of their impact upon people and their institutions. Public focus upon the *human* factor of production which emphasizes the vital importance of people to the development process should contribute substantially to the development of an independent cultural identity and the successful, long-term development of the Third World.

Footnote

[1]United Nations. *The Brain Drain in Five Developing Countries.* (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1971), p. 45.

[2]*Ibid.* p. 49.

[3]*Ibid.* p. 58.

[4]*Ibid.* p. 59.

Professional Migration: The Brain Drain From the West Indies and Africa—Abbreviated Remarks*

Rawle Farley

Positive Facts and Independent Choices

These remarks are not meant to be interventionist in any way at all. They are not meant to cut across the policies of any country. The countries with which we are concerned are largely independent. They rightfully determine their own policies. If they are not independent, they are in most cases seeking to determine their own perspectives. They may all choose to stay where they are or they may choose predetermined rates of change, in terms of opportunity costs with which the leadership and people of that society are highly satisfied. Positive economics cannot easily escape confrontation with the peculiarized normative values of each society. I want therefore to avoid presumptive error.

My perspectives are rather 'iffy.' If developing countries accept key conventional variables as economic indicators of desperate initial conditions and if they accept the role of high talent manpower as critical to transforming these initial conditions, then their initiating policies to counteract the brain drain becomes a matter of emergency. Those of us who are familiar with developing countries may know of

*The remarks above represent an abbreviation of the author's contribution as a panelist to the remarkable conference held under the auspices of the West Indian Student Association and Michigan State University at East Lansing on May 25, 1976.

many personal motives for discouraging the return of high talent manpower. Assuming however that national economic survival -- getting the economy at least transforming out from the existing level -- is not inconsistent with calculations for personal survival, the emergency becomes even more desperate if Keynes's well-known dictum "in the long run we are all dead" is taken into account. The new demand is for development now, development in one's lifetime.

Yet there is no generalized theory of economic development.[1] There are many competing theories. Aggressive research is taking place. We have no evidence that it is usual or a simple matter to transform desperate conditions in a single generation. My studies of Libya and of Latin America[2] indicate, for differing reasons, that a capital surplus economy does not necessarily suddenly overcome deeply rooted constraints any more rapidly than a capital deficient economy. Economists and others are of course busy mobilizing and sifting data, testing hypotheses and reaching out for generalizations. For developing countries, the disadvantages here are immediately evident. The lack of high talent manpower itself stymies the gathering of data and the testing out of hypotheses. The developing country, however, need not wait to accept the view that an increasing range of high talent manpower is essential for accelerating structural change in the economy as well as in meeting other economic development ideals.

Initial Conditions: Selected Economic Indicators

Conventional indicators readily show the initial conditions to be transformed. In 1972 the average GNP per capita, for instance, of 19 Latin American republics stood at only $605. Yet this was almost three times the $205 average for Africa. Twenty-one African countries had a per capita GNP

below this figure -- reaching down to $64 for Burundi and $70 for Upper Volta. In the Caribbean, Haiti had a per capita GNP of $110 in 1970. Except for Bermuda ($3540), the U.S. Virgin Islands ($3050), The Bahamas ($2300), Jamaica ($670), and Trinidad and Tobago ($860) the per capita GNP of most of the Caribbean was under $500. In Haiti, a whole island was economically a ghetto. But tourism in the Virgin Islands (U.S.), the Bahamas and Bermuda, oil in Trinidad, and bauxite in Jamaica conceal dualistic contrasts, enclave economies, thwarted employment opportunities, and huge disparities in the distribution of income.

Agriculture and monoculture continue to dominate the sectoral structure of most of these economies. In Africa, excluding South Africa, the primary sector (including mining) accounted for 43 percent of the 1971 Gross Domestic Product as against a contribution of 11 percent from manufacturing. The situation is even more skewed in individual countries. The respective figures are 53 and 8 for Nigeria; 52 and 15 for Ghana; 42 and 13 for Tanzania; 35 and 11 for Kenya; 65 and 2 for Libya. Per capita agricultural production degenerated from an index of 100 in 1965 to 93 in 1973. Yet over 73 percent of the African labor force is in agriculture. In Mali, Rwanda, and Chad, it is over 90 percent; and over 80 percent in Botswana, Burundi, and 18 other African countries.

Latin America, including the Caribbean, appears "better" off. There is only slightly tenable substance in the differences in economic indicators. In Haiti, for instance, in 1970 agriculture contributed nearly 50 percent of the GNP, employed 90 percent of the occupied population, and produced 80 percent of the exports. In Jamaica (where in 1971, agriculture contributed 8 percent of the GDP and manufacturing 29 percent) it is bauxite and alumina which dominated

total exports (over 60 percent) and sugar provided the employment. In Trinidad, where manufacture and agriculture accounted for 44 percent and 8 percent respectively of the GDP, it was petroleum which dominated exports. In Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as throughout so much of the Caribbean, tourism made a glamorous but unstable contribution to economic survival.

'Gappery' analysis has its weaknesses. The indicators involve the errors of guess-estimating in many cases and of the need for more refined methodology. But they are sufficient to shock aspiring or existing leadership into initiating counterattacks against continuing poverty. (I have dealt with Latin America as a whole at full length in my *The Economics of Latin America*.) The constraints to be overcome in the Caribbean do not end with those with which we have already dealt. Demographic pressures complicate the emergency. World population, growing at 2.0 percent a year, will double every 35 years but that of Africa every 28 years and of Latin America every 25 years. In affluent North America, the doubling takes place every 70 years or so. In Guyana, the prospective El Dorado of the Caribbean, population doubling every 23 years is compounded by demographic disequilibrium, and like most developing countries, with the problem of an enormous dependency ratio. The overall population density of Barbados of over 1500 per square mile is paralleled by a Guyanese coastal population pressure of over 1000 per square mile.

Acceptable projections calculate that while the North American population will have increased by 59 percent between 1968 and 2000, and that of Europe by 16 percent, the corresponding figure for Africa is put at 131 percent and for Latin America at 138 percent. Conditions of rural despair initiate a rural exodus to the towns where hopelessness becomes

compounded. Jamaica has urban problems -- over 41 percent of the population was urbanized in 1970. In Barbados, the figure was 44 percent, and in Trinidad over 50 percent. Low birth rates, low death rates, high life expectancies, high urbanization ratios, and high ratios of the population in the service sector normally characterize a developed economy. Caribbean economic indicators in these areas therefore constitute paradoxical indicators.

The Caribbean, like most of Africa, has the problem of marginality -- and unemployment figures of over 10 percent constitute only the tip of the iceberg. Despite significant growth in the GDP, unemployment remained unconquered in 1971 in Trinidad at some 12-13 percent and at a speculative 25 percent or more in Guyana. In Haiti, it was over 50 percent. Barbados confronts a conflict between land needed for residential space and land needed for agricultural and industrial development. And all face the agonizing problem of choosing between capital intensive industries generating faster growth in the GDP and more international competitive strength, and labor intensive industries which more readily help to solve chronic unemployment problems.

The evidence therefore of an immediate compulsion to get going with the job of development is overwhelming. Where does high talent manpower fit in? We turn to this question.

High Talent Manpower and Development

The contribution of manpower to the transformation of the economy is readily discernible from an aggregate production function. If $Y = f(K, L, N, T, U)$, where Y = total output; K = capital resources; L = labor resources; N = natural resources; T = technology; U = socio-economic factors, clearly if the quantity

and/or quality of L is upgraded, the other variables remaining unchanged, Y would increase. Development, of course, is much more than an increase in total GNP -- but increased production in Caribbean and African circumstances is an essential ingredient of development. This would be so regardless of the ideological umbrella under which development takes place. Distributional equity is as important a consideration as increasing output. 43.6 percent of the African population in 1969 were below an income level of $75 a year and the top 20 percent of the Jamaican population got nearly 62 percent of the nation's income in 1959. Distributional equity however generates less clear cut issues; increasing output commands immediate consensus as a matter of economic logic.

Economic reasoning and economic experience indicate that mobilizing initiatives to change the status of the economy depends in the first instance on the entrepreneurial, managerial, and technical skills of the L vector. It is high talent manpower, under any system, which mobilizes and combines inputs to produce the outputs to meet the spontaneous or predetermined needs of the society. The work of Theodore Schultz, Edward Denison, Frederick Harbison, Charles Myers, Solomon Fabricant, Gary Becker, and a whole array of others is too well known to need resummarizing here. The role of high talent manpower in the economic development of Japan is convincing.[3] The Caribbean, like Africa, can act safely on the presumption that high talent manpower is of priority importance to the development of the area.

One scientist would hardly make a decisive difference. Numbers matter and the kind and level of training matters, among many other considerations. Investment education, that is training in economics, business and public administration, natural sciences and technology, takes decisive preference over so-called

consumer education. The constraints in Africa are immediately severe. An average literacy standing of 19 percent spotlights the gap to be made up. Literacy in Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria standing at 25 percent or so, is five times higher than literacy in Chad, Ethiopia, Mali and Niger for instance. Calculations for the future are even more difficult. The school is the major pipeline for producing trained manpower from among the citizens of the country. In the first instance, training takes time and the gestation period for human capital is, in many cases, almost as long as for physical capital. In the second instance, the flow of trained manpower is very small. In Africa, in 1970, only 29 percent of the age group 5-19 years of age were enrolled in schools. In Ethiopia, Niger and Upper Volta the figure was below 10 percent.

The Caribbean appears to be in a different position. Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, enjoy literacy ratios equal to that of developed countries. This is an enormous achievement. However, in terms of the investment education tests, the literacy situation here may actually be what I have said about Chile (90 percent literate) a case of concealed underdevelopment in education. We are now, I believe, in a position to put the problem of professional migration into perspective so far as the requirements of economic development are concerned.

High Talent Manpower: Taking Stock

The strands of the analysis can now be drawn together. Development is an emergency requirement. The mobilizing of high talent manpower is critical to initiating or maintaining or accelerating the development push. The stock of high talent manpower is limited and there are severe constraints to increasing the flow of high talent manpower. There are equally

severe constraints to the importation and use of high talent manpower who are non-citizens. Given, then, a recognition of these arguments, economic reasoning again suggests that optimizing the use of existing scarce high talent manpower and counteracting the migration of scarce high talent manpower are emergency requirements. A nation confronting economic disaster must innovate. A nation stymied by the lack of high talent manpower must similarly innovate effective policies to maintain, recruit, and keep attracting high talent manpower. The nation of course has another choice. It can do without them. Accepting the opportunity costs of this decision is the nation's right.

The situation is complex. The Immigration Act of 1924 put severe limits on immigration but the Immigration Act of 1965 by abolishing quotas based on national origin stimulated immigration into the United States. Between 1965 and 1973, for instance, Latin American immigration increased by 22 percent, that of the West Indies by 75 percent and of Africa by 97 percent. In 1973, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were among the leading sources of immigrants in the U.S.A. Twenty five percent of the African immigrants belonged to the professional and technical class.[4] Besides this, there were, for instance, some 151,066 foreign students in the U.S.A. of whom 12,937 were from Africa and 30,276 from Latin America.[5] A study by Vice President Mondale in 1967 showed the serious cost of the brain drain. In 1962, according to this study, two-thirds of the engineers graduating in the Dominican Republic emigrated to the U.S.A. Between 1962 and 1966 25 percent of all foreign students in the U.S.A. changed status to permanent residents.[6]

Yet Tanzania in 1962-63, with a population of 10 million and a per capita GNP of only $62, had no geologists, no mechanical or electrical engineers, only

Table 1

Selected Indicators for Scientific and Technical Manpower

Country		Total Stock: Scientists & Engineers Per 10,000 Population	Total Stock: Technicians Per 10,000 Population
Botswana	(1973)	12.5	10.8
Ghana	(1970)	8.0	17.5
Kenya	(1972)	3.3	7.9
Nigeria	(1970/71)	3.6	2.8
Sudan	(1971/72)	8.6	1.6
Tanzania	(1968/69)	3.2	8.7
Zambia	(1970)	14.1	37.3
Antigua	(1970)	68.6	42.9
Belize	(1970)	16.8	43.9
U.S.A.	(1973	76.6	47.9

Source: UNESCO *Statistical Yearbook 1974*

38 graduate African secondary school teachers, 5 chemists, 1 forecaster, 8 telecommunications engineers and 9 veterinarians.[7] In 1970, a study by A. Baron Holmes IV was predicting critical shortfalls in the requirements for doctors, dentists, lawyers, engineers, accountants, architects, quantity surveyors and other high talent manpower in Kenya and Tanzania. Figures embodied in Charles V. Kidd's study show that between 1965 and 1968, the number of nurses in the case of Trinidad and Tobago who emigrated to the U.S.A. increased from 18 to 194; of medical technicians from 5 to 45; and of engineers from 8 to 23. The figures for Guyana were respectively 16 to 105 for nurses and 2 to 8 for medical technicians. Jamaicans flooded out. The nursing emigrants increased from 39 in 1965 to 771 in 1968 and engineers from 24 to 67.[8]

Two seminal studies in the Caribbean underline the emergency further. R. K. Girling estimated that in 1967-68, 4,140 technicians and professionals left Jamaica for the U.S.A. and Canada. Girling calculated that while one out of every 25 of the Jamaican labor force was a technical and professional worker, one out of every 6 of the emigrants was in this category. He estimated that 68 percent of the technical and professional personnel trained between 1970 and 1975 would emigrate from Jamaica.[9] In fact, Ransford Palmer's estimates showed that between 1962 and 1971, the migration of West Indian professional and technical personnel increased from 377 to 2,003. 53.8 percent of this total in 1971 was from Jamaica.[10]

There is no need at this stage to enter into the gains and losses calculations. A few references are appended.[11] If the original home country of the emigrant, at the state level or at any other institutionalized level is convinced that the inputs of the professional emigre is essential, it seems logical that policies would be devised to recruit and attract

this critically important group. Most frequently, it is not that the emigre has turned his back on the original country. Indeed, in many cases, the original country derives immense external advantages from the emigre's contacts, research and publications and information flows, from remittances and general advertisement of the original home country. The original home country gains in terms of not having to use local income to pay the emigrant's salary or the costs of schooling his or her children and so on. The essential fact is that the original home country has, more often than not, for a complex range of reasons, turned its back on the emigre. It is always ironic when a richer country is more entrepreneurial than a poorer country in providing opportunities for high talent manpower.

Recruiting is never helped by simple condemnations of the emigre nor by simple invocations without modification of constraints to the exercise of professional abilities and to the personal survival of the professional and his or her family. Unless the society operates a total command economy, the state and every other employing institution cannot avoid using the market and cost/benefit calculations to secure the desired inputs. Without the highly organized market for high talent manpower in North America, the demand and supply mismatch would obviously be economically undesirable. In many developing countries the market comes understandably under ideological considerations. Unless the country, however, is committed to a pure command economy or accepts *a priori* a theory of moral incentives, strengthening and using the market is unavoidable. The organization of the professional market place is a phenomenon to those not accustomed to this kind of institutionalization. If, however, high talent manpower is regarded as critical and development is an immediate necessity, competitive

ingenuities would all the more readily be mobilized to identify, assess, attract, and retain high talent manpower in a climate providing maximum security for the individuals and their families and maximum opportunities for the exercise of their abilities. A society confronting economic disaster would not retreat from innovating to escape crisis.

Footnotes

[1]CF. Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*. London: Methuen & Co., 1964, especially Chapter 10.

[2]See for example *The Economics of Latin America: Development Problems in Perspective* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); *Planning for Development in Libya: The Exceptional Economy in the Developing World* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

[3]See, for instance, Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, *Management in the Industrial World*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1959, pp. 249-264. See also Frederick Harbison, *Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.)

[4]See Sandra Steniel, "The New Immigration," *Editorial Research Reports*, Vol. II, No. 22, 1974.

[5]See *Yearbook of Higher Education 1975-76*. Chicago: Marquis Academic Media.

[6]Walter Mondale, "The Cost of the Brain Drain," *Atlantic*, December 1967, p. 67.

[7]Henry A. Okulo, "Manpower Development in Tanzania," *Bulletin*, Vol. 9, 1972, International Institute for

Labour Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 76. See also A. L. Adu, Rawle Farley, M. Devani, *Reports of the Tanganyika Pre-Independence Local Salaries Commission*, Vols. 1 and 2, (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1961).

[8]See A. Baron Holmes IV, "East Africa: Tanzania and Kenya," in the Committee on the International Migration of Talent, *The International Migration of High-Level Manpower Its Impact on the Development Process*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 431-432. See Charles V. Kidd, "Migration of Highly Trained Professionals from Latin America to the United States," *ibid. supra*, especially pp. 486-498.

[9]R. K. Girling, "The Migration of Human Capital from the Third World: The Implications and some Data on the Jamaican Case," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1974, p. 92.

[10]Ransford W. Palmer, "A Decade of West Indian Migration to the United States, 1962-1972: An Economic Analysis," *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 1974, p. 573.

[11]cf. Walter Adams, ed., *The Brain Drain*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968); M. Blaug, ed., *Economics of Education 2* Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1969, especially Part Three, pp. 241-301.

Caribbean Immigrants: Some Further Perspectives On their Lives

*Delores M. Mortimer**

As part of my task in editing this compendium about experiences and factors which figure in the immigration of Caribbean people into the United States, I was presented with papers from various seminars and asked to make a whole of its often diverse parts. While reading the individual manuscripts (which all reflected familiarity with if not training in some branch of the social sciences), I began to wonder how much of the information that each paper contained reflected the life experiences of the author in question. And, in looking at the first eight articles as a representative sample of the volume, I had to ask what could I sense of the *people* whose movements and motives for emigration to the U.S. were being discussed. For me, there was little beyond the intellectual knowledge that, yes, indeed, there were live beings who were caught up in the process of human movement and dynamics of adjustment. But, those "live beings" seemed to have been reduced to or collapsed within a vast and

*The author wishes to acknowledge the help of many busy individuals who rearranged their schedules to accommodate my attempts to determine the extent to which they, as private persons, conformed or did not conform to some of the studied findings of the other contributors to this volume. While more people than one would expect (given the nature of this article) desired anonymity, others can be thanked publicly for their participation: Max Alce, Carmen H. Allende, Serge Bellegarde, Maureen Bunyan, Yvonne Chappelle, George Dalley, George Fisher, Pierre-Michel Fontaine, Basil Matthews, Winston D. Munnings, Patricia Niles, Aleida Portuondo, Maxine Roberts, Hugh Smith and Hilbourne A. Watson.

definitely faceless statistical or conceptual mass. This feeling led ultimately to the design of a brief questionnaire which was to have given me a more humanistic picture of what the process of migration entails for the "temporary" immigrant. It was hoped that the questionnaire, although brief, would loosely test some of the opinions expressed in the volume against those of a select group of West Indians living in the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area.

The group was comprised of (a) alien residents including diplomats and international employees, (b) foreign students, (c) permanent residents, (d) offspring of all the people in the above categories and (e) U.S. citizens native to extra-territorial jurisdictions. The questionnaire was divided into four levels. The first was addressed to general conditions in the Caribbean as perceived by the individual which s/he felt contributed significantly toward emigration in general and emigration to the United States in particular. The second level dealt with the specific factors that had influenced and determined the informant's life-career goals. The focus of level three was segmented so as to discuss the person's reasons for remaining in the United States in those cases where there were possibilities of returning to the Caribbean. Finally, a fourth level was included to pick up those *lacunae* which were revealed during the answering of the first three levels of open-ended questions. This last set of queries was retrospective in nature and also served as a 'check' on what was said previously, by placing it in a different context.

This short article does not try to reiterate the individual responses of the persons interviewed because the survey questions were so structured that there was some degree of complexity in any one response. And, often, responses were not made from the individual's professional perspective but from the perspective of

the private individual who happens to be a professional.

All of the persons involved in the survey had lived in the Caribbean for a period of time or, as in the case of some offspring, had had to learn consciously or unconsciously to juxtapose the life style built upon West Indian mores and values to that which was based upon "the American way of life." Additionally, this seemingly diverse group could be considered fairly homogenous in three other respects; all the individuals were (1) overwhelmingly identifiable as persons of African descent, (2) except for one person, had lived for some time in the Caribbean -- at least long enough to have been affected, socially and culturally, in an indelible way, and (3) have had to undergo some degree of cultural, social or attitudinal adaptation in adjusting to the milieu that is the urban United States, i.e., Boston, New York, Miami, and other cities which constitute the major entrepôts of America and which provide the new citizen and the sojourner with popular images of the U.S. and its people.

In addition to the information already given there were other aspects evident or particular to some of the groups. For example, the alien resident group was comprised of people working in the U.S. as professionals and clearly intending to return home permanently in the near future. Inclusion of diplomats and international employees may not seem necessary at first. However, both types of international migrants are alike in certain respects. The diplomat, as an example, may find herself posted in the U.S. for quite a few years beyond the normal tour of duty because she has special skills which are in high demand and short supply. The international employee, for his part, may be detailed to the U.S. for the same reason. Unlike the diplomat he may be able to request duty in another part of the world by remaining aware of impending openings and opportunities. More likely than not, however, his

situation is one in which he is assigned to a country pre-selected by his superiors.

The majority of the alien resident group, excluding diplomatic and international employees, came to the United States as students. Some of them married American citizens who expressed willingness to return, eventually, to the Caribbean with their spouses. Still other respondents married nationals from their own or other countries of the Caribbean or Africa. Many of the spouses and/or sibling dependents of this sub-group of alien residents had begun and were still in the midst of pursuing their own educations -- a situation which, therefore, called for an extension of the sojourn in the United States, sometimes by ten years depending upon the course of study. Thus, in the overwhelming majority, despite the nature of their status, such individuals were representative of long-term residence in the United States.

The foreign students who were approached were all engaged in full-time employment and all had families which included dependents, either here or back home in the Caribbean. Consequently, they were generally categorized and viewed as employed persons who incidentally were students.

The group made up of permanent residents contained persons who had emigrated from their own countries for economic as well as political reasons, either or both of which they could not tolerate or which was felt to pose a threat to their existence. Within this context one may classify both Haititans and Cubans as refugees. The fundamental difference is that Haitians are not allowed into this country with the preferential official status of refugee. In my opinion, the failure to allow entrance to such political refugees indicates the lack of a well thought out U.S. foreign policy in regards to refugees which deals appropriately with Caribbean political realities. Thus,

the Cuban threatened by subjection to Communism receives treatment of a sort different from that which the Haitian can expect although the latter may also perceive of his government as totalitarian and oppressive. Nevertheless, political and legal differences aside, as refugees all such people are likely to remain in the United States for a considerable period of time.

Two types of 'immigrants' have status which make their perspectives on the existent variations between life in the Caribbean and life in the United States substantially different from others previously discussed. These are (1) individuals from the extra-territorial U.S. jurisdictions of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and (2) children of West Indians born either in America or the Caribbean or brought to the U.S. during early childhood. (Discussion of these groups will appear later in this commentary.)

Notwithstanding these various and subtle differences in categories among all the immigrants studied, the one overriding point of commonality of the groups was a long period of stay in this country. Thus, while differences among the immigrant types made it impossible for all of the questions to be equally applied, the commonalities justify holding the sample together.

To the question of "How did you view the United States economically and politically *prior* to your coming?" there was a general prevalence of the opinion that by dint of hard work, application of one's intellectual (or other) resources, and sheer perseverance, the immigrant from the Caribbean could go far. And, even in cases where there were gaps in their employment history, in none of the cases was that situation due to the impossibility of finding a job -- any job. In most cases the intervals were due to the individual's having taken time out to concentrate more fully on academic studies.

None of the individuals questioned had any concrete realization of what the American socio-political environment was like prior to coming. Impressionistic information was obtained from relatives and friends who had lived, visited or worked in the U.S. However, one person recalled having great difficulty thinking of Black Americans as 'Americans' in the same sense as he perceived other citizens of this society. The images received through exposure to print and electronic media, and stories heard from others, formed much of the basis for his envisioning Blacks as people so very much discriminated against and oppressed that he could imagine no situation in which they could be loyal to the United States. But, this individual, like most of the other respondents, saw himself as essentially apart from the Black American in the sense that one is always apart from the natives of any country one visits. Many respondents sought to make this point very clear and also stated that they were not used to being thrust into the kind of majority-minority situation that constitutes the American racial dichotomy vis-à-vis Blacks and Whites.

A number of respondents ended by stating that they generally had no problems with the broad stream of Americans with whom they came into contact either as professionals or students. But, some were quick to add, they could sense a different type of treatment being accorded them once they spoke in their various accents, and thereby were observed to be foreign and not native Afro-Americans.

But here the situation of the Afro-West Indian citizen native to U.S.-held Caribbean territories presents a different set of realities. Unlike other newcomers to the U.S., the American citizen *qua* colonial immigrant (to use Bryce-Laporte's very apt description) has a perspective of the U.S. that is shaped by a unique historical-political relationship. For example,

one respondent born in Puerto Rico, even before setting foot on the mainland, had learned to expect to encounter social attitudes concretized along hierchical lines which place Caucasians at the apex of American society, Asians and other sub-groups in a shifting middle, Blacks at the bottom, and in some netherland below the bottom, there was a place reserved for Puerto Ricans. Nevertheless, like respondents from independent nations and/or non-U.S. territories, the deliberately planned and temporary nature of her stay enabled her to withstand some of the difficulties she encountered with the American educational system and the social system which shapes it.

When those who came for educational reasons were asked why the U.S. had been chosen, some respondents spoke of the lack of sufficient or adequate educational facilities in their own countries. And, many also underscored the fact that from childhood they had been imbued with the idea that education was *the* tool that helps one to succeed in life. So, if this meant going abroad, then abroad one must go. Also, this set of respondents had all apparently shared the notion that one should aspire to be a "professional" aiming either to become educators, engineers, doctors, lawyers or career politicians which required certificates and much formal higher education.

When asked why they had chosen to stay and work in the U.S. upon completion of their studies some did point to opportunities in the Caribbean for fulfillment of their career objectives. Others, however, pointed out the fact that career opportunities had developed only subsequent to their arrival in the U.S. -- a region-wide set of occurrences which had developed hand-in-hand with the acquisition of self-government. And, at this point in time, these respondents also had clear, logical and substantial reasons for remaining in North America. While some people may have chosen to

stay, others, particularly refugees, felt that even today they have little recourse but to stay.

Whether political or economic, refugees when asked if they could be content or "happy" in a Caribbean country other than their own almost unanimously answered in the affirmative. However, two persons from Haiti, in separate interviews, pointed out that although they were awaiting responses to employment applications in Trinidad they were unsure what they would do in the event of acceptance. That hesitance was prompted, one of them explained, by the fact that there were so many Haitians in imposed or self-exile throughout the Caribbean that as a group they were beginning to be discriminated against. The other respondent, when asked for an opinion on that issue, explained the difficulty in terms of the economic and political realities which force Caribbean governments to place priority on maintaining employment levels for their nationals. This is a consideration that is especially necessary in light of gross unemployment that continues to soar and draw talented educated youth away from the Caribbean to metropolitan centers where more varied and lucrative employment can be had with far less difficulty.

None of the papers which precede have dealt with women *per se* as immigrants especially in light of the fact that there is an increasingly high percentage of women from the Caribbean involved in the immigration process. There was no difference evident between males and females responding to such basic questions as "Why did you come?" and why did they remain? (The question of why they remained has already been touched upon. And, sex notwithstanding, the reasons were much the same.) The most interesting differences were evident in relation to the question of how immigrants fared in terms of their ability to successfully interact with Americans who viewed these visitors as "Black."

It was among the female respondents that I

sensed the greater perception and understanding of what it must mean to be Black, foreign and frustrated in striving to reach goals (economic or educational) which continue to be elusive.

All of the women questioned had very definite plans to seek employment upon completion of their studies. When they were asked to take a retrospective glance at the patterns of their careers here in the U.S., some felt that many of the difficulties and obstructions in their professional advancement were largely due not only to being non-white but also to deliberate as well as unconscious misogynism on the part of males in positions of authority. That sexual bias, one woman felt, would have made the career struggle seem even more arduous had she realized *then* how pervasive it was.

The last point I shall describe revolves around those people born of West Indian parents but raised in the United States. This group, I discovered, could be divided into two categories: adults whom I interviewed personally and adolescents or teenagers whose parents provided information about their children's lives. In response to questions centered around differences perceived in life styles in the United States versus the Caribbean, I found this group of people personally fascinating. All spoke at some point of growing up with a sense of pride in their heritage as Caribbean as well as African people. When asked with what groups -- ethnic, racial, or national -- they most readily identified or were most comfortable with, there was, invariably, some hesitation. Like one female respondent, many of the adult survey participants felt that if they were growing up in the U.S. *today* they might not feel as though they had reached adulthood "straddling cultural fences." In expanding upon that phrase a female respondent noted, for example, that whereas she did not feel apart from Black Americans her parents had

definite views concerning whether she should live by a "West Indian cultural value system or an American one." She stated that her parents felt that Black American "culture" and pride in race was a mere shadow when compared to that of West Indians. Along those same lines another respondent recalled discussions between her mother and grandmother about racism and the responses of Black Americans and West Indians to it. As a silent observer and listener the message that she heard was that West Indians were more prideful than Black Americans of their racial heritage and less willing to tolerate racism. It was only after the advent of civil rights demonstrations and a trip to Africa that she began to conceive of the Black American heritage as being just as rich as that of the Afro-West Indian. The outstanding point that most women and men made, however, was that they neither identified solely with one or another group nor did they feel like 'marginal' Afro-Americans or estranged West Indians.

Conclusion

To conclude this commentary it is necessary to return to the original reason for conducting the interviews. As we stated in the Introduction, the papers which comprise this compendium were done for specific but diverse reasons. Those reasons are, in part, responsible for the almost total stress on the structural rather than on the personalized "humanistic" focus of the individual papers and the volume as a whole.

However, despite that drawback, the papers in this volume represent a needed and valuable beginning towards the understanding of the implications that can be drawn about the interface between West Indians and Americans, the implications that the Caribbean migration has for future relations between the U.S. and countries of the area, and the continued development of the

circum-Caribbean nations and territories. Yet, future studies must, in some way, make explicit that West Indian immigrants are more than a class, resource, economic commodity, juridical category or faceless statistical mass. The immigrants are, after all, people with certain sentiments about their heritage, lives, and countries which cannot be overlooked if the meaning of their movement and presence is to be fully understood and appreciated.

Finally, while the preceding articles can be seen as statements of expertise, they also reflect personal experiences and sentiments of the authors themselves. From my point of view that is to be expected. What I ask is that such scholars, and the policy makers who give attention to their work, also be aware that Caribbean immigrants (including their offspring) also possess sentimentalities and thoughts, such as I have reported on, which must be taken into account. As a constituency, vis-à-vis the policies of immigration, this aspect must be respected and responded to particularly since the range of socio-economic and ethnic types among them, as well as the conditions under which they come to, live in, and, sometimes, leave this country are far wider than the collection represents.

Caribbean Migration to the United States: Some Tentative Conclusions

Roy S. Bryce-Laporte

The preceding papers were not marshalled around any specific aspect or position on Caribbean migration. They were pulled together not so much to persuade or please a particular readership but to draw attention, share opinions, and provide a beginning basis for responsible and well thought out action on an issue of pressing national and international interest.

Undoubtedly, some of the papers are complex in themselves. They are all complex as a group, so too is the reality of Caribbean migration. In this volume, the Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands represent one extreme of complexity. Their ambivalent political status as U.S. colonial extensions make ambivalence in the status of their local citizens -- host majorities, immigrant minorities depending on where they are but colonials, nevertheless. Matching in complexity these "colonial immigrants" (as, for example, were pre-independent Jamaicans in England) are the "unrecognized refugees" as constituted by many of the illegals (for example, some of the Haitians and Dominicans discussed in the literature). Having engaged in flights of desperation from situations of economic stagnation or political repression with learned enthusiasm to a situation of anticipated economic opportunity and political openness, many encounter harsh disappointment in this strange country. Rather than the public sympathy and government support accorded their peers from communist countries i.e., Cuba, they are faced by popular hostility, exploitation, police tactics, incarceration and deportation. They find themselves victims of an "Other America" -- for some even worse than that from which they sought refuge or relief and

quite distinct, therefore, from the land of opportunity to engage in economic growth of and freedom for political expression or assembly which they anticipated.

Beginning with the background statement, the papers move in the direction of general to specific sets of considerations. They move almost according to the presumed natural history of the immigrant experience, even though not always analyzed from the level or point of view of the immigrant -- dynamics of emigration, aspects of reception, settlement, adjustment and mobility in the host society, and empuzzlement about identity, repatriation, and returns of services to the homeland. The presentations move from the theoretical to the phenomenological and then to the pragmatic. Recommendations, though not always explicit, range from considerations of need for revolutionary change in international systems, systematic relations, and in the structures of countries within such systems to calls for immediate recourse to shorter term measures of competitive manpower utilization, marketing and innovative recruiting on the part of the Caribbean governments and business sector. Some writers operating from a middle range between these two positions extend the onus of responsibility to the immigrants themselves. Some among them stress the futility of immigrants themselves to resolve their predicament. Others celebrate the achievements and contributions of immigrants in the face of the overwhelming institutional adversities. They attribute this success to the zeal of self-application, abnegation, the adoption of a sense of sojourners, purposive but instrumental attitudes and psychological distance toward the challenges and constraints of the host society.

Insofar as these papers represent varied levels and *foci* of concern there is, of course, good reason to assume that with few exceptions the apparent contradictions among them may not be beyond some degree of mutual reinforcement or compatibility on some points or at other

levels. This, however, is a matter of analysis which requires that each of the various positions be more fully thought out and their contentions made more equitably explicit.

To the extent a public policy on immigration is to be soundly grounded it must benefit from analysis and recommendations which in themselves must be fully explicated and accurate in their claims of representativeness and validity. But immigration policy, at least public action, cannot always wait on thorough academic analysis, unless such analysis is done in anticipation. The public sector then should encourage forward looking scholarship, even when by the nature of the matter it is "alien," "foreign," or "minority" scholars who may have reasons to have best foresight on major problems. The views of such scholars may be problematic or unpopular in narrower ideological terms, however, they should not be disregarded when they constitute relevant input into the solution of a larger objective problem of international proportions.

The following summary statements cover some of the salient points presented or implied in the papers, and provide a tentative profile of Caribbean migration:

1. Caribbean migration to the United States is not new as an occurrence or in its character. It has dated back to the period of colonial formation and slavery. It has always been characterized largely as a movement of laborers -- the export of labor -- once generally menial and enslaved and now also including professionals, students, and the skilled. At points of political crises in the Caribbean, immigration may take on a different form and proportion but a sizeable proportion of refugees eventually join the rank of the wider working class, and the underemployed of the host society. The increasing number of immigrants from the Caribbean are essentially part of a mobile working class some of whom are caught in the exercise of work which they obtain

illegally and perform under exploitative conditions.

2. Caribbean migration to the United States is a reflection of various levels of inequality. This involves variance in the capabilities of the two regions to gainfully employ or effectively service their respective populations; to accommodate the growth rates and rise in expectations of these populations. It also involves the variance in capacity between the two systems to influence movement, growth and expectations of peoples even across boundaries of their respective territories. The United States by various practices not only has succeeded in attracting but also in displacing and redirecting the movement of Caribbean peoples. There is no measure of comparable reciprocal capabilities in the Caribbean, even with respect to its own nationals found in the United States. In large measure, whether as tourists or specialists, the American-based populations that migrate to the Caribbean do so temporarily and are responding largely to the influence of American enterprises or capital in the area.

In addition to development differentials, the movement also reflects internal differences within the respective Caribbean source societies. On one level the movement to the United States involves peoples whose livelihood, ambitions and mobility are stymied in the strained and warped economies of their countries. On another level it involves persons sufficiently endowed, trained and connected who opt to depart from an economy and country which needs them but is not able to compete relative to the United States or expand in directions which would allow their employment in large numbers. Some of the writers view this as a discrepancy in competitive resourcefulness between the two regions; others posit it to be a discrepancy in power and role between nations as well.

3. Caribbean migration is neither an absolute process or final experience. Proximity, continual

movement, and numerous levels of inter-connection mitigate the probability of severe separation between immigrants, their kin or homeland. Moreover, there exists so much undefined and relative space in the structure and ideology of the United States with respect to mobility for hard work or ingenuity that, despite its covert barriers against full advancement (or assimilation) of certain ethnic/national groups, Caribbean immigrants are inclined to be in constant pursuit of "success," higher standards and redefinition of their statuses.

The new Caribbean immigrants, however, undergo experiences of contradiction and tensions of identity in more intense proportions than their European predecessors. These immigrants display and experience ambivalence with regard to national ethnics with whom they share close affinities, beyond the normal competition and socialization conflicts between old and new Americans. They are also torn between their participation and progress in this country and the sense of calling to return and share in the fate, life quality and needs of their ancestral homes. Generally, they seem to fight for a pluralistic society and racial justice in the United States. Yet, they lament their own inabilities to affect United States policies toward development and self-determination of their respective countries. Also, in various ways they try to influence the direction of politics, socio-economic and cultural affairs within their homeland and its image on relations with the United States. As a final recourse many are resigned to sponsoring the migration of relatives, purchasing small properties or supporting by remittances those loved ones left behind.

4. Consequences of Caribbean migration tend to be disproportionately one-sided in the favor of the United States. Among the emigrants from the Caribbean countries are professionals, skilled workers, and the young including students and dependents who do not generally

return. The first set represents a loss in terms of expenditures made by their national societies on their training without full return in service. The latter groups represent potentiality and productivity which when developed rebound in the United States where they were trained. Not only are the Caribbean countries not successfully competing for recruiting such talents, but also there is no legally regularized arrangements for rechanneling such resources or returns in any massive, systematic or even selective way. This situation is particularly untimely since many of these countries have been emerging as constitutionally independent nations but are shackeled by underdevelopment, continued economic-colonial dependency, and threatening projections of over-population. Under such conditions, migration does not solve but represents part of the redistribution of economic activities and difficulties within the international system of which these countries are subordinate parts.

5. Caribbean-United States migration is just one aspect of a larger movement of the world's population. The overwhelming pattern of this movement flows from less developed or peripheral countries to more developed or metropolitan centers. Among the added complexities of this larger movement are the secondary circulatory, internal, interim and reverse patterns of migration; the movement of technical and political types in addition to workers and their dependents; and the movement of ideas and ideology, capital and profit, raw and manufactured goods, fuel and resources; and skills, cultures and processes.

The above characterizations of Caribbean migration reiterate the contention of its complexity -- and inform on the urgency to respond to its challenges. By the very nature of the immigration phenomenon the challenges must be accepted on various levels -- local, national and international. This vexing predicament calls for decisive internal actions by peoples, institutions and governments

of the United States and the Caribbean. It also calls for international involvement by both sides and other involved parties; e.g., multinationals, international agencies, other relevant nations or blocs, and, of course, overseas immigrants, their communities and organizations.

Some Policy and Planning Implications for the United States

Heavy migration of Caribbean peoples into the United States is likely to continue for the immediate future. This movement cannot be taken simply. Any anticipatory or regulatory measures will require international cooperation and mutual understanding in various directions. An American solution must assume that (1) U.S. technology and peacetime economy would continue both to need and be able to afford a foreign labor force without disregarding the needs of its native-born minorities; (2) the American people would tolerate additional non-white aliens of distinctive culture and language in their midst; and (3) the U.S. is willing to participate in a reshuffling of the international economic order so that the disparity of wealth, function, and opportunities between this country (or other metropolitan states) and the circum-Caribbean region are categorically reduced.

A new U.S. policy will have to be viewed in terms which transcend the isolated needs or priority of interests of the United States. The American government must then be prepared to temper the traditional focus on national interest as the prime objective of foreign policy with a broader creative concern for those regional objectives which are commonly sought by all other states in the area or at least are compatible with their national interests. Such policies will have to reflect a serious attitude toward the region in its own right, taking into account all its complexities in composition, prevailing conditions, priorities, potentials, and problems.

All of this will call for a radical readjustment by the United States to the new or anticipated exercise of divergence, sovereignty, nonalignment and economic emancipation by these Caribbean nations. The recent changes in status and the attitude of these countries must be understood, but not isolated from the new conditions they face nor the new problems such conditions pose for them as well as this country. And, even when the broadest definition of the circum-Caribbean implies the most complex situation for negotiation and policy, there is need for the United States'commitment not only to individual nations but to the notion of a regional collectivity of Caribbean states increasingly oriented toward technical and economic cooperation among themselves and common positions vis-à-vis the industrial bloc.

These nations have expanded their diplomatic ties and are abandoning postures as neo-colonial satellites in favor of positions organized around collective strength, regional priorities and more equitable relations with the West. Their domestic affairs are undergoing deliberate restructuring along more traditional nationalist and socialist lines. Their development policies now press for nationalization of local industries, greater utilization of local manpower and in some restriction of outmigration and external expenditures, freedom of trade choices and cooperative control of world prices of the natural resources shared with other Third World nations toward the end of shifting the locus and control of processing, transportation, marketing, managing, and proprietorship away from the metropolitan states. Like police methods isolated imposition of family planning on these countries is not only ineffective in stemming the flow of immigrants but is counter-productive in terms of the image of this country in relation to the Caribbean. It is only when population control is pursued within the context of comprehensive development plans which includes the above steps, that the Caribbean countries will begin

to effectively approach goals of full employment, more equal opportunities, greater non-economic benefits and better public services for their populations. While such goals may heighten import and sale prices for certain goods and reduce other industries or types of employment opportunities in the United States, they should contribute seriously to the reduction of the causes of massive inflow of immigrants (and illegals) who are said to undercut and displace local American labor.

The already substantial number of Caribbean peoples among the new immigrants -- legal and illegal -- found in the United States is neither accidental, mechanistic, or ahistorical in nature. Caribbean peoples and their lands have played important roles in United States' development in its critical past. The increasing imbalance between population growth and economic development, especially of the smaller island states, threaten stability, impedes advancement, and encourages out-migration. Moral decency simply demands that they not be denied entry and their countries not be refused appropriate American assistance in this critical period of their development. The expectations and direction of movement of Caribbean peoples are also in response to the image of itself propagated by the United States and the varied forms of inducement practiced by its entrepeneur in the region. There is also the growing sense of entitlement and awareness which the modern generations of the Caribbean share with their American counterparts. The world seems small and open to them as a resort, resource or frontier. The metropolis seems a rightful option to them to share and shape as tourists, investors or residents, as intervenors from the metropolis have done in their countries.

There is no need to deny the present economic constraints faced in this country on the domestic level or to dismiss the public concern with increased immigration

at this point in time. Rather, imagine the magnitudinous problems facing the more dependent and less developed countries of the Caribbean. And, imagine a bit further the potential crises which the United States faces, vis-à-vis such embattled and fermenting nations, if immigration were to be suddenly halted or illegals returned en masse.

The American answer, therefore, must be creative. It must go beyond the one-sidedly, negative, premature and too often shortsightedly self-interest concerns, which while couched in economic and demographic terms too often contain strong suggestions of neo-racism, neo-exclusionary sentiments, blatant insensitivity that betray both fear and failure by Americans to think out more fully the complexity of the situation, or the implications of their wilder proposals. Responsible leadership of this nation cannot allow an incomplete but impassioned definition of the situation to lead the country towards creation of policies which lopsidedly stress restrictive laws, compulsory identification, population control and increased police enforcement; thereby causing further injury to the image, value-structure and character of the country, and its relations with its Caribbean neighbors.

Any effort to balance pragmatically imposed limitations with highly regarded social values will require a willingness to accept some of the challenges implied: (1) testing the elasticity of the economy to indeed deal forthrightly with the employment needs of both national and alien minorities now present in the society; (2) reordering the political-economic functions between the United States and the Caribbean neighbors so as to remove the need for so much out-migration from the Caribbean region to the cities and even countryside of this country; (thereby reducing threats of undesired population increase and its economic concommitants). (3) reducing the exploitation of immigrant and minority labor, the artificially induced competition between

them, and other forms of institutional racism which they suffer; (4) modifying the anachronistic monolingual/ monocultural educational programs in order to accommodate the large number of new immigrant/ethnic residents as well as to enhance the functional skills and enrich the cultural repertoire of the native-born population; and, (5) providing appropriate services, decent statuses, and a sense of security and worth to the struggling alien -- in many cases parents of American-born children who will be called upon to serve the country.

When viewed seriously the New Immigration creates a need for the people of the United States to consider the connections between its national and international responsibilities, between its domestic and foreign policies. Domestically there is a need for a more balanced, compassionate and historically sensitive understanding of Caribbean immigration as part of the New Immigration -- since the 1960s. It is the newest chapter in the continued peopling of America (USA) and a movement with which America (USA) has had more to do than ever before. Therefore, current U.S. immigration represents a key problem of interrelated multilateral, multifaceted and multilevel propositions. This consciousness must accompany even the most isolated or obtusely related policy decisions which impinge on the movement of aliens into and within the nation.

The New Immigration as a phenomenon adds to the further cosmopolitization of the United States. It adds another level of linkage with the rest of the emerging world. In that respect it is the source of new cultural and linguistic inputs, new citizenry and manpower, and new challenges of the content, practices and arrangements of the public services and urban governments. It is an infusion of new life, new blood, and may be one of the best investments in international friendship for the future of this country.

Clearly, the new U.S. government must commit

itself to the serious attendance of immigration as a pressing issue of the highest priority. Immigration must become one of the explicit subjects of its future bi-national and international agreements. A key objective of such negotiations should be to arrive at agreeable levels of complementarity in migration policy, development programs and international relations between the United States and these nations. Moreover, new efforts to resolve problems related to new immigration from the Caribbean and other such areas must be pursued within a worldwide frame of reference. Yet, on all these levels the efforts must be sensitive, comprehensive and profound; they must involve the deliberate interplay of relevant research, analysis, planning, policy, public service and administration, civil rights, education, public opinion and morality.

The new U.S. government imbued as it is with instilling a "spirit of hope" should consider, therefore, the diplomatic gains and domestic profits it could derive from an extension of that spirit to the immigrants themselves; the countries and families they leave behind as well as the communities in which they will live; the minorities with which they will interact; and the world as a community and resource in which we all need increasingly to share on more equal and compatible terms. Most of the world seek a "new beginning." The new immigrants among us, both potential and actual, also do have the "human right" to enjoy the progress, prosperity and promises of today's world.

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*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1982 O-393-606/285